Convergence Report 2004 - Technical annex. A Commission services working paper. SEC(2004) 1268. PROVISIONAL LAYOUT The definitive version will be published as European Economy No 6/2004 by unknown
  
 
European Economy 
 
 
 
Convergence Report 2004 – Technical annex 
 
A Commission services working paper 
 
 
 
 
 
SEC(2004)1268 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROVISIONAL LAYOUT 
The definitive version will be published as European Economy No 6/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/convergencereports2004_en.htm 
 Acknowledgements 
 
 
This paper was prepared in the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs under the supervision of 
Klaus Regling, Director-General, and Antonio J. Cabral, Deputy Director-General. 
 
The main contributors to the paper were Johan Baras, Sean Berrigan, Carsten Brzeski, Adriaan Dierx, Christine 
Gerstberger, Alexandr Hobza, Fabienne Ilzkovitz, Filip Keereman, Paul Kutos, Baudouin Lamine, João Nogueira 
Martins, Moises Orellana Pena, Lucio R. Pench, Jiri Plecity, Stéphanie Riso, Delphine Sallard, Charlotte Van 
Hooydonk, Johan Verhaeven and Joachim Wadefjord. 
 
Country-specific contributions were provided by Georg Busch, Juan Ramon Calaf Sole, Nathalie Darnaut, Per 
Eckefeldt, Luis Fau Sebastian, Barbara Kauffmann, Filip Keereman, Viktoria Kovacs, Carlos Martinez Mongay, 
Marek Mora, Willem Noë, Mateja Peternelj, José Luis Robledo Fraga, Agnieszka Skuratowicz, Siegfried Steinlein, 
Kristine Vlagsma, Helga Vogelmann and Ralph Wilkinson. 
 
Charlotte Van Hooydonk edited the paper. Statistical and technical assistance was provided by Vittorio Gargaro, 
Tony Tallon and André Verbanck. 
 Contents 
 
 
1. Introduction and overview.................................................................................................................1 
1.1. Introduction................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.2. Application of the criteria ........................................................................................................... 2 
1.2.1. Legal compatibility ............................................................................................................................... 2 
1.2.2. Price stability......................................................................................................................................... 3 
1.2.3. Government budgetary position ............................................................................................................ 5 
1.2.4. Exchange rate stability .......................................................................................................................... 5 
1.2.5. Long-term interest rate convergence..................................................................................................... 6 
1.2.6. Additional factors.................................................................................................................................. 6 
2. Compatibility of national legislation with the Treaty as well as with the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank .......................................9 
2.1. Introduction................................................................................................................................. 9 
2.2. Scope of necessary adaptation of national legislation................................................................ 9 
2.2.1. General.................................................................................................................................................. 9 
2.2.2. Objectives ........................................................................................................................................... 10 
2.2.3. Independence ...................................................................................................................................... 10 
2.2.4. Integration of NCBs in the ESCB and other legislation...................................................................... 11 
2.2.5. Prohibition of monetary financing ...................................................................................................... 13 
2.2.6. Legislation outside the scope of Article 109 of the Treaty.................................................................. 13 
2.3. Timing of adaptation ................................................................................................................. 13 
2.4. Situation in the Member States ................................................................................................. 14 
2.4.1. Czech Republic ................................................................................................................................... 14 
2.4.1.1. Current legal situation ............................................................................................................... 14 
2.4.1.2. Assessment of compatibility...................................................................................................... 15 
2.4.2. Estonia................................................................................................................................................. 15 
2.4.2.1. Current legal situation ............................................................................................................... 15 
2.4.2.2. Assessment of compatibility...................................................................................................... 16 
2.4.3. Cyprus ................................................................................................................................................. 16 
2.4.3.1. Current legal situation ............................................................................................................... 16 
2.4.3.2. Assessment of compatibility...................................................................................................... 17 
2.4.4. Latvia .................................................................................................................................................. 17 
2.4.4.1. Current legal situation ............................................................................................................... 17 
2.4.4.2. Assessment of compatibility...................................................................................................... 17 
2.4.5. Lithuania ............................................................................................................................................. 18 
2.4.5.1. Current legal situation ............................................................................................................... 18 
2.4.5.2. Assessment of compatibility...................................................................................................... 18 
2.4.6. Hungary............................................................................................................................................... 18 
2.4.6.1. Current legal situation ............................................................................................................... 18 
2.4.6.2. Assessment of compatibility...................................................................................................... 19 
2.4.7. Malta ................................................................................................................................................... 19 
2.4.7.1. Current legal situation ............................................................................................................... 19 
2.4.7.2. Assessment of compatibility...................................................................................................... 20 
2.4.8. Poland ................................................................................................................................................. 20 
2.4.8.1. Current legal situation ............................................................................................................... 20 
2.4.8.2. Assessment of compatibility...................................................................................................... 21 
2.4.9. Slovenia............................................................................................................................................... 21 
2.4.9.1. Current legal situation ............................................................................................................... 21 
2.4.9.2. Assessment of compatibility...................................................................................................... 21 
2.4.10. Slovakia.......................................................................................................................................... 22 
2.4.10.1. Current legal situation ............................................................................................................... 22 
2.4.10.2. Assessment of compatibility...................................................................................................... 22 
2.4.11. Sweden ........................................................................................................................................... 22 
2.4.11.1. Current legal situation ............................................................................................................... 22 
2.4.11.2. Assessment of compatibility...................................................................................................... 23 
 3. Price stability ....................................................................................................................................27 
3.1. The price stability criterion .......................................................................................................27 
3.1.1. Treaty provisions ................................................................................................................................ 27 
3.1.2. Inflation developments in relation to the reference value ................................................................... 27 
3.2. Horizontal analysis of price developments ................................................................................31 
3.2.1. Medium-term developments ............................................................................................................... 31 
3.2.2. Recent trends....................................................................................................................................... 35 
3.3. Convergence towards price stability .........................................................................................37 
3.4. Underlying factors and sustainability of inflation performance................................................37 
3.4.1. Unit labour costs, wages and productivity developments ................................................................... 37 
3.4.2. Import prices ....................................................................................................................................... 43 
3.4.3. Balassa-Samuelson and other effects .................................................................................................. 44 
3.5. Concluding remarks...................................................................................................................45 
4. Government budgetary position......................................................................................................47 
4.1. Convergence criterion ...............................................................................................................47 
4.2. Overview of recent budgetary developments .............................................................................51 
4.2.1. General government accounts ............................................................................................................. 51 
4.2.1.1. General government balance ..................................................................................................... 51 
4.2.1.2. Influence of cyclical conditions and one-off operations............................................................ 52 
4.2.1.3. Government investment expenditure and other components of the government accounts........ 56 
4.2.2. Government gross debt ....................................................................................................................... 57 
4.3. Medium-term prospects .............................................................................................................61 
4.3.1. Convergence programmes................................................................................................................... 61 
4.3.2. Convergence programme projections for the general government balance ........................................ 61 
 Convergence programme projections for the debt ................................................................................... 66 
4.3.3................................................................................................................................................................... 66 
4.4. Developments by Member State.................................................................................................67 
4.4.1. Czech Republic ................................................................................................................................... 67 
4.4.2. Estonia ................................................................................................................................................ 69 
4.4.3. Cyprus................................................................................................................................................. 71 
4.4.4. Latvia .................................................................................................................................................. 73 
4.4.5. Lithuania ............................................................................................................................................. 75 
4.4.6. Hungary .............................................................................................................................................. 77 
4.4.7. Malta ................................................................................................................................................... 79 
4.4.8. Poland ................................................................................................................................................. 80 
4.4.9. Slovenia .............................................................................................................................................. 82 
4.4.10. Slovakia.......................................................................................................................................... 84 
4.4.11. Sweden ........................................................................................................................................... 86 
4.4.11.1. Situation in the 2002 Convergence Report ................................................................................ 86 
4.4.11.2. Assessment of public finances in 2004...................................................................................... 86 
5. Exchange rates ..................................................................................................................................89 
5.1. Treaty provisions and assessment of exchange rate stability ....................................................89 
5.2. Exchange rate movements of Member State currencies ............................................................89 
5.2.1. Overall conditions in exchange markets ............................................................................................. 89 
5.2.2. ERM II currencies............................................................................................................................... 90 
5.2.3. Developments in non-ERM II currencies............................................................................................ 93 
5.2.3.1. The pegged currencies: the Cyprus pound, the Hungarian forint, the Latvian lats and the 
Maltese lira. .................................................................................................................................................. 93 
5.2.3.2. ......The floating currencies: the Czech koruna, the Slovak koruna, the Polish zloty and the Swedish 
krona...........................................................................................................................................................   97 
6. Long-term interest rates ................................................................................................................101 
6.1. Treaty provisions .....................................................................................................................101 
6.2. Interest rate developments in major bond markets and the Member States ............................101 
6.2.1. Global context................................................................................................................................... 101 
6.2.2. Long-term interest rates in the Member States with a derogation..................................................... 102 
6.2.2.1. Overall developments.............................................................................................................. 102 
6.2.2.2. Country-specific developments ............................................................................................... 103 
6.3. Assessment of long-term interest rate convergence in terms of the Treaty criterion...............106 
 
 7. Additional factors ...........................................................................................................................113 
7.1. Results of the integration of markets....................................................................................... 113 
7.1.1. Financial market integration ............................................................................................................. 113 
7.1.1.1. Compliance with EU financial legislation ............................................................................... 114 
7.1.1.2. Financial structure and characteristics..................................................................................... 115 
7.1.1.3. Progress in financial integration .............................................................................................. 116 
7.1.1.3.1 Financial intermediaries......................................................................................................................116 
7.1.1.3.2 Capital markets ...................................................................................................................................119 
7.1.1.4. Conclusion............................................................................................................................... 121 
7.1.2. Product market integration................................................................................................................ 121 
7.1.2.1. Trade and FDI.......................................................................................................................... 121 
7.1.2.2. Implementation of the Internal Market.................................................................................... 124 
7.2. Situation and development of the current account of the balance of payments ...................... 127 
 
 List of Tables 
 
Table 1.1 Current performance of the eleven Member States in relation to convergence 
Table 2.1 Current situation in the eleven Member States in relation to legal compatibility 
Table 3.1 Inflation convergence – August 2004 
Table 3.2 Evolution of the inflation reference value 
Table 3.3 Labour costs 
Table 3.4 Import prices 
Table 4.1 General government balance 
Table 4.2 Main features of the government account 
Table 4.3 General government gross debt 
Table 4.4 Convergence programme projections for the general government balance 
Table 4.5 Convergence programme projections for the general government gross debt 
Table 4.6 Convergence of debt ratios in Cyprus and Malta 
Table 4.7 Czech Republic: budgetary developments 
Table 4.8 Estonia: budgetary developments 
Table 4.9 Cyprus: budgetary developments 
Table 4.10 Latvia: budgetary developments 
Table 4.11 Lithuania: budgetary developments 
Table 4.12 Hungary: budgetary developments 
Table 4.13 Malta: budgetary developments 
Table 4.14 Poland: budgetary developments 
Table 4.15 Slovenia: budgetary developments 
Table 4.16 Slovakia: budgetary developments 
Table 4.17 Sweden: budgetary developments 
Table 6.1 Development of long-term interest rates 
Table 7.1 New Member States’ state of adoption of financial market related acquis upon EU entry 
Table 7.2 Current account of the balance of payments 
Table 7.3 Net foreign direct investment 
 
List of Graphs 
 
Graph 1.1 Key convergence indicators 
Graph 3.1 Comparison of Member States’ average inflation rates (HICP) with reference value 
Graph 3.2 Inflation rates (HICP) in the Member States 
Graph 3.3 Inflation and wage trends 
Graph 4.1 General government balance and economic growth 
Graph 4.2 Government debt dynamics 
Graph 5.1 Euro against US dollar, Japanese yen, pound and Danish krone 
Graph 5.2 ERM II currencies, spread against central rate and nominal effective exchange rate 
Graph 5.3 Exchange rate of the pegged currencies 
Graph 5.4 Pegged currencies: bilateral exchange rate against the euro and nominal effective exchange rate 
Graph 5.5 Floating currencies: bilateral exchange rate against the euro and nominal effective exchange rate 
Graph 6.1 Nominal long-term interest rates for the convergence assessment 
Graph 6.2 Comparison of average long-term interest rate with reference rate 
Graph 7.1 Comparison of financial structures in the new Member States and Sweden 
Graph 7.2 Share of foreign-owned banks and foreign currency loans in CEE new Member States 
Graph 7.3 Insurance assets and insurances penetration 
Graph 7.4 Basic characteristics of bond markets 
Graph 7.5 Basic characteristics of the equity market 
Graph 7.6 Trade openness – goods 
Graph 7.7 Intra-EU trade 
Graph 7.8 Total FDI inflows 
Graph 7.9 Price convergence between EU Member States 
Graph 7.10 Transposition deficit (May 2004) 
Graph 7.11 Current account – Net international investment position 
 
 List of Boxes 
 
Box 1.1  Article 122(2) of the Treaty 
Box 4.1  Excessive deficit procedure 
Box 4.2 Pension reforms, the classification of pension schemes and the government balance 
Box 5.1 Euro central rates and compulsory intervention rates in ERM II 
Box 6.1  Data for the interest rate convergence criterion 
 
 
 Abbreviations and symbols used 
 
 
 
Member States 
BE Belgium 
CZ Czech Republic 
DK  Denmark 
DE Germany 
EE Estonia  
EL  Greece 
ES  Spain 
FR  France 
IE  Ireland 
IT  Italy 
CY Cyprus 
LV Latvia 
LT Lithuania 
LU  Luxembourg 
HU Hungary 
MT Malta 
NL  The Netherlands 
AT  Austria 
PL Poland 
PT  Portugal 
SI Slovenia 
SK Slovakia 
FI  Finland 
SE  Sweden 
UK  United Kingdom 
 
EUR-12  European Union Member States having adopted the single currency (BE, DE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, 
AT, PT, FI) 
EU-25  European Union, 25 Member States 
EU-15   European Union, 15 Member States before 1 May 2004 (EUR-12 plus DK, SE and UK) 
 
 
Currencies 
EUR  euro 
ECU  European currency unit 
CYP Cyprus pound 
CZK Czech koruna 
DEM German mark 
DKK  Danish krone 
EEK Estonian kroon 
GBP  pound sterling 
HUF forint 
JPY  Japanese yen 
LTL litas 
LVL lats 
MTL Maltese lira 
PLN zloty 
SIT tolar 
SDR special drawing right 
SEK  Swedish krona 
SKK Slovak koruna 
USD  US dollar 
 
 
 
 Other abbreviations 
 
CPI consumer price index 
ECB European Central Bank 
EMU economic and monetary union 
ERM exchange rate mechanism 
Eurostat Statistical Office of the European Communities 
FDI foreign direct investment 
GDP gross domestic product 
GFCF gross fixed capital formation 
HICP harmonised index of consumer prices 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IPO initial public offering 
 
 
 

 1
1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1.1. Introduction 
A smooth functioning of economic and monetary union 
(EMU) requires a high degree of convergence among 
the participating countries. In a single-currency area, 
convergence will ensure that the single interest rate set 
at the level of the EMU is appropriate for all its 
participants. Furthermore, when the economic and 
monetary union is hit by a shock, a high degree of 
convergence limits the emergence of asymmetric 
economic developments at the country level, to which 
not any longer can be responded by using the exchange 
rate. Recognising the importance of convergence, the 
Treaty specifies the criteria to be evaluated and requires 
the Commission and the ECB to make a report. On 1 
May 2004, ten new countries joined the European 
Union (EU). It was an historical step in the further 
integration of Europe, because of the sheer size of the 
enlargement and because the new countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe had to undergo a transition 
process from centrally-planned to market economies. 
They went through comprehensive adjustments and 
moved a long way in converging to the rest of the EU, 
but important disparities remain as captured by on 
average lower income per capita levels. This report 
makes for the first time an assessment of the 
convergence criteria applied to the new countries1. 
The single currency, the euro, was introduced on 
1 January 1999. This was the result of several years of 
successful adjustment efforts by the Member States to 
achieve the high degree of sustainable convergence 
required for the stability and success of the new 
currency. The decision2 by the Council (of Heads of 
State or Government) on 3 May 1998 in Brussels on the 
eleven Member States ready to participate in the single 
currency from the beginning had, in accordance with 
the Treaty (Article 121(4)), been prepared by the Ecofin 
Council on a recommendation from the Commission 
and was based on the two convergence reports made by 
the Commission3 and the European Monetary Institute 
(EMI)4. These reports, prepared in accordance with 
                                                 
1 The current report makes use of economic data and information 
available up to 6 October 2004. 
2 OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 30. 
3 Report on progress towards convergence and recommendation 
with a view to the transition to the third stage of economic and 
monetary union, COM(1998)1999 final, 25 March 1998. 
4 European Monetary Institute, Convergence Report,  March 1998. 
Article 121(1) of the Treaty, examined in considerable 
detail whether the Member States satisfied the 
convergence criteria and met the legal requirements5. 
Member States which are assessed as not fulfilling the 
necessary conditions for the adoption of the single 
currency have a derogation. In 1998, two Member 
States had a derogation, namely Greece and Sweden. 
Article 122(2) of the Treaty lays down provisions and 
procedures for re-examining the situation of Member 
States with a derogation (see Box 1.1). At least once 
every two years, or at the request of a Member State 
with a derogation, both the Commission and the 
European Central Bank (ECB) are required to prepare a 
new convergence report on such Member States. 
Box 1.1: Article 122(2) of the Treaty 
At least once every two years, or at the request of a 
Member State with a derogation, the Commission and 
the ECB shall report to the Council in accordance with 
the procedure laid down in Article 121(1). After 
consulting the European Parliament and after 
discussion in the Council, meeting in the composition of 
the Heads of State or Government, the Council shall, 
acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission, decide which Member States with a 
derogation fulfil the necessary conditions on the basis 
of the criteria set out in Article 121(1), and abrogate 
the derogations of the Member States concerned. 
                                                 
5 Denmark and the United Kingdom were not the subject of a 
formal assessment because of their opt-out arrangements. 
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Greece submitted a request on 9 March 2000 for its 
convergence situation to be re-examined. The Ecofin 
Council adopted the decision6 that Greece fulfilled the 
necessary conditions for adoption of the single currency 
on 19 June in Santa Maria da Feira. The decision was 
taken, having regard to the discussion of the Council, 
meeting in the composition of Heads of State or 
Government, and had, in accordance with the Treaty 
(Article 122(2)), been prepared on a proposal from the 
Commission. The decision was based on the two 
convergence reports made by the Commission7 and the 
ECB8. Greece adopted the single currency with effect 
from 1 January 2001. 
Sweden was re-assessed by the Commission and the 
ECB, both in 20009 and 200210 as not fulfilling the 
necessary conditions for the adoption of the single 
currency and continues to be referred to as a “Member 
State with a derogation”. Two years have elapsed since 
the last reports were made by the Commission and the 
ECB (22 May 2002) and so Sweden is due for re-
examination. 
In accordance with Article 4 of the Treaty of Accession, 
the ten countries that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 are 
“Member States with a derogation”. Although the 
maximum period referred to in Article 122(2) of the 
Treaty has not elapsed, the timing of the re-examination 
of Sweden is seized as an opportunity to analyse also 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. Two 
other Member States do not participate in the euro. 
Denmark and the United Kingdom negotiated opt-out 
arrangements before the adoption of the Maastricht 
Treaty (Protocols attached to the Treaty). Until these 
Member States indicate that they wish to join the single 
currency, they are not the subject of an assessment by 
the Council as to whether they fulfil the necessary 
conditions. Such a wish was not expressed by Denmark 
and the United Kingdom and the present report by the 
Commission does not deal with them. 
                                                 
6 OJ L 167, 7.7.2000, p. 19. 
7 European Commission, Convergence Report 2000, COM(2000) 
277 final, 3 May 2000. 
8 European Central Bank, Convergence Report 2000, May 2000. 
9 See footnotes 7 and 8 respectively. 
10 European Commission, Convergence Report 2002, COM(2002) 
243 final, 22 May 2002 and European Central Bank, Convergence 
Report 2002,  May 2002 respectively. 
1.2. Application of the criteria 
In accordance with Article 121(1) of the Treaty, the 
convergence reports shall have to include an 
examination of the compatibility of national legislation 
with the Treaty as well as with the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the 
European Central Bank. The reports shall have to 
further examine the achievement of a high degree of 
sustainable convergence by reference to the fulfilment 
of the four convergence criteria dealing with price 
stability, the government budgetary position, exchange 
rate stability and the long-term interest rate. Finally, the 
reports shall have to take into account some additional 
factors. 
1.2.1. Legal compatibility 
Chapter 2 of this Working Paper assesses the 
compatibility between a Member State’s legislation, 
including the statutes of its national central bank, and 
Articles 108 and 109 of the Treaty and the Statute of the 
ESCB/ECB. This legal examination mainly covers three 
areas. First, the objectives of the national central banks 
(NCBs) must be examined, in order to verify their 
compatibility with the objectives of the ESCB as 
formulated in Article 105(1) and Article 2 of the Statute 
of the ESCB/ECB. The ESCB’s primary objective is to 
maintain price stability. Without prejudice to this 
objective, it shall support the general economic policies 
in the Community. Second, the independence of the 
national central banks and of the members of their 
decision-making bodies (cf. Article 108) must be 
assessed. This assessment notably covers all issues 
linked to an NCB’s institutional and financial 
independence and to the personal independence of the 
members of its decision-making bodies. Third, the 
integration of the NCBs into the ESCB has to be 
examined, in order to ensure that the NCBs act in 
accordance with the ECB’s guidelines and instructions 
once the country concerned has adopted the single 
currency. 
It appears that none of the eleven Member States being 
examined is fully compliant in all areas that form part 
of legal compatibility. 
Chapter 1 
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1.2.2. Price stability 
The assessment of price stability and inflation 
convergence (see Chapter 3) is based on the harmonised 
index of consumer prices (HICP). The average rate of 
inflation in each Member State has been calculated as 
the percentage change in the arithmetic average HICP 
of the latest 12 month relative to the average index of 
the preceding period. Based on the available 
information (August 2004), the reference value has 
been calculated for the purpose of this report as the 
simple arithmetic average of the average inflation rates 
in the following three best-performing Member States 
plus 1.5 percentage point: Finland, Denmark and 
Sweden. Although the average inflation rate at the 
moment of the examination was lower in Lithuania (-
0.2 percent), this country has been excluded from the 
calculation of the reference value because countries 
with negative inflation rates are not considered to be 
best performers in terms of price stability. Calculated in 
this way the reference value was 2.4 percent. Of the 
eleven Member States assessed in this report, five are 
below this reference value, namely the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Lithuania and Sweden. For 
comparison, the euro area 12 month average over the 
same period was 2.1 percent. 
The factors underlying the inflation developments in the 
eleven countries under review vary considerably. From 
inflation rates ranging in the hundreds in some of the 
former transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, all countries achieved in recent years single-
digit inflation levels. A clear policy orientation towards 
nominal stability has been key. In Cyprus and Malta, 
where price movements were much less dramatic, 
inflation was in particular influenced by international 
price developments and wages. In Sweden, the stability-
oriented macroeconomic policy, including an inflation 
targeting regime, contributed to maintaining low 
inflation.
Table 1.1
Current performance of the Member States in relation to convergence
Legal Inflation Government budgetary position Exchange Long-term
compatibility Existence Deficit(2) Debt rates interest
HICP(1) of an (% of GDP) (% of GDP) ERM II rates(3)
excessive participation
September August deficit Change from previous year September August
2004 2004 2003 2003 2003 2002 2001 2004 2004
Reference value 2.4(4) 3 60 6.4(5)
Czech Republic no 1.8 yes(6) 12.6 37.8 9.0 3.5 7.1 no 4.7
Estonia no 2.0 no -3.1 5.3 0.0 0.9 -0.3 yes(7) 4.6(8)
Cyprus no 2.1 yes(6) 6.4 70.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 no 5.2
Latvia no 4.9 no 1.5 14.4 0.3 -0.8 2.0 no 5.0
Lithuania no -0.2 no 1.9 21.4 -1.0 -0.5 -0.9 yes(7) 4.7
Hungary no 6.5 yes(6) 6.2 59.1 1.9 3.7 -1.9 no 8.1
Malta no 2.6 yes(6) 9.7 71.1 8.4 0.5 5.8 no 4.7
Poland no 2.5 yes(6) 3.9 45.4 4.3 4.4 -0.1 no 6.9
Slovenia no 4.1 no 2.0 29.4 -0.1 1.4 0.7 yes(7) 5.2
Slovakia no 8.4 yes(6) 3.7 42.6 -0.7 -5.4 -1.2 no 5.1
Sweden no 1.3 no -0.3 52.0 -0.6 -1.8 1.6 no 4.7
EUR-12 2.1 2.7 70.7 1.3 -0.1 -0.9 4.3
EU-25 2.1 2.8 63.3 1.7 -0.5 -0.8 4.6
(2) A negative sign indicates a surplus
(3) 10-year benchmark bonds on government debt; average of the last 12 months.
(6) Council decision of 5 July 2004.
(7) Since 28 June 2004.
(8) Bank lending rates; not directly comparable with long-term interest rate data for the other Member States.
Source : Commission services 
(1) Percentage change in arithmetic average of the latest 12 monthly harmonised indices of consumer prices (HICP) relative to arithmetic average of the 12 monthly HICP of the 
previous 12 months.
(4) Definition adopted in this report: simple arithmetic average of the inflation rates of the three Member States with the lowest positive inflation rate plus 1.5 percentage points.  
Lithuania with falling prices has been excluded from the calculation of the reference value.
(5) Definition adopted in this report: simple arithmetic average of the 12-month average of the interest rates of the three Member States used for the calculation of the inflation 
reference value plus 2 percentage points.
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Graph 1.1
Key convergence indicators
Source : Commission services 
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1.2.3. Government budgetary position 
The assessment of the criterion on the government 
budgetary position, discussed in Chapter 4, is linked to 
the decisions made in accordance with the excessive 
deficit procedure in Article 104 of the Treaty. 
Specifically, a Member State is considered to have 
attained sustainable convergence if it has achieved a 
budgetary position without an excessive deficit. In turn, 
the existence of an excessive deficit is determined in 
relation to the two criteria for budgetary discipline set in 
Article 104, namely on the government deficit and the 
government debt. 
The situation of the eleven Member States covered by 
the report is as follows. In 2003, the Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia all 
recorded a general government deficit in excess of the 3 
percent of GDP Treaty reference value; the remaining 
five Member States had either a lower deficit or a 
surplus. Cyprus and Malta also did not respect the 
government debt criterion in 2003, as they posted debt 
ratios above the 60 percent of GDP Treaty reference 
value. 
Based on this prima facie evidence for the existence of 
an excessive deficit, the Commission initiated the 
excessive deficit procedure for the Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia in May 
2004. On 5 July 2004, the Council decided11, on a 
recommendation from the Commission, that an 
excessive deficit existed in these six Member States. 
They therefore do not fulfil the budgetary convergence 
criterion. The other Member States covered by the report 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Sweden) are 
not the subject of such a Council decision and therefore 
fulfil the criterion. 
In accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact12, the 
Member States in the report have submitted for 
examination by the Council their convergence 
                                                 
11 See website on the Stability and Growth Pact maintained by the 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/m
ain_en.htm. 
12  Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1). 
programmes13, containing the government’s medium-
term budgetary plans. In particular, the programmes of 
the six Member States found in breach of the criteria for 
budgetary discipline outline the strategies for the 
correction of this situation, including annual targets for 
deficit and debt. At the same time as deciding on the 
existence of an excessive deficit, the Council adopted, 
on a recommendation from the Commission, 
recommendations to each of the six Member States on 
how to correct this situation14. In line with the strategies 
contained in the respective programmes, Cyprus is 
recommended to bring its deficit below 3 percent of 
GDP already in 2005 and Malta in 2006, whereas 
Poland and Slovakia should correct their excessive 
deficits by 2007 and the Czech Republic and Hungary 
by 2008. 
In most Member States no clear trends emerge for 
government balances in recent years. While only two 
Member States, namely Estonia and Sweden, have 
generally maintained a balanced or surplus position, a 
gradual trend towards fiscal consolidation is visible in 
the other Member States fulfilling the budgetary 
convergence criterion (Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia). 
In 2004 a reduction of the deficit is expected in the 
Member States not fulfilling the budgetary criterion 
except Slovakia and Poland. Increased deficits or 
reduced surpluses are expected in the other Member 
States. While the government debt ratio remains below 
the 60 percent of GDP reference value in all the eleven 
Member States except Malta and Cyprus, over the last 
five years it has increased significantly also in the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Slovakia and remains only slightly 
below the reference value in Hungary. In 2004 the debt 
ratio is projected to increase further in all the Member 
States with significant stocks of debt except Hungary. 
1.2.4. Exchange rate stability 
The Treaty refers to the exchange rate criterion as the 
observance of the normal fluctuation margins of the 
exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European 
Monetary System for at least two years without severe 
tensions and in particular without devaluing against the 
currency of any other Member State. As in previous 
reports, the assessment of this criterion (see Chapter 5) 
                                                 
13  The ten new Member States submitted their first convergence 
programmes in May 2004. Sweden submitted the most recent 
update of its convergence programme in December 2003. 
14 See footnote 11. 
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takes into account the regime change which occurred 
with the introduction of the euro at the beginning of 
199915, verifies the participation in ERM II (the 
successor of ERM when the euro was introduced) and 
examines exchange rate behaviour within the 
mechanism. 
On 28 June 2004, the Estonian kroon, Lithuanian litas 
and Slovenian tolar joined ERM II with a standard 
fluctuation band of ±15 percent around their central rate. 
Over the period of reference, Estonia and Lithuania have 
successfully maintained their currency board within 
ERM II while the Slovenian tolar, after having 
continuously depreciated against the euro in the previous 
years, has remained very stable. 
The Cyprus pound, Czech koruna, Hungarian forint, 
Cyprus pound, Latvian lats, Maltese lira, Polish zloty, 
Swedish krona, and Slovak koruna and Swedish krona 
have not yet joined ERM II. These currencies are 
characterised by different exchange rate regimes. While 
three out of four pegged currencies, namely the Cyprus 
pound, the Latvian lats, and the Maltese lira and the 
Cyprus pound, have displayed in recent years a fairly 
stable development vis-à-vis their anchor currencies 
(respectively the SDR, a currency basket and the euro), 
the peg of the Hungarian forint to the euro has been less 
stable in a context of increasing inflation and substantial 
fiscal deficits. Among the floating currencies, the Czech 
koruna and Swedish krona were relatively stable against 
the euro in the last two years, while the Slovak koruna 
strengthened and the Polish zloty initially depreciated 
but appreciated recently. 
The minimum stay of two years in ERM II is not 
respected by any of the eleven countries examined, and 
hence none fulfil the exchange rate criterion. 
1.2.5. Long-term interest rate convergence 
The criterion on the durability of convergence as 
reflected in long-term interest rates (see Chapter 6), is 
based on the assessment of interest rates on 10-year 
government benchmark bonds, using an average rate 
over the latest 12 months. Due to the absence of 
harmonised benchmark bonds or comparable securities 
in Estonia, partially linked to the low level of 
                                                 
15 See Annex D of “Convergence report 2000”, COM (2000) 277 
final, 3 May 2000. 
government debt in that country, an interest rate 
indicator has been identified. 
The reference value has been calculated as the simple 
arithmetic average of the long-term interest rates of the 
three best-performing Member States in terms of price 
stability plus 2 percentage points. In August 2004, the 
reference value was 6.4 percent, which is respected by 
eight of the ten Member States for which long-term 
interest data are available: the Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia and 
Sweden. 
The interest rate indicator in Estonia, based on long-term 
bank lending rates, was in the year to August 2004 on 
average 4.6 percent, which is, however, not directly 
comparable to the reference value of 6.4 percent. Based 
on the analysis of developments in the interest rate 
indicator and taking into account, inter alia, the low 
level of government debt, there are no reasons to 
conclude that Estonia would not fulfil the long-term 
interest criterion. 
Long-term interest rates in Sweden have been relatively 
stable, while in the new Member States, they generally 
declined in the last two years reflecting success in 
macroeconomic stabilisation. In Hungary and Poland, 
the process of interest rate convergence has been 
interrupted in the second half of 2003 on concerns about 
the authorities’ resolve to tackle the mounting 
government deficits. 
1.2.6. Additional factors 
The Treaty also requires an examination of other factors 
relevant to economic integration and convergence. 
These additional factors, which are, however, not 
necessary conditions for adopting the euro, are discussed 
in Chapter 7. They include the results of financial and 
product market integration and the development of the 
balance of payments. The examination of the 
development of unit labour costs and other price indices, 
which is also prescribed by Article 121 of the Treaty, is 
covered in the chapter on price stability16.  
                                                 
16 Among the factors of which the convergence reports also have to 
take account is “the development of the ecu”. The provision can be 
considered obsolete following the irrevocable fixing of the parities 
between the participating national currencies and the ecu and the 
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The development and structure of the financial systems 
in the countries under review varies considerably, with 
Sweden being the most developed followed by Cyprus 
and Malta, which have well-established off-shore 
centres. Financial integration between the Member 
States assessed in this report and the euro area is quite 
advanced. Reflecting this, the euro is already playing an 
important role as a financing and investment currency in 
the new Member States. Functional links with euro area 
equity markets have been established as part of a process 
of global integration. Foreign ownership in the banking 
sector is more higher in the new Member States than in 
most of the euro area countries. Only in Slovenia, 
foreign-owned banks account for less than half of total 
assets and capital, compared to more than 80 percent in 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia. 
This high degree of foreign ownership should foster a 
further modernisation of the financial sector in the new 
Member States and help to sustain their nominal and real 
convergence towards the euro area, but will require 
adequate cross-border cooperation in prudential 
supervision. 
Product markets in the new Member States underwent a 
considerable structural change in the last 15 years, 
induced by the transition towards a fully-fledged market 
economy and by the process of integration with the EU. 
These developments contributed in particular to greater 
competition on product markets, which should facilitate 
economic stabilisation in case of asymmetric shocks. 
Sweden remains well integrated in the EU economy.  
                                                                             
converting of the ecu at one-to-one with the euro on 1 January 
1999. 
Product market integration is measured through trade, 
foreign direct investment (FDI), merger and acquisition 
(M&A) activity and the functioning of the Internal 
Market. The degree of trade openness of the new 
Member States is high compared to EU-15 countries and 
the EU-15 is their major trading partner. The relative 
importance of intra-EU trade declined somewhat in 
Sweden in line with the overall trend in the EU-15. The 
Member States under review received considerable FDI 
inflows, also in the form of intensified M&A activity, 
which can be associated with a transfer of know-how. 
The EU-15 Member States account for around ¾ of the 
FDI stocks invested in the new Members States. The 
gradual adoption of the Internal Market acquis has 
contributed to an improved framework for competition 
in the new Member States, but there is still some way to 
go. 
Recently, current accounts deteriorated in most of the 
new Member States, but sustainability does not appear 
in general to be an issue. In particular, in the Baltic 
States, wide current account deficits are observed in the 
Baltic States and Hungary. The risk of a balance of 
payments crisis is reduced as current account deficits 
have been linked to a strong investment activity 
underlying the catching-up process and improving the 
export potential. Furthermore, FDI inflows, which are 
more stable than short-term capital flows, have to an 
important extent financed the current account deficits in 
the new Member States. 
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2. COMPATIBILITY OF NATIONAL LEGISLATION WITH THE TREATY AS WELL AS WITH THE STATUTE OF 
THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM OF CENTRAL BANKS AND OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
2.1. Introduction 
According to the second sentence of Article 121(1) of 
the Treaty, the convergence report “shall include an 
examination of the compatibility between each Member 
State’s national legislation, including the statutes of its 
national central bank, and Articles 108 and 109 of this 
Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB/ECB”17. 
The present chapter is devoted to this examination. 
Section 2.2 describes the scope of the adaptations that 
are necessary to bring national legislation in line with 
the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB/ECB and 
provides a summary description of the main problems 
encountered in the legislation of the eleven countries 
under review. Section 2.3 deals with the timing aspects 
of the necessary legal adjustments. Section 2.4 provides 
a country-by-country assessment of the compatibility of 
national legislation with the Treaty and the Statute, with 
a particular focus on national legislation regarding the 
central bank. 
A summary table of the adjustments to be made by each 
country, covering both the incompatibilities and 
imperfections, concludes the chapter. 
2.2. Scope of necessary adaptation of 
national legislation 
2.2.1. General 
As from 1 January 1999, the competence for monetary 
policy, exchange rate policy and monetary law has been 
transferred from participating Member States to the 
Community level. Naturally, provisions referring to 
national competence in these fields and setting up 
national rules are numerous in any jurisdiction. Article 
109 of the Treaty reads: “Each Member shall ensure, at 
the latest at the date of the establishment of the ESCB, 
that its national legislation, including the statutes of its 
national central bank is compatible with this Treaty and 
the Statute of the ESCB”. 
                                                 
17  ESCB = European system of central banks. 
The method by which compatibility is achieved is not 
specified in the Treaty. Possible methods are repealing 
of incompatible national provisions, incorporation in 
national law of language reflecting Treaty or 
ESCB/ECB Statute provisions, reference to such 
provisions or a combination thereof. 
The examination can be divided into three main areas: 
-  objectives of national central banks (NCBs) 
(Article 105(1) of the Treaty); 
-  independence (Article 108 of the Treaty); 
- integration of the NCBs into the ESCB. 
Other issues linked to the prohibition of monetary 
financing (Article 101 of the Treaty) and the prohibition 
of privileged access (Article 102 of the Treaty) will also 
be raised whenever appropriate. 
As far as the new Member States are concerned, part of 
these Treaty provisions was considered as acquis 
communautaire to be implemented in legislation by the 
candidate countries prior to accession. This notably 
covered the implementation of the statutory objectives 
of the ESCB and central bank independence. While 
compliance in these areas was already required at the 
date of accession, the convergence assessment covers 
the various elements of this acquis since national 
legislations could have been amended in the meantime. 
After completing this “baseline assessment”, the 
Commission verifies the integration into national 
legislation of the elements which were not considered as 
part of the acquis to be implemented prior to accession, 
in particular the full integration of the NCBs into the 
ESCB as from the date of adoption of the euro. 
The report distinguishes two types of legal difficulties: 
genuine “incompatibilities” and mere “imperfections”: 
- “incompatibilities” exist when national 
legislation is not compliant, e.g. is in 
contradiction with the Treaty and the 
ESCB/ECB Statute; 
- “imperfections” refer to elements in national 
legislation which are not explicitly in 
contradiction with the Treaty, but could be 
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usefully completed, clarified or made more 
precise. 
2.2.2. Objectives 
The objectives of an NCB must be compatible with the 
objectives of the ESCB as formulated in Article 105(1) 
of the Treaty (and Article 2 of the Statute of the 
ESCB/ECB): “The primary objective of the ESCB shall 
be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the 
objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the 
general economic policies in the Community with a view 
to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of 
the Community as laid down in Article 2 [of the 
Treaty]”. 
References in national law to the policy of the 
government or to specific macroeconomic objectives are 
not incompatible provided that the primacy of the first 
objective as well as definition of the second objective of 
Article 105 of the Treaty is respected. 
The primacy of price stability is fully recognised by the 
national central banks of all eleven Member States. As 
regards the definition of the secondary objective, 
imperfections subsist in many national legislations being 
examined (see Table 2.1 at the end of this chapter). In 
some cases, no reference is made to the ESCB’s 
secondary objective, while in other instances reference 
is only made to national economic policies as opposed to 
the general economic policies of the Community. 
2.2.3. Independence 
Article 108 of the Treaty ensures that the ESCB will 
operate free from instructions from third parties. It reads 
as follows: “When exercising the powers and carrying 
out the tasks and duties conferred upon them by this 
Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB/ECB, neither the 
ECB nor a national central bank, nor any member of 
their decision-making bodies shall seek or take 
instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from 
any government of a Member State or from any other 
body. The Community Institutions and bodies and the 
governments of the Member States undertake to respect 
this principle and not to seek to influence the members 
of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the 
national central banks in the performance of their 
tasks”. 
The different features which make up independence may 
be grouped into three categories: institutional, personal 
and financial independence. 
(i) Institutional independence 
This category includes, for instance, the absence of any 
right of a body external to the NCB, as far as ESCB-
related tasks are concerned: 
- to give instructions to a NCB; 
- to approve, suspend, annul or defer a decision 
of a NCB; 
- to censor decisions of a NCB on legal 
grounds; 
- to participate in decision-making bodies of a 
NCB with a right to vote; 
- to be consulted before a NCB takes a 
decision. 
The legislation of Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Malta is fully compliant as regards the institutional 
independence of their respective national central banks, 
while some imperfections subsist in the Czech Republic 
(the right for the Parliament to reject the annual financial 
report or to request modifications), Hungary (the 
Ministry of Justice has the right to review legislative 
acts of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank), Poland (the Act does 
not explicitly refer to the independence of the National 
Bank of Poland’s decision-making bodies, while it 
emphasizes the collaboration between the Bank and the 
state authorities), Slovenia (the nature of the 
government’s involvement with respect to the 
management of the Bank of Slovenia’s foreign exchange 
assets should be clarified), Slovakia (the right for the 
Parliament to oblige the National Bank of Slovakia to 
modify its annual report) and Sweden (prohibition of 
seeking or taking instructions only on monetary policy 
issues and division of powers not clearly defined). 
(ii) Personal independence 
Certain rules are imposed on national legislation by 
virtue of Article 14(2) of the Statute of the ESCB/ECB: 
- the term of office for the governor must be at 
least five years; 
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- a governor may be relieved from office if he 
no longer fulfils the conditions required for 
the performance of his duties or if he has been 
guilty of serious misconduct; he moreover 
benefits of a right of judicial review. 
In view of Article 108 of the Treaty, which covers all 
members of the decision-making bodies, these rules 
should not only apply to the governor, but also to the 
other members who are involved in the performance of 
ESCB-related tasks. Where a member of a decision-
making body with ESCB-related tasks exercises 
functions outside this body, his or her independence 
may, depending on the nature of such functions, be 
jeopardised. 
The Central Bank laws and/or Constitution of Cyprus, 
Lithuania, Malta and Sweden are fully compliant in 
respect of personal independence, while the legislation 
of the seven other countries being examined contains 
some imperfections. In particular, the grounds for 
dismissal of the governors and of the other members of 
the decision-making bodies should be brought more 
closely into line with the provisions of Article 14(2) of 
the ESCB/ECB Statute (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia). 
Further imperfections also subsist in relation to the 
possible judicial review for the other members of the 
decision-making bodies (Czech Republic). In Estonia, 
the deputy governor’s rights should be protected more 
adequately, 
(iii) Financial independence 
An NCB must be financially accountable. However, a 
right for an external body to control ex ante the NCB’s 
budget may, depending on the context, create a situation 
where an NCB is unable to fulfil its ESCB-related tasks 
independently. Similarly, a right for a third party to 
amend, approve or reject the NCB’s budget and annual 
accounts or to control the distribution of the NCB’s 
profits (or capital and/or reserves) would be contrary to 
the principle of the NCB’s financial independence. More 
specifically, in those countries where third parties and/or 
parliament are in such a position, directly or indirectly, 
to exercise influence on the determination of an NCB’s 
budget, annual accounts or the distribution of profit, the 
relevant statutory provisions should contain a safeguard 
clause ensuring that this does not impede the proper 
performance of the NCB’s ESCB-related tasks. 
The relevant national legislation in the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Slovenia and Slovakia is compatible with the financial 
independence requirement. An incompatibility in this 
area can still be found in the Riksbank Act of Sweden 
(profits of the Riksbank are allocated by the Riksdag). 
An imperfection subsists in Poland (annual accounts are 
submitted for approval to the Council of Ministers). 
2.2.4. Integration of NCBs in the ESCB and 
other legislation 
According to Article 9(2) of the Statute of the 
ESCB/ECB, the ECB shall ensure that the tasks 
conferred upon the ESCB are implemented either by its 
own activities or through the NCBs. Furthermore, 
according to Article 14(3) ESCB/ECB, the NCBs are an 
integral part of the ESCB, and they shall act in 
accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the 
ECB as from the date of adoption of the euro. Therefore, 
provisions in the statutes of NCBs which stand in the 
way of the NCBs assuming their role need to be adapted 
under Article 109 of the Treaty. 
The ECB is moreover endowed with legislative powers 
(Article 110 of the Treaty and Article 34 ESCB/ECB) in 
order to carry out the tasks entrusted to it and can adopt 
regulations, decisions, recommendations and opinions 
which have effect in the euro area Member States. 
Provisions in national law which are in contradiction 
with the transfer of these powers from the national to the 
Community level as from the date of introduction of the 
euro should be adapted accordingly. 
The integration requirement thus implies that, as a 
minimum, all legal provisions concerned should be 
rendered obsolete as from the date of entry into the euro 
area. In addition, specific provisions from the Treaty and 
the ESCB/ECB Statute (or references thereto) could be 
reflected into national legislation, notably for 
clarification purposes. 
The following sections classify and explain the main 
problems encountered in relation to integration into the 
ESCB. As certain types of difficulties exist in the 
legislation of a large number of Member States, they 
will be discussed in greater detail in the country-specific 
assessments in section 2.4 below. 
(i) General issues 
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In order to properly reflect that the different NCBs form 
an integral part of the ESCB and have to act in 
accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the 
ECB as from the date of adoption of the euro, it is 
appropriate to include an explicit provision to this effect 
in the different NCB acts (as is for instance the case in 
the relevant legislation of the Czech Republic, Lithuania 
and Slovenia). 
In some countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia and 
Slovakia), the legislation does not fully reflect the 
ECB’s legislative powers stemming from Article 110 of 
the Treaty, including the possibility to impose fines and 
periodic penalty payments, and these incompatibilities 
should therefore be removed. 
 (ii) Definition and implementation of monetary 
policy 
With the exception of Slovenia, all other countries being 
examined fail to acknowledge the ESCB’s competence 
for the definition and implementation of monetary 
policy as from the date of introduction of the euro. The 
relevant provisions should therefore be made compatible 
with Article 105 of the Treaty and Article 12(1) 
ESCB/ECB. 
(iii) Foreign exchange operations; definition of 
foreign exchange policy 
The national legislation of Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia does not recognise the ESCB’s role in respect 
of the conduct of foreign exchange operations (Article 
105(2) of the Treaty) and needs to be made compatible 
in this respect. 
With respect to the definition of foreign exchange 
policy, the legislation in all countries except Slovenia 
fails to allow for the Council, by virtue of Article 111 of 
the Treaty, to define the exchange rate policy in relation 
to the euro and/or to conclude international agreements 
concerning monetary or foreign exchange matters. 
(iv) The holding and managing of foreign 
reserves 
As from the introduction of the euro, a number of 
statutory provisions come into play, such as the 
mandatory transfer of a certain volume of foreign 
reserve assets to the ECB (Article 30 ESCB/ECB) and 
the need for ECB approval of foreign exchange 
transactions by participating NCBs and by their Member 
States (working balances) above a certain limit (Article 
31 ESCB/ECB). Incompatibilities in this respect should 
be removed in several countries (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland and 
Slovenia). 
(v) Euro banknotes and coins 
National legislation should not contain any provisions 
which are in contradiction with the ECB’s exclusive 
right to authorise the issue of euro banknotes (Article 
106(1)) as well as the volume of euro coins (Article 
106(2)) in the euro area. Similarly, decisions on the 
denominations and technical specifications of euro coins 
intended for circulation are not a national competence 
but are adopted by the Council (Article 106(2)). 
Incompatibilities exist in the legislation of all eleven 
countries. 
(vi) Instruments of monetary control 
Incompatibilities relating to the choice of monetary 
control instruments being used, and the rules applying to 
their implementation, can be found in the legislation of 
all eleven Member States being examined. These relate 
to the responsibility for decisions relating to open 
market and credit operations (cf. Article 18(2) 
ESCB/ECB), the calculation and determination of 
minimum reserves (cf. Article 19(1) ESCB/ECB) as 
well as the Council’s role laid down in Article 19(2) 
with respect to the basis, the maximum permissible 
ratios and the appropriate sanctions of such minimum 
reserves. Article 20 ESCB/ECB moreover confers a 
broadly defined competence to the ECB in the definition 
of monetary control methods, with the Council also 
becoming involved to the extent that such methods 
impose obligations on third parties. 
(vii) Financial provisions 
The inadequate reflection of the role of the ECB 
Governing Council and of the EU Council in the process 
of selecting independent external auditors (cf. Article 
27(1) ESCB/ECB) constitutes the main source of 
incompatibilities in this area (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Hungary, Malta and Slovakia). Further 
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incompatibilities exist in a few countries (Estonia, 
Latvia, Poland and Slovakia) as regards the involvement 
of the respective state audit offices in the audit of the 
national central banks. 
(viii) Other issues linked to integration 
The participation of national central banks in 
international monetary institutions (when acting in their 
own capacity) is subject to approval by the ECB (cf. 
Article 6 ECSB/ECB). Central bank legislation in 
Cyprus and Lithuania is problematic in this respect. 
Article 105(4) of the Treaty obliges national authorities 
to consult the ECB on any draft legislative provision in 
its field of competence. The national legislation in 
several countries provides for a similar obligation to 
consult the NCB on draft legislation. Once the NCB 
concerned forms part of the Eurosystem, it would be 
logical to confine such consultations to the ECB, 
particularly if the draft legislation is related to ESCB-
related tasks. 
2.2.5. Prohibition of monetary financing 
A number of central bank acts refer to the possible 
granting of emergency loans to credit institutions in 
certain exceptional circumstances, notably in order to 
safeguard the stability of the financial system (cf. Article 
14 of the Act on the National Bank of Hungary and 
Article 15(1)(g) of the Central Bank of Malta Act), as 
part of a bank rehabilitation programme (cf. Articles 
42(3)-(4) of the Act on the National Bank of Poland) or 
in order to maintain bank liquidity (Article 24(2) of the 
Act on the National Bank of Slovakia). Safeguards 
should be in place in order to avoid that the national 
central banks concerned might eventually end up 
bearing financial costs to be borne by the state, as 
monetary financing (prohibited by Article 101 of the 
Treaty) would otherwise be involved. 
Similarly, the possibility for certain national central 
banks to grant loans or to advance credit to deposit 
guarantee funds and/or other guarantee funds, notably in 
the event of temporary or long-term deficits, should be 
clarified. This is for example the case in Hungary 
(Article 71(3) of the MNB Act provides for possible 
lending to the Guaranteed Fund of the Funds), Poland 
(Article 43 of the NBP Act refers to the possible 
extension of loans to the Bank Guarantee Fund) and 
Slovakia (Articles 24(3) and 36(1) of the SNB Act relate 
to the Deposit Protection Fund). If the central banks 
concerned could thereby end up bearing unrecoverable 
losses and thereby assuming financial responsibilities to 
be borne in principle by the state budget, this would 
constitute a form of monetary financing contrary to 
Article 101 of the Treaty. 
2.2.6. Legislation outside the scope of Article 
109 of the Treaty 
The elements of national legislation which are addressed 
above can be compared directly with provisions of the 
Treaty and the ESCB/ECB Statute. Any necessary 
adjustments in these areas are to be made by virtue of 
Article 109 of the Treaty. 
A country adopting the single currency will have to 
make further adjustments in order to comply with 
detailed rules and obligations laid down by the ECB 
(e.g. confidentiality regime of national central banks, 
rules for the introduction and withdrawal of euro 
banknotes, etc.), or with secondary legislation adopted 
by the Council (e.g. the legal framework which has been 
established for the fight against counterfeiting of euro 
banknotes and coins). Such adaptations fall under the 
general obligation of Member States to remove 
incompatibilities with EC law from their national 
legislation (cf. Article 10 of the Treaty) although, 
strictly speaking, they do not form part of the 
“convergence” examination under Article 122(2). While 
the present report does not address incompatibilities or 
other problems which may exist in this area, it is very 
important that Member States bring all such national 
legislation into line at the date specified in secondary 
legislation or when the ECB specifies the respective 
rules. 
This report does not examine whether national 
legislation complies with the Treaty in general, that is 
with any obligation of Member States to adapt their 
national legislation to Community law other than those 
obligations which follow from the transfer of 
competences in the context of EMU. 
2.3. Timing of adaptation 
Article 109 requires Member States to “ensure” that 
their legislation is compatible with the Treaty. 
Compatibility is only achieved when the legislative 
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process is completed. This applies to the three areas 
identified above (legislation related to the definition of 
an NCB’s objectives, independence as well as 
integration into the ESCB). However, the distinction 
between the three areas is important when it comes to 
determining the date from which legislation must 
become applicable. 
The requirements linked to the start of the second stage 
of EMU became applicable as from 1 January 1994 (cf. 
Article 116 of the Treaty). Incompatibilities relating to 
the independence of an NCB (Article 108) needed to be 
effectively removed by the Member States at the date of 
establishment of the ECB (Article 109), that is, the 
relevant changes in legislation needed not only to be 
adopted, but also needed to be in force at that particular 
date (1 June 1998). Other areas of legislation, in 
particular those which relate to the integration of an 
NCB into the ESCB, need to become effective at the 
latest when a country adopts the single currency and the 
responsibility for monetary policy is transferred to the 
ECB. 
The 2004 convergence report constitutes the first 
convergence assessment for the ten Member States 
which joined the European Union on 1 May 2004. They 
joined the EU as Member States with a derogation by 
virtue of Article 4 of the Accession Treaty. These 
countries were under the obligation, in all EU policy 
areas, to ensure the compatibility of their national 
legislation with the Community acquis before their 
accession. As regards EMU, and the requirements 
stemming from Article 109 of the Treaty in particular, 
full compliance with “Stage II” requirements was 
required, as well as the independence of their national 
central bank. Similarly, compliance with the objectives 
of the ESCB was considered important, notably in view 
of the direct link between central bank independence 
and the pursuit of the central bank’s objectives. 
The full integration of the NCBs into the ESCB was 
considered as part of the post-accession legal 
requirements, which are associated with Member States’ 
preparations for their future entry into the euro area. 
Since the present convergence assessment comes in only 
a few months after accession, and well before the end of 
the minimum period of two years before any of the ten 
Member States can adopt the euro, quite a few 
integration issues are still outstanding and the large 
majority of incompatibilities is related to this particular 
area. In view of the wording of Article 109 of the 
Treaty, the new Member States are expected to adjust 
their national legislation as soon as possible after their 
accession to the EU, even though the adjustments need 
to become effective only when a country adopts the 
single currency and the responsibility of its central bank 
for the conduct of monetary policy is transferred to the 
ECB. Member States are thus expected to initiate action 
in order to ensure compliance in time for the next 
Convergence Report. 
2.4. Situation in the Member States 
The country-by-country examination provides some 
background information on the NCB concerned (history, 
internal organisation, relevant legislation) and 
subsequently examines the degree of compatibility as 
regards objectives, independence and integration. 
Problematic legal provisions are explicitly listed, while 
an indication is provided on whether the provision in 
question is to be considered as incompatible with the 
Treaty, or whether it rather constitutes an imperfection 
18. Each country section is concluded by a brief overall 
assessment on the degree of compatibility. 
2.4.1. Czech Republic 
2.4.1.1. Current legal situation 
Introduction 
The Czech National Bank (CNB) was established on 1 
January 1993, following the division of the State Bank 
of Czechoslovakia. Its creation was based on the Czech 
National Council Act No 6/1993 adopted on 17 
December 1992. This Act was last amended in 2002 by 
Act No 127/2002, which entered into force on 1 May 
2002, while amendments adopted in 2000 entered into 
force on 1 May 2004.The supreme governing body of 
CNB is the Bank Board composed of seven Members 
(including the governor of the CNB), who are appointed 
and dismissed by the president of the Republic. 
Objectives 
The objectives of the CNB Act are fully compliant with 
those of the ESCB.  
                                                 
18  Unless indicated otherwise, the references relate to specific articles 
in the respective national central bank acts. 
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Independence 
No incompatibilities with the Treaty exist in this area. 
The possibility for the Chamber of Deputies of 
approving or rejecting the annual financial report and to 
request modifications (Article 47(3)-(5)) could however 
impinge upon the central bank’s institutional (and 
possibly also financial) independence. In addition, the 
grounds for dismissal of the governor and of the other 
members of the decision-making bodies (Article 6(11)-
(13)) should be brought more closely in line with Article 
14(2) of the ESCB/ECB Statute and a right of judicial 
review should exist for the other members of the 
decision-making bodies. 
Integration in the ESCB 
The incompatibilities in this area are linked to the 
following ESCB/ECB tasks: 
- the legislative power of the ECB (Articles 
5(2)a and 37); 
- the definition of monetary policy (Articles 
2(2)a, 5(1) and 23);  
- the conduct of foreign exchange operations 
and the definition of foreign exchange policy 
(Article 35a); 
- the holding and managing of foreign reserves 
(Article 1(4); Article 35d contains an 
imperfection); 
- the right to authorise the issue of banknotes 
and the volume of coins (Articles 12, 13 and 
22; Article 2(2)b contains an imperfection); 
- the monetary functions, operations and 
instruments of the ESCB (Articles 23, 25, 26, 
28, 29, 32 and 33); 
- the financial provisions related to the ESCB 
(Article 48(2)). 
2.4.1.2. Assessment of compatibility 
As regards central bank integration into the ESCB at the 
time of euro adoption, legislation in the Czech Republic, 
in particular the Czech National Bank Act, is not fully 
compatible with Article 109 of the Treaty and the 
ESCB/ECB Statute.  
In addition, the correction of some residual 
imperfections is recommended. The Czech National 
Bank Act contains imperfections linked to the CNB’s 
integration into the ESCB and in the field of institutional 
and personal independence. 
2.4.2. Estonia  
2.4.2.1. Current legal situation 
Introduction 
Eesti Pank was originally founded on 24 February 1919 
and was restored as Estonia’s central bank in the 1990s. 
A monetary reform was implemented in 1992 based on 
the establishment of a currency board linked to the 
DEM, and to the euro as from 1999. The Eesti Pank Act 
was adopted on 18 May 1993 and last amended on 29 
January 2003.  
The decision-making bodies of Eesti Pank are the 
governor of the Central Bank and the Supervisory 
Board. The president of the Republic appoints the 
governor on the proposal of the Supervisory Board. The 
governor is the sole body vested with responsibility for 
formulating monetary policy.  
Objectives 
Article 2(1) and/or 4(4) of the Eesti Pank Act should 
include a reference to the secondary objective of the 
ESCB, while the objectives of regulating currency 
circulation, of upholding the stability of the national 
currency and of supporting the economic policy of the 
Government should be subordinated to the primary and 
secondary objectives of the ESCB. 
Independence 
No incompatibilities with the Treaty exist in this area. 
The grounds for dismissal of the governor and the 
chairman and members of the Supervisory Board 
(Article 12(1)) should however be adapted by bringing 
them closer into line with Article 14(2) of the 
ESCB/ECB Statute. Similarly, the position of the deputy 
governor should be strengthened (Article 10(4)) as the 
governor could transfer his authority to him under 
certain circumstances. 
Integration in the ESCB 
The incompatibilities in this area are linked to the 
following ESCB/ECB tasks: 
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- the legislative power of the ECB, including 
regarding possible sanctions (Articles 2(7), 
14(3) and (8)) as well as the absence of a 
general reference to the Eesti Pank as an 
integral part of the ESCB and to its 
subordination to the ECB’s legal acts (Article 
1(3) contains an imperfection); 
- the definition of monetary policy (Articles 
14(3) and (6); Article 2(4) contains an 
imperfection); 
- the conduct of foreign exchange operations 
and the definition of foreign exchange policy 
(Articles 2(1)); 
- the holding and managing of foreign reserves 
(Article 26(4); Article 2(3) contains an 
imperfection); 
- the right to authorise the issue of banknotes 
and the volume of coins (Articles 2(2) and 
9(2)9); 
- the monetary functions, operations and 
instruments of the ESCB (Articles 2(7), 14(4) 
and 14(7)-(8)); 
- the financial provisions related to the ESCB 
(Articles 9(2)71 and 31(1) contain an 
imperfection). 
The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia (Article 
111) is not compatible with the EC Treaty and the 
ESCB/ECB Statute, since it attributes to the sole Eesti 
Pank the right to issue the Estonian currency as well as 
the tasks of regulating currency circulation and 
upholding the stability of the Estonian currency. The 
currency law contains similar incompatibilities as 
regards the definition of monetary unit (clauses 1 and 3), 
the right to authorise the issue of money (clause 2), as 
well as the definition of the foreign exchange policy 
(clause 5). The law on the security for Estonian Kroon 
also contains incompatibilities as regards the definition 
of the foreign exchange policy (clauses 1-3) and 
regarding the right to issue currency (clause 4). 
2.4.2.2. Assessment of compatibility 
As regards central bank integration into the ESCB at the 
time of euro adoption, legislation in Estonia, in 
particular the Eesti Pank Act, the Constitution of the 
Republic of Estonia as well as the currency law and the 
law on the security for Estonian kroon, is not fully 
compatible with Article 109 of the Treaty and the 
ESCB/ECB Statute.  
In addition, the correction of some residual 
imperfections is recommended. The Eesti Pank Act 
contains a number of imperfections related to its 
integration into the ESCB. Imperfections also subsist as 
regards the Bank’s objectives as well as the personal 
independence of the members of its decision-making 
bodies. 
2.4.3. Cyprus  
2.4.3.1. Current legal situation 
Introduction 
The Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) was established by 
the Central Bank of Cyprus Law in 1963, shortly after 
the island gained its independence in August 1960. The 
law was replaced by the Central Bank of Cyprus Law of 
2002 (138(I)2002), as amended by the CBC 
(amendment) Law of 31 October 2003. The CBC is a 
corporate entity while its capital has been paid up by the 
government. 
The decision-making bodies of the CBC are the Board 
of Directors, the Monetary Policy Committee, the 
governor and the deputy governor. The Monetary Policy 
Committee, composed of the governor, the deputy 
governor and five other members, defines and 
implements monetary policy and decide on matters 
related to the conduct of exchange rate policy and the 
operation of the payment and settlement systems.  
Objectives 
The secondary objective of the CBC (Article 5) refers to 
the general economic policy of the State. It should 
moreover make reference to the general economic 
policies in the Community, with the latter taking 
precedence over the former. 
Independence 
The CBC Law is compatible with the Treaty in this 
respect. 
Integration in the ESCB 
The incompatibilities in this area are linked to the 
following ESCB/ECB tasks: 
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- the absence of a general reference to the CBC 
as an integral part of the ESCB and to its 
subordination to the ECB’s legal acts (Article 
3 contains an imperfection); 
- the definition of monetary policy (Articles 
6(2)a and 10); 
- the conduct of foreign exchange operations 
and the definition of foreign exchange policy 
(Articles 6(2)b, 10 and 37); 
- the holding and managing of foreign reserves 
(Articles 6(2)c and 33 to 36 contain an 
imperfection); 
- the right to authorise the issue of banknotes 
and the volume of coins (Articles 29, 30 and 
31(2)); 
- the definition of the monetary unit (Articles 
27 and 28); 
- the monetary functions, operations and 
instruments of the ESCB (Articles 39(2), 
40(1)a, 40(2), 41(1), 44, 46(2)-(3)) and 65;  
-  the need for the ECB’s prior approval for the 
participation of an NCB in international 
monetary organisations (Article 6(2)g 
contains an imperfection). 
2.4.3.2. Assessment of compatibility 
As regards central bank integration into the ESCB at the 
time of euro adoption, legislation in Cyprus, in 
particular the Central Bank of Cyprus Law, is not fully 
compatible with Article 109 of the Treaty and the 
ESCB/ECB Statute. 
In addition, the correction of some residual 
imperfections is recommended. The Central Bank of 
Cyprus Law contains some imperfections with respect to 
its integration into the ESCB, while an imperfection 
subsists in its objectives. 
2.4.4. Latvia 
2.4.4.1. Current legal situation 
Introduction 
The Bank of Latvia was founded in 1922 and re-instated 
in 1991 under the Bank of Latvia Law, as last amended 
on 20 June 2002. 
The decision-making bodies of the Bank of Latvia are 
the Board of governors, chaired by the governor of the 
Central Bank, and the Executive Board. The Board of 
governors is the sole body involved in decision-making 
as regards ESCB-related tasks. 
Objectives 
The wording of the Bank of Latvia’s primary objective 
(Article 3) should reflect the wording of Article 105(1) 
of the Treaty more closely, while a reference to the 
secondary objective of the ESCB should be introduced. 
Independence 
No incompatibilities with the Treaty exist in this area. 
The grounds for dismissal of the governor and the other 
members of the Board of Governors (Article 22) should 
however be adapted by bringing them closer into line 
with Article 14(2) of the ESCB/ECB Statute. 
Integration in the ESCB 
The incompatibilities in this area are linked to the 
following ESCB/ECB tasks: 
- the absence of a general reference to the Bank 
of Latvia as an integral part of the ESCB and 
to its subordination to the ECB’s legal acts 
(Article 2 contains an imperfection); 
- the possibility for the Parliament to wind up 
the Bank of Latvia (Article 17); 
- the definition of monetary policy (Article 26); 
- the conduct of foreign exchange operations 
and the definition of foreign exchange policy 
(Article 4); 
- the holding and managing of foreign reserves 
(Article 8; Article 5 contains an 
imperfection); 
- the right to authorise the issue of banknotes 
and the volume of coins (Articles 4 and 34); 
- the monetary functions, operations and 
instruments of the ESCB (Article 38); 
- the financial provisions related to the ESCB 
(Article 43). 
2.4.4.2. Assessment of compatibility 
As regards central bank integration into the ESCB at the 
time of euro adoption, legislation in Latvia, in particular 
the Law on the Bank of Latvia, is not fully compatible 
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with Article 109 of the Treaty and the ESCB/ECB 
Statute. 
In addition, the correction of some residual 
imperfections is recommended. In particular, 
imperfections subsist in respect of the objectives and the 
personal independence of the members of the Bank of 
Latvia’s decision-making bodies. 
2.4.5. Lithuania 
2.4.5.1. Current legal situation 
Introduction 
The Bank of Lithuania started operating in 1922 and was 
re-established in March 1990. As from April 1994, the 
litas was linked to the US dollar via a currency board. In 
February 2002, the euro became the anchor currency of 
Lithuania’s currency board. The Law on the Bank of 
Lithuania, as last amended on 15 April 2004, constitutes 
the legal basis for the establishment of the Bank of 
Lithuania. 
The decision-making bodies of the Bank of Lithuania 
are the chairperson and the Board. The Board formulates 
Lithuania’s monetary policy. 
Objectives 
The secondary objective of the Bank of Lithuania 
(Article 7(2)) refers to the general economic policy of 
the State. It should moreover make reference to the 
general economic policies in the Community, with the 
latter taking precedence over the former. 
Independence 
No incompatibilities with the Treaty exist in this area. 
Integration in the ESCB 
The incompatibilities in this area are linked to the 
following ESCB/ECB tasks: 
- the possibility for the Parliament to wind up 
the Bank of Lithuania (Article 1(3)); 
- the definition of monetary policy (Articles 
8(1)2 and 11(1)1); 
- the conduct of foreign exchange operations 
and the definition of foreign exchange policy 
(Articles 8(1)3, 11(1)3 and 31); 
- the holding and managing of foreign reserves 
(Articles 11(1)4 and 11(1)17; Article 33 
contains an imperfection); 
- the right to authorise the issue of banknotes 
and the volume of coins (Articles 6, 8(1)1 and 
11(1)9); 
- the monetary functions, operations and 
instruments of the ESCB (Articles 11(1)2, 
11(1)5, 25-27, 29, 30 and 32); 
- the need for the ECB’s prior approval for the 
participation of an NCB in international 
monetary organisations (Article 11(1)8). 
Article 125 of the Constitution of Lithuania attributes to 
the Bank of Lithuania an exclusive right to issue 
banknotes and is therefore not fully compatible with the 
Treaty and the ESCB/ECB Statute. The law on currency 
contains incompatibilities as regards the definition of the 
monetary unit (Articles 1 and 3), the right to authorise 
the issue of banknotes and the volume of coins (Article 
2) and the definition of the foreign exchange policy 
(Article 4). The law on the credibility of the Litas 
contains similar incompatibilities as regards the right to 
issue currency (Articles 1-2) and the definition of the 
foreign exchange policy (Article 3). 
2.4.5.2. Assessment of compatibility 
As regards central bank integration into the ESCB at the 
time of euro adoption, legislation in Lithuania, in 
particular the Law on the Bank of Lithuania, the 
Constitution of Lithuania as well as the law on currency 
and the law on the credibility of the litas, is not fully 
compatible with Article 109 of the Treaty and the 
ESCB/ECB Statute. 
In addition, the correction of some residual 
imperfections is recommended. In particular, an 
imperfection subsists as regards the Bank’s objectives. 
2.4.6. Hungary 
2.4.6.1. Current legal situation 
Introduction 
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The Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) originally started its 
operations in 1924 and restarted to operate as a central 
bank in 1987.  The Act on the MNB, which was adopted 
in October 1991, re-instated the Bank’s independence. 
The legal basis for the operations of the MNB is now 
contained in Act LVIII of 2001 as last amended in 2004; 
further provisions can be found in the MNB’s Statutes. 
The MNB’s decision-making bodies are the General 
Meeting, the Monetary Council, the Board of Directors 
and the Supervisory Board. The Monetary Council is the 
supreme decision-making body as regards the basic 
tasks of the MNB. 
Objectives 
The secondary objective of the MNB (Article 3) refers 
to the general economic policy of the State. It should 
moreover make reference to the general economic 
policies in the Community, with the latter taking 
precedence over the former. 
Independence 
The possibility for the Ministry of Justice to review 
certain legislative acts of the MNB (Article 60(3)) could 
affect the MNB’s institutional independence 
(imperfection). The grounds for dismissal of the 
members of the Monetary Council (Articles 49(10)a-b) 
constitute a further imperfection with respect to Article 
14(2) of the ESCB/ECB Statute. 
Integration in the ESCB 
The incompatibilities in the central bank act are linked 
to the following ESCB/ECB tasks: 
- the absence of an explicit reference to the 
subordination of the MNB to the ECB’s legal 
acts (Article 1 contains an imperfection); 
- the definition of monetary policy (Articles 
4(1), 6, 7, 12 and 60(1)a); 
- the conduct of foreign exchange operations 
and the definition of foreign exchange policy 
(Articles 7d and 11(2)-(3)); 
- the holding and managing of foreign reserves 
(Article 61(5)); 
- the right to authorise the issue of banknotes 
and the volume of coins (Articles 4(2) and 
31); 
- the monetary functions, operations and 
instruments of the ESCB (Articles 5-7, 9, 10, 
14, 30, 60(1)b-c); 
- the financial provisions related to the ESCB 
(Article 48d). 
Chapter 6 Article 32/D of the Constitution Act attributes 
the competence for monetary policy to the Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank without reference to the ESCB’s role in 
this respect. 
2.4.6.2. Assessment of compatibility 
As regards central bank integration into the ESCB at the 
time of euro adoption, legislation in Hungary, in 
particular the Magyar Nemzeti Bank Act and the 
Constitution Act, is not fully compatible with Article 
109 of the Treaty and the ESCB/ECB Statute. 
In addition, the corrections of some residual 
imperfections is recommended. In particular, 
imperfections subsist as regards the Bank’s objectives as 
well as the institutional and personal independence. 
2.4.7. Malta 
2.4.7.1. Current legal situation 
Introduction 
Following Malta’s independence in 1964, the Central 
Bank of Malta (CBM) was established in April 1968 on 
the basis of Central Bank of Malta Act (1967). The 
CBM became an independent central bank pursuing 
price stability as its primary objective following 
amendments to the Act passed in October 2002. 
The decision-making bodies of the CBM are the 
governor and the Board of Directors. A Monetary Policy 
Advisory Board has also been established. The sole 
authority and responsibility to take decisions and to 
perform any function or duty or to exercise any power 
relating to monetary policy vests in the governor. 
Objectives 
The secondary objective of the CBM (Article 4(1)), 
which refers to “orderly and balanced economic 
development” should reflect the ESCB’s secondary 
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objective more closely. In addition, Article 4(2) should 
refer to the tasks of the CBM rather than to its 
objectives. 
Independence 
The CBM Act is fully compatible with the Treaty in this 
respect. 
Integration in the ESCB 
The incompatibilities in this area are linked to the 
following ESCB/ECB tasks: 
- the absence of a general reference to the CBM 
as an integral part of the ESCB and to its 
subordination to the ECB’s legal acts (Article 
3 contains an imperfection); 
- the definition of monetary policy (Articles 
4(2)a, 17a(1) and (4-5), as well as 17d(1)-(3)); 
- the conduct of foreign exchange operations 
and the definition of foreign exchange policy 
(Article 40; Article 4(2)b contains an 
imperfection); 
- the holding and managing of foreign reserves 
(Articles 15(2), 15(2)b, 19(1) and 41); 
- the right to authorise the issue of banknotes 
and the volume of coins (Articles 41, 42 and 
43(1)-(4)); 
- the definition of the monetary unit (Article 
39); 
- the monetary functions, operations and 
instruments of the ESCB (Articles 15(1)c-g 
and 37(1)-(3)); 
- the imposition of sanctions (Article 52a); 
- the financial provisions related to the ESCB 
(Article 22). 
2.4.7.2. Assessment of compatibility 
As regards central bank integration into the ESCB at the 
time of euro adoption, legislation in Malta, in particular 
the Central Bank of Malta Act, is not fully compatible 
with Article 109 of the Treaty and the ESCB/ECB 
Statute. 
In addition, the correction of some residual 
imperfections is recommended. The Central Bank of 
Malta Act suffers from imperfections related to the need 
for integration into the ESCB and as regards the 
formulation of the CBM’s objectives. 
2.4.8. Poland 
2.4.8.1. Current legal situation 
Introduction 
The National Bank of Poland (NBP) reverted in 1989 to 
its traditional role as a central bank operating in a 
market economy. The Act on the National Bank of 
Poland was adopted in January 1989 and last amended 
in December 2003. 
The decision-making bodies of the NBP are the 
president of the NBP, the Monetary Policy Council and 
the Management Board. The Monetary Policy Council, 
chaired by the NBP president, is responsible for 
formulating Poland’s monetary policy. 
Objectives 
The secondary objective of the NBP (Article 3(1); see 
also Article 9(3)) refers to the economic policies of the 
government. It should moreover make reference to the 
general economic policies in the Community, with the 
latter taking precedence over the former. 
Independence 
The Act on the National Bank of Poland contains some 
imperfections as regards independence: no reference to 
the NBP’s independence is included, while the Act 
emphasizes the co-operation between the NBP and the 
state authorities (Articles 21 and 23). Moreover, Article 
69 provides for the submission of the NBP’s annual 
accounts for approval by the Council of Ministers. 
As regards personal independence, some imperfections 
subsist. The grounds for dismissal of the NBP president 
and of the members of the Monetary Policy Council 
(Articles 9(5) and 13(5) of the Act and Article 198 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland) could be 
brought in line with those of Article 14(2) of the 
ESCB/ECB. 
Integration in the ESCB 
 
The incompatibilities in the NBP Act in this area are 
linked to the following ESCB/ECB tasks: 
- the absence of a general reference to the NBP 
as an integral part of the ESCB and to its 
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subordination to the ECB’s legal acts (Article 
2 contains an imperfection); 
- the definition of monetary policy (Articles 
12(1), 12(2) and 23(1)2; Articles 3(2) and 
21(1) of the Act contain an imperfection); 
- the conduct of foreign exchange operations 
and the definition of foreign exchange policy 
(Articles 3(2)3, 24(1)-(2) and 52); 
- the holding and managing of foreign reserves 
(Article 52; Article 3(2)2 contains an 
imperfection); 
- the right to authorise the issue of banknotes 
and the volume of coins (Articles 4 and 33); 
- the definition of the monetary unit (Articles 
31 and 32); 
- the monetary functions, operations and 
instruments of the ESCB (Articles 12(2)1-3, 
12(2)6, 38-41, 42(4)-(7), 44-47). 
Article 227 of the Polish Constitution does not reflect 
that monetary policy decisions as well as foreign 
exchange policies shall be adopted at EC level once 
Poland joins the euro area. Moreover, the NBP shall 
exercise its responsibility for issuing the national 
currency as part of the ESCB. The role of the Supreme 
Chamber of Control with regard to the NBP, as defined 
in Article 203 of Poland’s Constitution, should be 
reduced, so as to ensure compliance with the provisions 
of Article 27 of the ESCB/ECB Statute. 
2.4.8.2. Assessment of compatibility 
As regards central bank integration into the ESCB at the 
time of euro adoption, legislation in Poland, in particular 
the Act on the National Bank of Poland and the 
Constitution of Poland, is not fully compatible with 
Article 109 of the Treaty and the ESCB/ECB Statute. 
In addition, the correction of some residual 
imperfections is recommended. In particular, 
imperfections subsist as regards the NBP’s objectives as 
well as institutional, financial and personal 
independence.  
2.4.9. Slovenia 
2.4.9.1. Current legal situation 
Introduction 
The Bank of Slovenia was established in June 1991, 
when the Bank of Slovenia Act was adopted. The initial 
Act was replaced by a totally new Act adopted on 3 July 
2002. 
The decision-making bodies of the Bank of Slovenia are 
the Governing Board and the governor of the Bank of 
Slovenia. The Governing Board, chaired by the 
governor, is responsible for formulating Slovenia’s 
monetary policy. 
Objectives 
Without prejudice to the primary objective of price 
stability, the Bank of Slovenia shall support the general 
economic policy and shall endeavour to safeguard 
financial stability (Article 4). The secondary objective 
should reflect the wording of Article 105(1) more 
accurately, while the third objective (safeguard financial 
stability) should be subordinated to the second one, as 
opposed to being at the same level. 
Independence 
No incompatibilities with the Treaty exist in this respect. 
The grounds for dismissal of the members of the 
Governing Board of the Bank of Slovenia (Article 39(1)) 
should however be aligned to those mentioned under 
Article 14(2) of the ESCB/ECB Statute. Moreover, the 
nature of the Government’s involvement as regards the 
management of the foreign exchange assets (Article 27(2)) 
requires further clarification. 
Integration in the ESCB 
The incompatibilities in this area are linked to the 
following ESCB/ECB tasks: 
- the holding and managing of foreign reserves 
(Article 58(2)); 
- the right to authorise the issue of banknotes and 
the volume of coins (Articles 8, 9 and 58(2)); 
- the monetary functions, operations and 
instruments of the ESCB (Articles 15, 16, 17(2), 
18(2), 19, 20, 45; Article 58(1) contains an 
imperfection). 
2.4.9.2. Assessment of compatibility 
As regards central bank integration into the ESCB at the 
time of euro adoption, legislation in Slovenia, in particular 
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the Bank of Slovenia Act, is not fully compatible with 
Article 109 of the Treaty and the ESCB/ECB Statute. 
In addition, the correction of some residual imperfections 
is recommended. In particular, imperfections subsist in 
respect of the Bank’s objectives as well as in the field of 
personal and institutional independence. 
2.4.10. Slovakia 
2.4.10.1. Current legal situation 
Introduction 
The National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) was established on 
1 January 1993, following the division of the State Bank 
of Czechoslovakia. The Act on the Bank of Slovakia (Act 
506/1992) was adopted on 18 November 1992, and 
subsequently amended by a new Act entering into force in 
May and July 2001 (for two paragraphs). The Act was last 
amended by an amendment to the Foreign Exchange Act 
of December 2003. 
The supreme governing body of the NBS is the Bank 
Board. Chaired by the governor of the NBS, the latter 
determines the monetary policy, the implementation 
instruments and decides on the NBS’s monetary policy 
measures. 
Objectives 
Article 12(1) of the Act on the SNB should include a 
reference to the secondary objective of the ESCB 
(Article 105(1) of the Treaty). 
Independence 
No incompatibilities with the Treaty exist in this respect. 
However, the grounds for dismissal of the members of 
the Bank Board (Article 7(9)) should be aligned with 
those mentioned under Article 14(2) of the ESCB/ECB 
Statute. The right for the Parliament to oblige the NBS 
to modify its annual report (Article 38(3)) constitutes a 
further imperfection in the area of central bank 
independence. 
Integration in the ESCB 
The incompatibilities in this area are linked to the 
following ESCB/ECB tasks: 
- the absence of an explicit and general 
reference to the subordination of the NBS to 
the ECB’s legal acts (Article 2(2) contains an 
imperfection); 
- the legislative power of the ECB/EC Council 
(Articles 6 (2)a and 30); 
- the definition of monetary policy (Articles 
2(1)a, 6(1), 6(2)a and 18); 
- the conduct of foreign exchange operations 
and the definition of foreign exchange policy 
(Articles 4(2) and 28a); 
- the right to authorise the issue of banknotes 
and the volume of coins (Articles 6(2)e, 16(1) 
and 17; Article 2(1)b contains an 
imperfection); 
- the definition of the monetary unit (Article 
15); 
- the monetary functions, operations and 
instruments of the ESCB (Articles 18, 20, 21, 
23, 24(1)-(2) and 27(1)); 
- the financial provisions related to the ESCB 
(Article 39(2)). 
2.4.10.2. Assessment of compatibility 
As regards central bank integration into the ESCB at the 
time of euro adoption, legislation in Slovakia, in 
particular the Act on the National Bank of Slovakia, is 
not fully compatible with Article 109 of the Treaty and 
the ESCB/ECB Statute. 
In addition, the correction of some residual 
imperfections is recommended. In particular, 
imperfections subsist as regards the Bank’s objectives 
and its independence (both personal and institutional). 
2.4.11. Sweden 
2.4.11.1. Current legal situation 
Introduction 
The position of the Riksbank as a central bank dates 
back to 1897 when the first Riksbank Act was accepted 
concurrently with a Law giving the Riksbank the 
exclusive right of issuing banknotes. The legal basis for 
its establishment is contained in both the Instrument of 
Government (Swedish Constitution) and in the Sveriges 
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Riksbank Act adopted in 1985. The Sveriges Riksbank 
Act was last amended in 2002. 
The decision-making bodies of the Riksbank are the 
General Council, the Executive Board and the governor. 
The Executive Board is in charge of decision-making on 
monetary policy. The respective competences of the 
Executive Board and the General Council are not 
explicitly specified in the Sveriges Riksbank Act. 
Objectives 
The secondary objective of the Riksbank Act (Chapter 1 
Article 2) refers to promoting a safe and efficient 
payment system. A reference should be included to the 
general economic policies in the Community, which 
shall take precedence over the secondary objective. 
Independence 
The absence of detailed legislation in the field of profit 
distribution impinges on the financial independence of 
the Riksbank (Chapter 10 Article 4) and constitutes an 
incompatibility. The possibility for the Riksdag (the 
Swedish Parliament) of proceeding with exceptional 
transfers, without any safeguard clause ensuring that the 
Bank will keep the necessary means to fulfil the ESCB-
related tasks, could jeopardise the ability of the 
Riksbank to carry out its monetary policy tasks. 
As regards institutional independence, the prohibition of 
seeking or taking instructions only covers monetary 
policy issues, and not all ESCB-related tasks (Chapter 3 
Article 2 of the Act, Chapter 9 Article 13 of the 
Instrument of Government). 
Integration in the ESCB 
The incompatibilities in this area in the Riksbank Act 
are linked to the following ESCB/ECB tasks: 
- the absence of a general reference to the 
Riksbank as an integral part of the ESCB and 
to its subordination to the ECB’s legal acts 
(Chapter 1 Article 1 contains an 
imperfection); 
- the definition of monetary policy (Chapter 1 
Article 2 and Chapter 6 Article 3); 
- the conduct of foreign exchange operations 
and the definition of foreign exchange policy 
(Chapter 7 Article 1); 
- the right to authorise the issue of banknotes 
and the volume of coins (Chapter 5 Articles 1 
and 2); 
- the definition of the monetary unit (Chapter 5 
Article 1); 
- the monetary functions, operations and 
instruments of the ESCB (Chapter 6 Article 6 
and Chapter 11 Articles 1 and 2). 
The integration requirement also implies the removal of 
incompatibilities in the Instrument of Government, 
notably in Chapter 9 Articles 12 (responsibility for 
general currency policy matters), 13 (responsibility for 
monetary policy decisions) and 14 (right to issue 
coinage and banknotes). 
2.4.11.2. Assessment of compatibility 
As regards central bank financial independence as well 
as central bank integration into the ESCB at the time of 
euro adoption, legislation in Sweden, in particular the 
Sveriges Riksbank Act and the Instrument of 
Government (the country’s Constitution), continues not 
to be fully compatible with Articles 108 and 109 of the 
Treaty and the ESCB/ECB Statute. 
In addition, the correction of some residual 
imperfections is recommended. In particular, an 
imperfection subsists both as regards the Bank’s 
objectives and in the field of institutional independence. 
 
  
Table 2.1.
Current situation in the eleven Member States in relation to legal compatibility
ESCB objectives (numbers refer to EC Treaty articles) CZ EE CY LV LT HU MT PL SI SK SE
105(1)  price stability i
105(1) secondary objective i i i i i i i i i i
X: incompatible provisions    i: imperfections    v: provisions requiring clarification
ESCB independence (numbers refer to EC Treaty and ESCB/ECB Statute articles) CZ EE CY LV LT HU MT PL SI SK SE
Monetary financing and privileged access
101(1) prohibition of monetary financing v v v v
101(1) reference to all bodies, in particular EC and other public institutions
101(1) reference to special funds and Government's paper v v v
101(2)  exception for public banks
102  prohibition of privileged access
Independence
108  institutional independence - no instructions i i
108  inst. ind. - reference to members of decision making bodies 
108  inst. ind. - no approval, suspension, annulation, … i i i
108  inst. ind. - no censorship on legal grounds i
108  inst. ind. - no participation with a voting right
108  inst. ind. - no ex-ante consultation
14(2) personal independence in general i
14(2)  term of office of governor
14(2)  term of office of others
14(2)  grounds for dismissal for governor i i i i i i i
14(2)  grounds for dismissal for others i i i i i i i
14(2)  judicial review for governor - competence of the ECJ
14(2)  judicial review for others i
14(2)  conflicts of interest
108  financial independence - means for the ESCB-related tasks 
108  fin. ind. - no consultation on NCB's budget
108  fin. ind. - review of accounts i
108  fin. ind. - distribution of profits - safeguard clause X
109 general legal convergence
X: incompatible provisions    i: imperfections    v: provisions requiring clarification
  
Integration into ESCB (numbers refer to EC Treaty and ESCB/ECB Statute articles) CZ EE CY LV LT HU MT PL SI SK SE
General
110(1) legislative power of the ECB, EC Council X X X
110(3) legislative power of the ECB - sanctions X
14(3) full integration into the ESCB i i X, i X i i i
14(3)  acting in accordance with ECB guidelines & instructions i i i i i i i i
14(4)  ECB veto against other activities 
Monetary policy: definition & implementation
105(2)  monetary policy/ESCB X i X X X X X X, i X X
12  monetary policy decision to the Governing Council X X X X X X X X X
Foreign exchange: policy & operations
105(2)  foreign exchange operations/ESCB X i X X
111 i) exchange rate policy - EC Council X X X X X X X X X X
Holding & managing foreign reserves
105(2)  hold/manage forex reserves/ESCB X
105(3) Government's forex limited to working balances
30  transfer of foreign assets to the ECB X X
31 ECB approval and guidelines on operations above limits X, i X, i i X, i X, i X X i X
Euro banknotes & coins
106(1)  banknotes X, i X X X X X X X X X, i X
106(2) i)  coins ECB autorisation X, i X X X X X X X X X, i X
106(2)  ii) coins technical characteristics & denomination by EC Council X X X X X X X X X X X
Reference to national currencies X X X X X X X
Instruments of monetary control
18(1) credit based on adequate collateral  X X X X
18(2)  OMO/credit operations - ECB guidelines  X X X X X X X X, i X
19(1)  ECB role as regards minimum reserves X X X X X X X X X, i X X
19(2)  EC Council role, in particular sanctions X X X X X X X X, i X X
20  other instruments - ECB Governing Council/EC Council X X X X X, i X
22 clearing and payment systems
23  external operations
Financial provisions
26(1)  financial year from 1/1 to 31/12
26(4)  ECB GC - standards for accounting and reporting for NCBs
27(1)  auditing - role ECB GC/EC Council X i X X X X
27(2)  role of the state audit office i X X X
32-33  allocation of monetary income & profits to NCBs
Other issues linked to integration
105(2) promote payment system/ESCB
105(4) ii) consultation of ECB
105(5)  ECB contribution to prudential supervision & financial system stability
5(4)  statistical role of ECB and EC Council
6(2)  ECB approval before participation in International Monetary Organisat. i X
15(3)  reporting commitments of the ECB
38  professional secrecy - exemptions
X: incompatible provisions    i: imperfections    v: provisions requiring clarification
Source:  Commission Services
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 3. PRICE STABILITY
3.1. The price stability criterion 
3.1.1. Treaty provisions 
The price stability criterion is defined in the first indent 
of Article 121(1) of the Treaty: “the achievement of a 
high degree of price stability (...) will be apparent from 
a rate of inflation which is close to that of, at most, the 
three best performing Member States in terms of price 
stability”. 
The protocol on the convergence criteria develops 
Article 121(1), by stipulating in Article 1 that a 
Member State is convergent in terms of inflation if it 
“has a price performance that is sustainable and an 
average rate of inflation, observed over a period of one 
year before the examination, that does not exceed by 
more than 1.5 percentage points that of, at most, the 
three best-performing Member States in terms of price 
stability. Inflation shall be measured by means of the 
consumer price index on a comparable basis, taking 
into account differences in national definitions”. 
Since national consumer price indices (CPIs) diverge 
substantially in terms of concepts, methods and 
practices, they do not constitute the appropriate means 
to meet the Treaty requirement that inflation must be 
measured on a comparable basis. To this end, the 
Council adopted on 23 October 1995 a framework 
regulation19 setting the legal basis for the establishment 
of a harmonised methodology for compiling consumer 
price indices in the Member States. This process 
resulted in the production of the Harmonised Indices of 
Consumer Prices (HICPs), which have been used for 
assessing the fulfilment of the price stability criterion. 
HICPs are currently available for all Member States 
with a derogation, starting in 1996 for the index and 
hence in 1997 for annual rates of change. 
                                                 
19 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2494/95 of 23 October 1995 
concerning harmonised indices of consumer prices (OJ L 257, 
27.10.1995, pp. 1-4) 
3.1.2. Inflation developments in relation to the 
reference value 
As has been the case in past convergence reports, a 
Member State’s average rate of inflation is measured 
by the percentage change in the arithmetic average of 
the last 12 monthly indices relative to the arithmetic 
average of the 12 monthly indices of the previous 
period. The reference value is calculated as the 
arithmetic average of the average rate of inflation of the 
three best-performing Member States in terms of price 
stability plus 1.5 percentage points. 
Table 3.1
Inflation convergence - August 2004
(inflation, measured by the percentage change in the HICP) (1)
Three best performers
FI 0.4
DK 1.0
SE 1.3
Reference value (2) 2.4
Member States below reference value
LT -0.2
SE 1.3
CZ 1.8
EE 2.0
CY 2.1
Member States above reference value
PL 2.5
MT 2.6
SI 4.1
LV 4.9
HU 6.5
SK 8.4
(1) Measured by the arithmetic average of the latest 12 monthly indices relative to the 
arithmetic average of the 12 monthly indices of the previous period.
(2) Unweighted aritmetic average of the three best performers in terms of inflation plus 
1.5 percentage points.
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Over the 12 month period covering September 2003-
August 2004, the three best-performing Member States in 
terms of price stability were Finland (0.4 percent), 
Denmark (1.0 percent) and Sweden (1.3 percent), 
resulting in a reference value of 2.4 percent20. For the 
purpose of calculating the reference value, countries with 
negative average inflation rates are not considered to be 
best performers in terms of price stability. Lithuania, for 
which the average rate of inflation was -0.2 percent, was 
therefore not included as a best performer. 
Six out of the eleven Member States with a derogation 
exceeded the reference value in August 2004: Poland (2.5 
percent), Malta (2.6 percent), Slovenia (4.1 percent), 
Latvia (4.9 percent), Hungary (6.5 percent) and Slovakia 
(8.4 percent) (see Table 3.1).  
                                                 
20  The reference values used in the 1998, 2000 and 2002 Convergence 
Reports were 2.7, 2.4 and 3.3 percent, respectively.  
For comparison, the highest inflation rate in the euro area 
was Greece (3.1 percent) and the euro area 12 month 
average over the same period was 2.1 percent. 
The reference value has been consistently above the euro 
area average. Over the period January 1999 - August 
2004, the reference value – based on EU-15 until April 
2004 and EU-25 afterwards – fell to a low of 1.8 percent 
in July 1999 and peaked between February and April 
2002 at 3.3 percent. 
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Graph 3.1: Comparison of Member States' average inflation rates (HICP) (1) with reference value (2)
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Graph 3.1: Comparison of Member States' average inflation rates (HICP) with reference value (continued)
Source : Commission services
(1)Measured by the percentage change in the arithmetic average of the latest 12 monthly indices relative to the arithmetic average of the 
12 monthly indices of the previous period.
(2)Unweighted arithmetic average of the three best performers in terms of inflation plus 1.5 percentage points.
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 Table 3.2
Evolution of the inflation reference value (1)
Three best 
performers (2)
Reference 
value (3) Euro area
 (2)
July 2003 BE, DE, UK 2.7 2.1
August 2003 BE, DE, UK 2.8 2.1
September 2003 BE, DE, AT 2.8 2.1
October 2003 DE, AT, FI 2.8 2.1
November 2003 DE, AT, FI 2.7 2.1
December 2003 DE, AT, FI 2.7 2.1
January 2004 DE, AT, FI 2.7 2.1
February 2004 DE, AT, FI 2.6 2.0
March 2004 DE, AT, FI 2.5 1.9
April 2004 DE, AT, FI 2.5 1.9
May 2004 CZ, DK, FI 2.5 2.0
June 2004 CZ, DK, FI 2.5 2.0
July 2004 DK, FI, UK 2.5 2.1
August 2004 DK, FI, SE 2.4 2.1
Source:  Commission services.
(1)EU-15 until April 2004; EU-25 from May 2004 onwards.
(2)Measured by the percentage change in the arithmetic average of the latest 12 monthly indices relative to the arithmetic average of the 12 monthly 
indices of the previous period.
(3)Unweighted arithmetic average of the three best performers in terms of inflation plus 1.5 percentage points.
 
 
3.2. Horizontal analysis of price developments 
3.2.1. Medium-term developments 
The main factors that have affected inflation developments 
in a medium term perspective in the eleven Member States 
that are assessed in this report vary considerably. Two 
country groups can be distinguished. One group consists of 
the eight countries that over the last 15 years were engaged 
in a transition from a centrally-planned to market-based 
economy. Such a transition implied the implementation of 
a series of profound political, institutional and economic 
structural changes. A second group is formed by those 
Member States that have longer-established market 
economies, i.e. Cyprus, Malta and Sweden. 
Member States from Central and Eastern 
Europe 
Over the last decade and a half the new Member 
States from Central and Eastern Europe achieved 
remarkable progress in terms of disinflation and 
convergence towards price stability. Inflation 
declined from sometimes three to four-digit levels in 
the early 1990s to in all cases single-digit levels in 
recent years. 
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The disinflation process in the eight new Member States 
from this region took place in different stages. In the early 
stages of transition, roughly 1990-1992, almost all of these 
countries experienced bouts of very high inflation linked to 
the initial liberalisation of prices and trade as well as the 
exchange rate depreciations that accompanied the 
beginning of the transformation of their economies. The 
size of the initial inflation surge varied across countries, 
reflecting inter alia the scale of the inherited distortions 
and the timing and design of the individual stabilisation 
programmes. On the basis of non-harmonised data, annual 
average rates of consumer price inflation in 1992 reached 
around 1000 percent in the Baltic countries, while inflation 
peaked earlier in most other countries, with annual average 
consumer price inflation figures between 500 and 600 
percent in Poland and Slovenia in 1990. In 1991, consumer 
price inflation was around 60 percent in what is now the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia and around 35 percent in 
Hungary. 
Between 1993 and 1997, annual inflation was reduced to 
more moderate rates, reflecting a clear policy orientation 
towards the achievement of nominal stability. While in 
some countries inflation declined steadily to single-digit 
levels (essentially the Baltic States and the Czech 
Republic), other countries – in particular Hungary and 
Poland - were faced with more persistent inflation rates. In 
1997, the first year for which HICP inflation data are 
available for all new Member States, the annual average 
HICP inflation rate for the new Member States from 
Central and Eastern Europe taken together stood at close to 
13 percent21, compared to about 1½ percent in both the 
euro area and the EU. The highest inflation rate was 
observed in Hungary (18.5 percent), followed by Poland 
(15.0 percent) and Estonia (9.3 percent), while the lowest 
inflation rates were observed in Slovakia (6.0 percent) and 
the Czech Republic (8.0 percent). 
During 1997 and 1999, strong exogenous shocks 
contributed to further disinflation. The Russian crisis of 
1998 contributed to a weakening of economic activity and 
resulted in the emergence of excess agricultural stocks in 
                                                 
21  The average inflation rate for the new Member States was calculated 
using HICP country weights, which makes it comparable to the 
regularly published figures for the euro area and the EU-15 average 
inflation rates. 
many of the new Member States, leading to a sharp 
drop in food prices. This period was also 
characterised by falling and very low world oil 
prices as well as generally falling inflation to 
historically low levels in the EU. The average HICP 
inflation rate for the eight Central and Eastern 
European new Member States was nearly halved, 
falling from an annual average rate of nearly 13 
percent in 1997 to about 6½ percent in 1999. The 
largest drop was registered in Hungary (8.5 
percentage points), followed by Lithuania (8.1 
percentage points) and Poland (7.8 percentage 
points). The only country where inflation increased 
over this period was Slovakia, with inflation rising 
from 6.0 percent in 1997 to 10.4 percent in 1999. 
The lowest inflation rates in that year were 
registered in Lithuania (0.7 percent), the Czech 
Republic (1.8 percent) and Latvia (2.1 percent). 
The period between 1999 and 2001 witnessed a 
pick-up in inflation in most of these countries. For 
the group as a whole, HICP inflation increased from 
an average of about 6½ percent in 1999 to nearly 9 
percent in 2000. The pick-up of inflation in many of 
these countries reflected the substantial increases of 
world oil prices, the recovery in global economic 
activity and, in some cases, the impact of currency 
depreciation. In the case of Poland, inflationary 
pressures were compounded by rising food prices 
and an increase in excise duties on fuel in the course 
of 2000. In Slovenia, the external inflationary 
impulses were compounded by the introduction of 
VAT in 1999. Although also increasing, inflation 
rates in the Baltic countries and the Czech Republic 
were among the lowest in the group. In Hungary, 
inflation remained stable at around 10 percent in 
1999-2000. 
From 2001 onwards, inflation in most of the Central 
and Eastern European new Member States resumed 
a downward path, reaching levels similar or even 
lower than in the EU-15 Member States. These 
developments could be seen as a resumption of the 
disinflation process started in the 1990s, which in 
many cases was temporarily interrupted by the oil 
price increases of 1999 and 2000. Common factors 
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 to the fall in inflation in 2001 and 2002 included the 
unwinding of the previous hikes in energy prices, a marked 
deceleration in global and euro area economic activity and 
a strengthening of currencies. In a number of cases the 
stance of monetary policy was also instrumental in 
reducing inflation, by reducing inflation expectations and 
offsetting the impact of other inflationary sources. 
Malta, Cyprus and Sweden 
Inflation developments since the early 1990s were less 
marked in the two other new Member States, Malta and 
Cyprus. Inflation in both countries moved within a 
corridor of fairly low levels over the whole time period. 
Based on non-harmonised data, consumer price inflation 
averaged 4.5 percent in Cyprus and 3.0 percent in Malta in 
1990. Inflation in Cyprus subsequently increased and 
peaked at 6.5 percent in 1992, while in Malta it fell to 1.8 
percent in 1992. Over the next three years, inflation again 
moved in opposite directions, falling to an average rate of 
2.6 percent in 1995 in Cyprus and rising to 4.0 percent in 
Malta in 1995. By 1997, the first year for which HICP data 
are available for all new Member States, the annual 
average inflation rate stood at 3.3 percent in Cyprus and 
3.9 percent in Malta. At those levels, HICP inflation rates 
in these two countries were the lowest of all ten new 
Member States in that year. 
During the 1997-1999 period, inflation decelerated to 1.1 
percent in the case of Cyprus and to 2.3 percent in Malta, 
helped by low oil prices and a general disinflation move in 
the EU and other industrialised economies. In 2000, 
reflecting the impact of rises in oil prices and the 
depreciation of the euro, inflation rose to 4.9 percent 
in Cyprus and to 3.0 percent in Malta. After 
receding in the following year, inflation steadily 
picked-up again in Cyprus to an annual average rate 
of 4.0 percent in 2003, associated with increases in 
VAT and excise duties and rising food and fuel 
prices, while in Malta HICP inflation gradually 
slowed to an annual average rate of 1.9 percent in 
2003. 
Following sustained periods of high inflation in both 
the 1970s and the 1980s, Sweden achieved a 
successful reduction in the inflation rate during the 
first half of the 1990s. The establishment of a 
stability-oriented macroeconomic policy framework, 
including an inflation targeting regime for monetary 
policy, following the economic crisis in Sweden at 
the beginning of the 1990s, contributed to this 
achievement. From an annual average rate of around 
10 percent in 1990, HICP inflation fell to levels 
substantially below 2 percent in the second half of 
the 1990s. While Sweden has had an explicit 
inflation target for monetary policy and a flexible 
exchange rate regime since 1992, the commitment to 
price stability as the objective of monetary policy 
was further underlined by the new legislation on the 
status of the Riksbank that came into force in 1999. 
After rising to an annual average rate of 2.7 percent 
in 2001, HICP inflation fell to 2.0 percent in 2002, 
reflecting the adverse impact on economic activity 
from the global slowdown and the easing of strains 
on productive capacity. HICP inflation stood at 2.3 
percent in 2003. 
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Graph 3.2: Inflation rates (HICP) in the Member States
(percentage change on a yearly basis, T/T-12)
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Graph 3.2: Inflation rates (HICP) in the Member States (continued)
Source : Commission services
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3.2.2. Recent trends 
The annual rate of HICP inflation (as measured by the 
change in the monthly HICP index from 12 months 
earlier) in most of the Member States examined in this 
report followed a U-shaped pattern over the last 2½ years. 
The downward trend of HICP inflation that started in 
2001 continued in most countries throughout 2002, 
sometimes also in the first part of 2003. Subsequently, 
inflation started to pick up, with a marked acceleration in 
2004. The exceptions to this pattern were Cyprus, 
Slovenia and Sweden. 
Developments in 2002 and 2003 
In the new Member States, HICP inflation fell on 
average from 4.2 percent in January 2002 to a low 
of 1.6 percent in December of the same year. In 
most cases, the deceleration of inflation in 2002 was 
the continuation of the downward path started one 
year earlier. The three countries with the highest 
inflation rates in January 2002 were Slovenia (8.4 
percent), Hungary (6.6 percent) and Slovakia (6.5 
percent), while the countries with the lowest 
inflation rates were Cyprus (2.2 percent), Lithuania 
(3.3 percent) and Latvia and the Czech Republic 
(both 3.4 percent). A year later, in January 2003, the 
highest inflation rates were found in the same 
countries, with Slovakia having the highest rate (7.1 
percent) followed by Slovenia (6.7 percent) and 
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Hungary (4.8 percent). At the opposite end, Poland 
reported the lowest inflation rate in January 2003 (0.4 
percent), while the annual rate of change of consumer 
prices was actually negative in the Czech Republic (-0.7 
percent) and Lithuania (-1.8 percent). These three 
countries, together with Malta, were also those that 
registered the largest drop in inflation during 2002 - in 
excess of 3 percentage points. 
During the first months of 2003 inflation for this group of 
countries taken together remained at historically low 
levels, before dropping further to 1.5 percent in April. 
The April 2003 figure was also around ½ percentage 
point below the annual inflation rate registered for the 
euro area and the EU in that month. 
By the summer of 2003, average HICP inflation in new 
Member States had risen to 2.0 percent. The drought 
across the continent damaged harvests and rising food 
prices put strong upward pressure on overall inflation. In 
addition, adjustments to VAT and excise taxes and further 
liberalisation of administered prices also provided 
inflationary impetus in some countries. Accordingly, a 
marked acceleration was observed in the final months of 
that year, with average HICP inflation reaching 2.8 
percent in the year to December 2003. In terms of annual 
averages, HICP inflation in the new Member States ended 
up at 2.1 percent in 2003. The latter figure compares with 
the annual average rate of 2.1 percent registered in the 
euro area in the same year and 2.0 percent for the EU-15. 
Developments in 2004 
Average HICP inflation in the new Member States 
continued on an upward path throughout 2004, starting 
the year at 3.3 percent and rising to 5.2 percent in August. 
This latter figure compares to an annual rate of 2.3 
percent in the euro area in the same month. Adjustments 
to tax systems to make them compliant with EU 
requirements, in particular upward adjustments to VAT 
and excise tax rates, contributed to this increase. Further 
liberalisation of administered prices also appears to have 
contributed significantly to inflation in several countries. 
While increases in inflation due to such changes are 
normally temporary, their large estimated impact raised 
some concerns as to possible second-round effects. In the 
spring of 2004, a common source of further upward 
pressure on HICP inflation came from developments 
in energy prices, reflecting the increase in world oil 
prices to historically high levels. 
In January 2004, Slovakia (8.2 percent), Hungary 
(6.7 percent), Slovenia (4.0 percent) and Latvia (4.0 
percent) reported the highest inflation rates. The 
lowest inflation rates in January 2004 were 
registered in Poland, Cyprus and Estonia (1.8 
percent, 1.6 percent and 0.6 percent, respectively), 
while prices continued to fall in Lithuania (-1.2 
percent). 
The relative positions changed little by August 
2004, but most countries reported higher inflation 
rates. Latvia, Hungary and Slovakia remained the 
countries with the highest inflation rates (7.8 
percent, 7.2 percent and 7.0 percent), while the 
lowest inflation rates were observed in the Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Malta and Lithuania (3.2 percent, 
2.8 percent, 2.5 percent and 2.2 percent). HICP 
inflation more than doubled in Estonia, rising from 
1.5 percent in April to 3.9 percent in August, 
thereby taking this country out of the group with the 
lowest inflation rates. The strong pick-up was 
triggered primarily by increases in VAT and excise 
duties as well as price hikes in certain food items 
following the introduction of the Common 
Agricultural Policy. Inflation rose sharply also in 
Lithuania, where it jumped from -0.7 percent in 
April to 1.0 percent in May and 2.2 percent in 
August, ending a period of nearly two years of 
deflation. The upsurge was induced by significant 
increases in prices of food, tobacco products, fuel 
and health care as well as the abolition, required by 
EU accession, of a reduced VAT rate on residential 
heating. 
The exceptions to the common U-shaped pattern 
described above were Cyprus, Slovenia and Sweden. 
Having bottomed out already in 2001, inflation in 
Cyprus picked up since mid-2002, reflecting the 
impact of increases in the VAT rate and excise 
duties. After another acceleration at the beginning of 
2003 that resulted from a further VAT hike and 
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 from surges in the energy and food prices, inflation in 
Cyprus embarked on a downward path that culminated 
with consumer prices rising by just 0.1 percent in March 
and April 2004. In the following months inflation in 
Cyprus jumped sharply up to 2.9 percent in July and 2.8 
percent in August, owing mainly to higher prices for food 
and fuel.  HICP inflation in Slovenia was on a broadly 
uninterrupted downward path since early 2001. In March 
2004 inflation reached a low at 3.5 percent. Reflecting 
higher prices for petroleum products it rose gradually 
since to stand at 3.7 percent in August 2004.  In Sweden, 
the annual rate of HICP inflation fell from around 3 
percent in the first months of 2002 to 1.2 percent in 
September of that year. From October onwards, under the 
influence of strong rises in energy prices, inflation 
embarked on an upward path, peaking at 3.3 percent in 
February 2003. Subsequently it hovered around 2.0 
percent for the rest of the year. The unwinding of the 
energy price hikes one year earlier let inflation in Sweden 
drop to 0.2 percent in February 2004. Inflation rose 
gradually since and stood at 1.2 percent in August 2004. 
3.3. Convergence towards price stability 
The progress in terms of disinflation in the new Member 
States has resulted in considerable convergence towards 
price stability. From the early 1990s to the middle of the 
decade, the spread between the new Member State with 
the highest inflation rate and the one with the lowest rate 
declined from three-digit levels to close to 40 percentage 
points. The unweighted standard deviation, a measure of 
dispersion less affected by outliers, declined from three-
digit levels in the early 1990s to around 15 percentage 
points in 1995. By 1997, the first year when HICPs are 
available for all new Member States, the spread between 
the highest and lowest inflation rates in the new Member 
States was down to 15 percentage points, while the 
unweighted standard deviation declined to 5 percentage 
points. Progress with convergence towards a low inflation 
environment continued during the following years, with a 
temporary interruption due to developments in 1999-
2000. A historically low degree of inflation divergence 
was reached in 2002, when the spread between the 
highest and the lowest inflation rates in the new Member 
States stood at 7 percentage points, while the unweighted 
standard deviation was merely 2 percentage points. The 
pick-up of inflation in 2003 in many new Member 
States led to an increase in inflation divergence. The 
spread between the highest and the lowest inflation 
rates in this group of countries rose to 10 percentage 
points, while the unweighted standard deviation rose 
to 3 percentage points22. 
3.4. Underlying factors and sustainability of 
inflation performance 
The Treaty not only requires Member States to have 
achieved a high degree of price stability but also 
calls for a price performance that is sustainable 
(Protocol on the convergence criteria). The 
requirement of sustainability aims at ensuring that 
the degree of price stability and inflation 
convergence achieved in previous years will be 
maintained after adoption of the euro. This implies 
that the satisfactory inflation performance must 
essentially be due to the adequate behaviour of input 
costs and other factors influencing price 
developments in a structural manner, rather than 
reflecting the influence of temporary factors, such as 
a fall in indirect taxes or import price developments. 
3.4.1. Unit labour costs, wages and 
productivity developments 
Developments in unit labour costs take on particular 
importance in the inflation process. They are the 
result of trends in labour productivity and nominal 
compensation per head. The former reflects more 
medium-term supply side factors (such as 
technological progress, the level of capital 
deepening and changes in the quality of labour) but 
might also be affected by cyclical developments.
                                                 
22 Although starting from a lower level, euro area Member States 
also achieved a remarkable degree of convergence in 
consumer price inflation developments over the 1990s. The 
spread between the Member States with the highest and 
lowest headline inflation rates fell from close to 20 percentage 
points in the early 1990s to spreads of less than 2 percentage 
points in the period 1997-1999. The unweighted standard 
deviation followed a similar path, falling from over 5 
percentage points in the early 1990s to historical lows of less 
than one percentage point in 1999. 
Convergence Report 2004 
Technical Annex 
 38
Table 3.3
Labour costs
(percentage change, total economy)
1998-
2000(1)
2001-
2003(1)
2002 2003 2004(2)
1998-
2000(1)
2001-
2003(1)
2002 2003 2004(2)
1998-
2000(1)
2001-
2003(1)
2002 2003 2004(2)
CZ 7.5 6.7 6.2 6.4 4.0 3.3 3.1 0.0 7.0 4.3 4.1 3.6 6.2 -0.6 -0.3
EE 13.4 8.9 10.2 8.9 8.9 7.8 5.2 5.6 4.3 5.5 5.3 3.6 4.3 4.4 3.2
CY 4.0 3.0 4.4 0.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 0.8 0.5 2.5 1.0 2.0 3.6 -0.5 0.4
LV 6.9 6.2 4.4 10.8 7.0 6.8 5.4 4.8 5.6 6.7 0.1 0.8 -0.4 4.9 0.3
LT 7.9 3.6 0.7 6.8 6.8 5.6 6.4 2.6 6.5 4.5 2.2 -2.5 -1.9 0.2 2.2
HU 11.6 14.4 12.1 15.5 8.5 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.1 3.4 8.7 11.4 8.9 13.2 5.0
MT 8.4 4.0 2.0 4.4 1.4 3.8 -0.2 1.8 1.7 -0.5 4.5 4.3 0.2 2.7 1.9
PL 9.4 6.8 2.0 5.0 4.7 5.3 3.5 3.7 5.0 6.5 4.0 3.3 -1.6 0.0 -1.7
SI 9.4 9.8 10.0 7.8 6.5 2.9 2.9 3.7 2.8 3.8 6.4 6.7 6.0 4.8 2.6
SK 10.7 8.5 9.9 9.3 6.5 4.3 3.5 5.5 1.9 3.9 6.1 4.8 4.1 7.3 2.5
SE 3.8 3.2 2.7 2.4 3.4 2.1 0.9 1.9 1.8 3.9 1.7 2.3 0.8 0.5 -0.5
Euro area 2.1 2.7 2.7 2.6 2.3 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.7 0.9 2.3 2.3 2.1 0.6
EU-25 3.8 2.5 3.0 1.0 3.4 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 2.1 1.3 2.5 2.3 2.1 0.8
EU-15 3.6 2.2 2.9 1.0 3.4 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.9 1.4 2.5 2.3 2.2 0.9
Source : Commission services
Labour 
productivity
Nominal unit 
labour costs
Nominal 
compensation per 
employee
(1)Average annual percentage change
(2)Forecast
The latter reflects private agents’ inflation expectations 
and thus serves as an important indicator, amongst others, 
of the credibility of the anti-inflationary policy pursued 
by the authorities and of the sustainability of the inflation 
performance. 
Unit labour costs 
Overall, in the eleven Member States that are assessed in 
this report, unit labour cost growth decreased 
substantially since the second half of the 1990s. While the 
unweighted average increase of unit labour costs was still 
over 11 percent in 1996, compared to double and triple-
digit numbers in the early 1990s, it fell to some 3 percent 
in 2003. Despite this drop, numbers continue to differ 
substantially among the eleven Member States. In 2003, 
unit labour cost growth ranged between -0.6 percent and 
13.2 percent, while it ranged between 0.6 percent and 5.7 
percent in the euro area. For 2004, the growth rates of unit 
labour costs are expected to further converge. 
In the recent period since 2001, the most spectacular 
developments were registered in Lithuania, where unit 
labour costs actually fell almost continuously between 
2001 and 2003. Other Member States, such as Cyprus and 
Latvia, had more incidental experiences with negative 
annual growth rates. In Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia, 
the growth rate of unit labour costs remained high, but is 
expected to decrease this year. In the Czech Republic, 
unit labour costs remained relatively high until 2002. This 
trend reversed in 2003 when the country experienced a 
decrease of unit labour costs. Unit labour costs in Sweden 
accelerated slightly faster than in the EU at the end of the 
1990s until 2001 but increased at a slower pace since.  
In comparison, while the rate of increase of unit labour 
costs at the end of the last century was subdued in the 
euro area (average annual growth rate of 0.9 percent), it 
increased in the period 2001-2003 to an average growth 
rate of 2.3 percent. This pick-up in unit labour costs was 
due to both higher wage increases and lower productivity 
growth. On the basis of the currently available 
information, unit labour cost growth in the euro area is 
expected to slow down in 2004, thereby remaining 
consistent with favourable inflation trends. 
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 Labour productivity growth 
Developments in labour productivity growth showed a 
rather diverse pattern over the last 15 years in the 
Member States assessed. Throughout the 1990s, 
productivity growth decreased slightly in Hungary, 
Slovakia and Slovenia but accelerated somewhat in the 
Czech Republic, while it is hard to identify a clear trend 
in Poland. Lithuania and Latvia registered double-digit 
decreases of productivity in the first half of the 1990s but, 
together with Estonia, recorded a strong pick-up in 
productivity growth towards the end of the 1990s. In 
general, productivity growth in the three Baltic countries 
was sizeable since the end of the 1990s and has been the 
highest of all new Member States in past years with only 
occasional exceptions. 
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Graph 3.3: Inflation and wage trends
(three-year moving average of annual percentage change)
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Graph 3.3: Inflation and wage trends (continued)
Source : Commission services
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At the turn of the century, productivity growth on an 
annual basis reached record-highs in all Member States 
that are assessed in this report. Labour productivity 
growth (measured as the three-year average of annual 
growth rates) accelerated in the period between 2001 and 
2003 compared to the period 1998 to 2000 in Lithuania 
(from 5.6 percent to 6.4 percent), Hungary (from 2.6 
percent to 2.7 percent) and remained unchanged in 
Slovenia (at 2.9 percent). It slightly decelerated in the 
Czech Republic (from 3.3 percent to 3.1 percent), Estonia 
(from 7.8 percent to 5.2 percent), Cyprus (from 3.0 
percent to 1.0 percent), Latvia (from 6.8 percent to 5.4 
percent), Malta (from 3.8 percent to -0.2 percent), Poland 
(from 5.3 percent to 3.5 percent), Slovakia (from 4.3 
percent to 3.5 percent) and Sweden (from 2.1 percent to 
0.9 percent). 
 
In comparison, at the end of the 1990s, productivity grew 
by 1.3 percent in EU-15 and by 1.1 percent in the euro 
area, but was more than halved between 2001 and 
2003. In 2004, productivity growth in the new 
Member States is expected to continue to 
outperform productivity growth of the euro area. 
While the strong productivity growth may partly be 
attributable to the catching-up process, it is also 
partly due to the high level of labour shedding 
following the restructuring of some sectors, in 
particular manufacturing. 
Nominal compensation per employee 
Nominal wage developments have been an 
important element behind the remarkable fall in unit 
labour costs and the lowering of inflation in the 
Central and Eastern European new Member States. 
Although there are some data constraints for the 
start of the transition period, the available data show 
that all countries registered nominal wage growth 
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rates at two, and sometimes even three, digit levels in the 
first half of the 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, nominal 
compensation growth had been brought down to single-
digit levels in the vast majority of the Central and Eastern 
European Member States. In comparison, since the 
second half of the 1990s, the growth rate of nominal 
compensation per employee in the euro area was below 3 
percent. 
A feature of the countries where moderate inflation rates 
were reached soon after the start of the transition period 
and where the disinflation process was sustained (Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Latvia) is that growth of nominal 
wages over the last five years substantially outpaced 
inflation. While these increases were almost offset in 
Latvia and in 2003 also in the Czech Republic by high 
labour productivity increases, productivity growth in 
Estonia stayed below nominal wage growth. In Poland, 
wage increases surged at the end of the 1990s but fell 
substantially in 2000 and2002 to one of the lowest levels 
of the Member States from Central and Eastern Europe. 
Hungary registered the highest wage increases of all 
Member States between 2001 and 2003 with an average 
annual increase of over 14 percent. 
Cyprus registered moderate wage increases at the end of 
the 1990s. Since then, wage increases remained subdued 
and wage growth in Cyprus in 2003 was the lowest of the 
Member States assessed in this report. In Malta, wage 
increases between 2001 and 2003 moderated to one of the 
lowest levels of the Member States assessed. Wage 
developments in Sweden were on average some half 
percentage point higher than in EU-15 at the end of the 
1990s. As labour productivity growth was also higher, the 
impact on inflation was limited. Between 2001 and 2003, 
wage increases were broadly in line with the EU-15 
average. 
Given the differences between the new Member States, it 
is difficult to provide a “one-size-fits-all” explanation for 
recent developments in compensation per employee. 
However, in many cases the trend towards moderate wage 
growth is likely to have resulted from several 
complementary factors. First, the much higher rate of 
unemployment in half of the New Member States 
compared to that in the EU15 might have contributed to 
lower labour cost pressures, which are increasingly 
seen as necessary for strong employment growth. 
This factor is thought to have been stronger in 
Poland, Slovakia and to a lesser extent the Baltic 
countries, where the unemployment rate is relatively 
high.  Second, although the causality goes both 
ways, the sharp decline in inflation recorded in most 
countries in recent periods has led to a regular 
increase in wage earners’ purchasing power, which 
is likely to have helped to moderate wage claims. In 
turn, moderation in wage claims may have 
reinforced the expectation of subdued inflation, 
rendering low negotiated pay rises more acceptable 
for wage earners. Third, wage negotiation systems 
are likely to have also played a role.  The main level 
of collective wage negotiation in most new Member 
States with the exception of Cyprus, Slovakia and 
Slovenia is the enterprise rather than the sector or 
the inter-industry level. In general, the firms of a 
given sector are quite diverse in terms of 
productivity and employers are reluctant to delegate 
bargaining power to their sectoral organisations23. 
These decentralised wage bargaining systems have 
in all likelihood contributed to keeping labour costs 
growth in check and putting it broadly in line with 
local conditions and firm-specific productivity 
developments. Other labour market features 
conducive to wage moderation in these countries are 
related to trade unions and the coverage of collective 
bargaining.  Average trade union membership in the 
new Member States is below the EU-15 level (21.9 
percent of employees against 30.4 percent in the 
EU-15). The direct coverage of collective 
agreements in the new Member States is, on 
average, also significantly lower than in the EU-
1524.   Fourth, the absence of economy-wide 
indexation (apart from Cyprus and Slovenia) 
prevented temporary rises in inflation, as recorded in 
                                                 
23 See European Commission (2004), “The EU Economy: 2003 
Review”, European Economy No. 6. 
24 However, the averages mask marked differences across 
countries.  For instance, countries such as Cyprus and Malta 
have trade union membership rates of 70 percent and 65 
percent, respectively. Similarly, direct coverage of collective 
bargaining ranges from 10 percent to 15 percent in Lithuania 
to almost 100 percent in Slovenia, where collective bargaining 
is mandatory. 
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 Table 3.4
Import prices
(percentage change in the deflator of imports of goods and services, in national currency)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(*)
CZ 1.6 6.2 -2.6 -8.4 -0.5 1.3
EE -0.2 6.2 4.6 0.4 -0.9 1.9
CY 2.6 8.0 1.8 -1.0 -1.6 1.8
LV -4.4 6.7 0.7 4.2 5.8 5.0
LT -4.0 4.3 -2.4 -3.9 -3.1 1.3
HU 5.5 12.4 2.4 -5.3 0.2 0.9
MT 0.2 12.4 -6.4 1.4 -3.8 3.3
PL 7.1 7.7 1.3 5.2 6.9 4.4
SI 1.5 13.8 6.2 2.4 2.0 2.9
SK 8.1 11.6 8.4 0.0 -3.5 -1.2
SE 1.1 4.8 4.0 0.0 -2.2 1.0
Euro area -0.2 8.5 0.8 -1.7 -1.3 0.7
EU-25 -0.1 7.6 0.7 -1.7 -0.9 0.7
EU-15 -0.4 7.5 0.7 -1.7 -1.1 0.6
Source : Commission services.
(*)Forecast
Slovakia in 2000-2001, from automatically translating 
into wage push. 
Looking at Sweden, the rise in compensation per 
employee growth in the 2000-2002 is likely related to the 
very low rate of unemployment (standing at around 4 
percent in 2001-2002) as well as the significant rebound 
in inflation over the period. Since then, wage growth rate 
has decreased and broadly stabilised owing to the upturn 
in unemployment together with the decline in inflation 
recorded in 2003/2004.  
3.4.2. Import prices 
The economies of the eleven Member States that are 
assessed in this report have a high degree of openness and 
developments in import prices can thus play an important 
role in the domestic price formation. Changes in import 
prices are the result of several different factors, including 
changes in international prices and the value of the 
exchange rate, the geographical composition of imports, 
the price-setting behaviour of foreign suppliers and 
domestic demand conditions. In due course, changes in 
import prices are likely to feed through, at least partially, 
to final prices. For the purpose of the assessment of a 
country’s inflation performance and of its sustainability, it 
is therefore relevant to examine whether and how external 
price developments have impacted on domestic inflation. 
Between 1999 and 2001 import prices in the Member 
States assessed showed a common trend. The sharp 
acceleration of the growth rate of import prices in 2000 
and the subsequent reversal were in many cases mainly a 
result of the oil price hike at the beginning of the century. 
Despite this common trend, growth rates of import prices 
varied quite substantially over the different countries over 
the last six years. In 1999, the annual increase of import 
prices ranged between 8.1 percent in Slovakia and -4.4 
percent in Latvia. In 2003, the annual increase of import 
prices was the highest in Poland (6.9 percent) and the 
lowest in Malta (-3.8 percent). This diversity reflects not 
only the geographical composition of imports, the price-
setting behaviour of foreign suppliers and domestic 
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demand conditions, but also different exchange rate 
regimes in the Member States. 
In Estonia and Lithuania, the existence of a currency 
board contributed to low and sometimes negative import 
price inflation, thereby exerting a moderating impact on 
overall consumer price increases. As almost 70 percent of 
Estonia’s imports is denominated in euro (the currency to 
which the kroon is pegged), exchange rate developments 
only have a limited direct impact on the prices of 
imported goods. In Lithuania, the restraining impact of 
import prices on inflation was reinforced by the fact that 
the peg was changed from the US dollar to the euro in 
2002. Import prices thus declined in 2001, reflecting the 
dollar appreciation, as well as in 2002 and 2003, 
reflecting the subsequent euro appreciation. The stronger 
dependency on US dollar developments in Latvia 
contributed to the sharp increase in import price inflation 
in recent years following the depreciation of the dollar. 
This explains to some extent the increase of domestic 
inflation since 2002. In the Czech Republic, import prices 
decreased substantially between 2001 and 2003 reflecting 
a trend appreciation in effective terms, thereby exerting a 
restraining impact on domestic price pressure. In 2002, a 
sharp decline in import prices helped reduce inflation by 
offsetting unit labour cost growth. 
Of the other four countries that experienced a substantial 
decline in inflation rates more recently (Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia), Slovenia and Slovakia recorded 
relatively high increases of import prices in 2000 and 
2001, as a result of higher commodity prices and 
depreciating currencies. The import price deflator was 
reduced to a more moderate level in the subsequent years 
when the effects of the oil price hike faded away. In 
Poland, import prices increased strongly between 1999 
and 2003 with the exception of 2001, reflecting the 
delayed effects of a depreciation of the currency until 
1998 and since 2002, as well as the effects of the oil price 
hike in 2000. Nevertheless, domestic inflation was 
reduced substantially since 2000, reflecting moderate 
wage increases and negative unit labour cost growth rates. 
Strategic pricing by importers and the credibility of 
monetary policy might explain the weak pass-through of 
the depreciation on inflation. Import price inflation in 
Hungary was low after 2000 and even negative in 2002, 
thereby partly offsetting the inflationary pressure from 
high unit labour cost increases and exerting a restraining 
impact on domestic prices. 
In Cyprus, import price inflation increased in 2000 and 
2001 but decreased between 2002 and 2003, showing a 
similar pattern as in other countries which pegged their 
currency to the euro. The fact that Malta pegged its 
currency to a basket in which the euro has a significant 
weight is reflected in the developments of import prices 
since the end of the 1990s. With over 12 percent, import 
price inflation in Malta in 2000 was one of the highest of 
all Member States assessed but slowed down markedly 
since. 
Import prices in Sweden accelerated somewhat in 2000 
and 2001, coinciding with the depreciation of the 
currency vis-à-vis the euro as well as in effective terms, 
which contributed to some upward pressure on inflation 
in particular in 2001. However, while the currency has 
been relatively stable vis-à-vis the euro since 2002, the 
effective exchange rate has shown an appreciating trend. 
This has contributed to falling import prices which in turn 
have contributed to keeping inflation low. 
3.4.3. Balassa-Samuelson and other effects 
The review of inflation developments since the early 
1990s has shown a variety of factors at play in explaining 
the – until recently – higher inflation rates in a number of 
new Member States, in particular those engaged in the 
transition from planned to market economy. One factor is 
related to private consumption which has grown more 
rapidly than under central planning. The composition of 
consumption may also have changed, with an increase in 
spending on non-tradable goods, e.g. services, which may 
have been previously under-supplied. If productivity 
growth in the non-tradables sector was unable to meet 
increased demand, this overall increase and change in the 
composition of consumption may have given rise to an 
increase in the overall price level. Also, general 
government deficits have risen for a period. With 
government consumption likely to be weighted more 
towards non-tradable goods, this may have given rise to a 
jump increase in the domestic price level. Of course, price 
liberalisation has also contributed to inflationary 
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 pressures. While prices of tradables have been liberalised 
early in the transformation process, some non-tradable 
goods have been sold below market prices for a more 
extended period and the completion of the process of 
deregulation of these administered prices may still affect 
the price index. Also, fundamental changes in tax 
systems, such as a shift towards indirect taxes, and the 
alignment of some prices (such as of agricultural 
products) in view of accession have had a temporary 
impact on price levels. 
A frequently cited explanation in discussions on inflation 
performance in a number of new Member States is the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. Applied to the new 
Member States, it postulates that a Member State that is 
catching-up will face higher overall inflation than the 
euro area due to higher differentials of productivity 
growth between the tradable and non-tradable sectors of 
the economy compared to the euro area. In a two-sector 
economy - tradables and non-tradables (typically 
services) - prices in the tradables sector will be equalised 
to those of the partner country at the present exchange 
rate. Due to catching-up, productivity growth in the 
tradables sector is expected to be higher than in the more 
mature trading partner. As a result, there is room for wage 
increases in the tradables sector without loss of 
competitiveness. However, wage equalization pressures 
are likely to spill over to the non-tradables sector where 
productivity increases are smaller. Consequently, prices 
in the non-tradables sector are likely to increase resulting 
in an increase in the overall price index, an increase that 
is likely to be higher than the one in the more mature 
trading partner. 
A number of authors have attempted to estimate the size 
of past Balassa-Samuelson effects in the former transition 
countries25. The bulk of the estimates points to an impact 
                                                 
25 Results from these studies are summarised among others in W. Buiter 
and C. Grafe (2002), “Anchor, Float or Abandon Ship: Exchange 
Rate Regimes for the Accession Countries”, Banca Nazionale del 
Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 221, pp. 1-32; B. Egertzs (2003), 
“Assessing Equilibrium Exchange Rates in CEE Acceding 
Countries: Can we have DEER with BEER without FEER? A 
Critical Survey of the Literature”, Oesterreichische Nationalbank 
Focus on Transition, 2/2003, pp. 38-106; M.A. Kovacs (2003), "How 
real is the fear? Investigating the Balassa-Samuelson effect in CEC5 
countries in the prospect of EMU enlargement", paper presented at 
between 0 and 2 percent per year, the latter figure being 
similar to the effects reported for Spain and smaller 
countries in the euro area prior to EMU. 
3.5. Concluding remarks 
The new Member States from Central and Eastern Europe 
have gone a long way since the early 1990s in bringing 
down inflation. From inflation rates ranging in the 
hundreds, all countries achieved in recent years single-
digit inflation levels and, as of July 2004, five out of the 
ten new Member States had inflation rates below the 
reference value. A clear policy orientation towards 
nominal stability has been key. Furthermore, an increased 
credibility of the resolve and the ability of monetary 
authorities to achieve price stability has contributed 
importantly to reducing inflation expectations. Unit 
labour cost increases were reduced substantially, 
reflecting a trend move towards wage moderation and 
increased productivity growth in most of the Member 
States assessed. 
The challenge for the years to come will be to consolidate 
and further the disinflation process. In some cases, the 
good inflation performance has been helped by 
developments in exchange rates and other temporary 
factors. Moreover, inflation has been on an upward trend 
again since the trough of mid-2003. While this may be a 
reflection of temporary factors, such as higher energy 
prices or adjustments in taxation systems, care will have 
to be taken to avoid second-round effects. 
                                                                               
the conference on Monetary Strategies for Accession Countries, 
Budapest, February 2003; and D. Mihajlek and M. Klau (2003), 
“The Balassa-Samuelson effect in central Europe: a disaggregated 
analysis”, BIS Working Papers No. 143. 
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 4. GOVERNMENT BUDGETARY POSITION
4.1. Convergence criterion 
The convergence criterion dealing with the government 
budgetary position is defined in the second indent of 
Article 121(1) of the Treaty as “the sustainability of the 
government financial position: this will be apparent from 
having achieved a government budgetary position without 
a deficit that is excessive as determined in accordance 
with Article 104(6)”. Furthermore, Article 2 of the 
Protocol on the convergence criteria states that this 
criterion means that “at the time of the examination the 
Member State is not the subject of a Council decision 
under Article 104(6) of this Treaty that an excessive 
deficit exists”. 
The convergence assessment in the budgetary area is thus 
directly linked with the excessive deficit procedure. For 
the main features of this procedure, which is specified in 
Article 104 of the Treaty and further clarified in the 
Stability and Growth Pact, see Box 4.126. 
Focus of the excessive deficit procedure is the respect of 
the two criteria for budgetary discipline specified by 
Article 104(2) of the Treaty, namely on the government 
deficit and on the government debt. Continuous 
compliance with prudent targets for annual deficit and 
outstanding debt, in turn defined through simple 
numerical rules, is the approach chosen by the Treaty to 
make operational the underlying goal of fiscal 
sustainability. 
The application of the excessive deficit procedure 
involves continuous monitoring of budgetary 
developments in each Member State. Failure by a 
Member State to fulfil the requirements under either 
criterion for budgetary discipline, namely on the 
government deficit and on the government debt, can lead 
to a decision by the Council on the existence of an 
excessive deficit, in which case the Member State 
concerned does not comply with the budgetary 
                                                 
26  Information regarding the excessive deficit procedure and its 
application to different Member States since 2002 can be found at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/edp
_en.htm. 
convergence criterion27. When a Member State has, in the 
view of the Council, corrected the excessive deficit, the 
Council abrogates its earlier decision. Both decisions are 
to be taken on the basis of recommendations from the 
Commission. 
The state of convergence in the budgetary area is being 
assessed for the first time in the present report for the 
Member States that acceded to the EU on 1 May 2004. As 
regards Sweden, convergence has been assessed in 
previous convergence reports. Specifically, the 
Commission considered in the 1998 Convergence Report 
28 that the excessive deficit situation in Sweden had been 
corrected. In the light of this assessment and in parallel 
with the adoption of the report, the Commission 
recommended to the Council that the decision on the 
existence of an excessive deficit in Sweden29, taken 
immediately after accession to the EU, be abrogated. 
Acting on this recommendation, the Council abrogated its 
earlier decision on 1 May 199830. Accordingly, in the 
2000 and 2002 Convergence Reports31, the Commission 
considered that Sweden fulfilled the criterion on the 
government budgetary position. This continues to be the 
case, as Sweden is not the subject of a Council decision 
on the existence of an excessive deficit. 
Concerning the new Member States, the Commission 
services Spring 2004 forecasts, which took into account 
budgetary data reported in the context of the March 2004 
notification32, showed that six of them, namely the Czech 
                                                 
27  The definition of the general government deficit used in this report is 
in accordance with the excessive deficit procedure, as was the case in 
previous convergence reports. In particular, interest expenditure, 
total expenditure and the overall balance include net streams of 
interest expenditure resulting from swaps arrangements and forward 
rate agreements. Government debt is general government 
consolidated gross debt at nominal value. 
28  COM (1998) 1999 final, 25.3.1998. 
29  Council Decision of 10 July 1995. 
30  OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 19. 
31  COM (2000) 277 final, 3.5.2000 and COM (2002) 243 final, 
22.5.2002. 
32  On 16 March 2004, Eurostat validated the deficit and debt figures 
reported by the new Member States, except for Latvia (see Eurostat 
News Release No 38/2004). Following improvement in the quality of 
Convergence Report 2004 
Technical Annex 
 48
Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia, 
recorded general government deficits above the 3 percent 
of GDP Treaty reference value in 2003, while, in Cyprus 
and Malta, the debt ratio also exceeded the Treaty 
reference value of 60 percent of GDP. In this connection, 
it should be noted that there are still some problems 
surrounding the quality and comparability of the 
budgetary data of the new Member States in spite of 
considerable efforts in the run-up to accession. 
In view of this prima facie evidence for the existence of 
an excessive deficit, the Commission initiated the 
excessive deficit procedure on 12 May 2004 by preparing 
a report for these six new Member States. On 5 July 2004, 
on a recommendation from the Commission, the Council 
decided that an excessive deficit existed in these six 
Member States and addressed recommendations to each 
of them to correct this situation33. 
                                                                               
Latvian accounts, Eurostat was able to validate the figures in 
September 2004 (see Eurostat News Release No 117/2004). 
33 The text of the Council decisions and recommendations can be found 
on the website on the Stability and Growth Pact maintained by the 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/mai
n_en.htm. 
In conclusion, six of the eleven Member States under 
consideration in this report (namely the Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovakia) cannot be 
considered as fulfilling the criterion on the government 
budgetary position because they are the subject of a 
Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. 
The remaining five countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovenia and Sweden) are not the subject of such a 
decision and hence are to be considered as fulfilling the 
budgetary convergence criterion. For Sweden, this 
confirms the assessment made in previous convergence 
reports. 
The remaining sections of this chapter examine recent 
budgetary developments in the eleven Member States, 
including expected developments in 2004, and examine 
medium-term budgetary prospects as laid down in their 
convergence programmes. The final section presents this 
evidence for each Member State separately. 
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 Box 4.1: Excessive deficit procedure 
 
The excessive deficit procedure is specified in Article 104 of the Treaty, the associated Protocol on the excessive deficit 
procedure and Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive 
deficit procedure34, which is the “dissuasive arm” of the Stability and Growth Pact. Together, they determine the steps to 
be followed to reach a Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit, which forms the basis for the 
assessment of compliance with the convergence criterion on the government budgetary position. 
 
Article 104(1) states that Member States are to avoid excessive government deficits. The Commission is required to 
monitor the development of the budgetary situation and of the stock of government debt in the Member States with a 
view to identifying gross errors (Article 104(2)). In particular, compliance with budgetary discipline is to be examined 
by the Commission on the basis of the following two criteria: 
 
“(a) whether the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value 
[specified in the Protocol as 3 percent], unless: 
— either the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the reference 
value; 
— or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close 
to the reference value; 
(b) whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product exceeds a reference value [specified in the Protocol 
as 60 percent], unless the ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory 
pace”. 
 
According to the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure, the Commission provides the statistical data for the 
implementation of the procedure. As part of the application of this Protocol, Member States have to notify data on 
government deficits, government debt and nominal GDP and other associated variables twice a year, namely before 1 
March and before 1 September35. After each reporting date, Eurostat examines whether the data are in conformity with 
ESA9536 rules and related Eurostat decisions and, if they are, validates them. 
 
The Commission is required to prepare a report if a Member State does not fulfil the requirements under one or both of 
the criteria given above (Article 104(3)). The report also has to take into account whether the government deficit 
exceeds government investment expenditure and all other relevant factors, including the medium-term economic and 
budgetary position of the Member State. The next step in the procedure is the formulation by the Economic and 
Financial Committee of an opinion on this report, which according to the Stability and Growth Pact must occur within 
two weeks of its adoption by the Commission (Article 104(4)). If it considers that an excessive deficit exists or may 
occur, the Commission addresses an opinion to the Council (Article 104(5)). 
 
Then, on the basis of a Commission recommendation, the Council decides, after an overall assessment, including any 
observation that the concerned Member State may have, whether an excessive deficit exists (Article 104(6)). The 
Stability and Growth Pact prescribes that any such decision has to be adopted within three months of the reporting dates 
(1 March, 1 September). At the same time as deciding on the existence of an excessive deficit, the Council has to issue a 
                                                 
34  OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 6. 
35  Council Regulation (EC) No 3605/93 on the application of the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure, OJ L 332, 31.12.1993, p. 7, as last 
amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 351/2002, (OJ L 55, 26.2.2002, p. 23). 
36  European System of National and Regional Accounts, adopted by Council Regulation (EC) No 2223/96 (OJ L 310, 30.11.1996, p. 1) as last 
amended by Regulation (EC) No 1267/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 180, 18.7.2003, p. 1). 
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recommendation to the Member State concerned with a view to bringing that situation to an end within a given period, 
also on the basis of a Commission recommendation (Article 104(7)). The Council recommendations are in principle 
non-public but in recent years have as a rule been made public by the Council at the request of the concerned Member 
State. According to the Stability and Growth Pact, the recommendation under Article 104(7) has to specify when the 
correction of the excessive deficit should be completed, namely in the year following its identification (unless there are 
special circumstances), and has to include a deadline of four months at most for effective action to be taken by the 
Member State concerned. 
 
Where it establishes that there has been no effective action in response to its recommendations, the Council may make 
its recommendations public on the basis of a Commission recommendation (Article 104(8)). According to the Stability 
and Growth Pact, a decision under Article 104(8), which is necessary to establish non-compliance by the Member State 
concerned with the recommendation addressed to it under Article 104(7), has to be taken immediately after the expiry of 
the deadline for effective action. The provisions of Article 104(9 and 11), on enhanced Council surveillance and 
ultimately sanctions in case of non-compliance, are not applicable to Member States with a derogation (that is, those that 
have not yet adopted the euro), which is the case of the Member States considered in this report. 
 
When, in the view of the Council, the excessive deficit in the Member State concerned has been corrected, the Council 
abrogates its decision on the existence of an excessive deficit, again on the basis of a Commission recommendation 
(Article 104(12)).  
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 4.2. Overview of recent budgetary developments 
4.2.1. General government accounts 
4.2.1.1. General government balance 
Table 4.1
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(*)
CZ -5.0 -3.6 -3.7 -5.9 -6.8 -12.6 -5.0
EE -0.3 -3.7 -0.6 0.3 1.4 3.1 0.3
CY -4.3 -4.5 -2.4 -2.4 -4.6 -6.4 -5.2
LV -0.6 -4.9 -2.8 -2.1 -2.7 -1.5 -2.0
LT -3.0 -5.6 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.9 -2.6
HU : : -3.0 -4.4 -9.2 -6.2 -5.5
MT : : -6.2 -6.4 -5.9 -9.7 -5.2
PL -2.1 -1.4 -0.7 -3.8 -3.6 -3.9 -5.6
SI : : -3.5 -2.8 -2.4 -2.0 -2.3
SK -3.8 -7.1 -12.3 -6.0 -5.7 -3.7 -3.9
SE 1.8 2.5 5.1 2.8 0.0 0.3 0.6
EUR-12 -2.2 -1.3 0.1 -1.7 -2.4 -2.7 -2.9
EU-25 : : 0.8 -1.2 -2.3 -2.8 -2.8
Source:  Commission services
General government balance
(as percentage of GDP)
(*) Forecast
 
Budgetary positions differ widely across the Member 
States considered in this report. Table 4.1 presents the 
evolution of the general government balance during the 
period 1998-2003, including Commission services 
forecasts for 2004. For ease of comparison, the 
aggregates for the EU as a whole and for the euro area 
are also shown. It has to be noted that pre-2000 data for 
the new Member States are of uneven quality37 and in 
some cases are missing altogether. 
In 2003, the last year for which actual data are available 
and therefore the main reference for this report, two 
Member States (Estonia and Sweden) had a surplus on 
the government accounts, three (Lithuania, Latvia and 
Slovenia) had government deficits equal to or slightly 
                                                 
37  Eurostat has only validated data on the public finances of the new 
Member States for the period 2000-2003. 
less than 2 percent of GDP, while the remaining six had 
deficits in excess of 3 percent of GDP. Of these, two 
(Slovakia and Poland) had deficits close to 4 percent of 
GDP, two others (Hungary and Cyprus) had deficits 
close to 6 percent of GDP and the remaining two (Malta 
and the Czech Republic) had deficits close to or in 
excess of 10 percent of GDP. It should be noted that the 
very high government deficits in the Czech Republic 
and in Malta reflected the impact of large one-off 
operations (respectively, the imputation of a state 
guarantee extended to a private bank and the 
assumption of liabilities of a restructured state-owned 
company): without these operations the deficits would 
have been around 6 percent and 6½ percent of GDP, 
respectively. 
Looking at the evolution since 1998, only Sweden has 
consistently recorded a surplus or a balance on the 
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budget balance throughout the period, while Estonia has 
been posting surpluses since 2001. The new Member 
States other than Estonia have had budget deficits 
throughout the period considered. A gradual trend 
towards fiscal consolidation is visible in the three 
Member States currently with deficits of less than the 3 
percent of GDP reference value (Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovenia). In the remaining Member States (those with 
deficits in excess of the reference value) budgetary 
positions in general have exhibited more volatility and 
have not shown a trend toward improvement. However, 
progress with fiscal consolidation can be seen in 
Slovakia, particularly if the budgetary figures are netted 
out for the effect of one-off operations (see also below). 
In 2004, government deficits are forecast by the 
Commission to decline in four of the six new Member 
States with deficits currently in excess of 3 percent of 
GDP (the Czech Republic, Malta, Cyprus, Hungary) 
and to increase in the remaining two (Slovakia, Poland). 
Adjusting for the expiration of the above-mentioned 
one-off deficit-increasing operations in Malta and the 
Czech Republic, the expected deficit reductions ranges 
between ¾ and 1 ¼ percent of GDP. By contrast, a 
significant deficit increase is expected in Poland mainly 
due to increases in expenditure. Deficits are also 
expected to increase in the new Member States with 
deficits below 3 percent of GDP. The deficit increase is 
particularly noticeable in Lithuania reflecting a large 
increase in expenditure, including expenditure related to 
EU-accession. A significant reduction in the surplus 
moving towards a close-to-balance position is expected 
in Estonia, reflecting the impact of tax cuts and 
increases in expenditure, including expenditure related 
to EU-accession. A surplus is expected in Sweden. 
4.2.1.2. Influence of cyclical conditions and one-
off operations 
Changes over time in the general government balance 
reflect the impact not only of discretionary policy 
choices but also of fluctuations in economic activity. In 
particular, reflecting the features of the tax and 
spending system, various revenue and expenditure 
categories react automatically to cyclical swings (so-
called automatic stabilisers). As a result, the budget 
balance tends to improve in years of high growth and to 
deteriorate in economic slowdowns. Cyclically-adjusted 
budget balances are calculated to correct the budget 
balance for the influence of the cycle and therefore 
capture the underlying trend in the budget balance, 
which reflects more closely the evolution of the policy 
stance. However, for the new Member States, a 
satisfactory information base to calculate such 
cyclically-adjusted balances is at this stage not yet 
available. Nonetheless, it is probably safe to say that 
relatively large variations in budgetary outcomes in the 
new Member States reflect a correspondingly high 
volatility of output and frequency of policy changes. 
Another factor that has to be taken into account is the 
impact of temporary factors unrelated to the cycle, 
which, as mentioned above, distort annual comparisons 
of budget outcomes. In some of the new Member 
States, such one-off operations, often linked to the 
reduction of the presence of the government in the 
economy, have significantly affected budgetary 
outcomes. 
As an illustration of the influence of cyclical conditions 
as opposed to fiscal policy measures on budget 
outcomes, Graph 4.1 depicts economic growth rates and 
deficit ratios over the period 1998-2004 for each of the 
eleven Member States. For ease of comparison, the 
average growth rate for the period 1995-2004 in each 
Member State is also indicated. 
As regards the countries not currently in excessive 
deficit, the following conclusions can be drawn. In 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, cyclical conditions were 
generally supportive of consolidation since 2000 (after 
weak or negative growth in 1999 in the aftermath of the 
Russian crisis). However, despite some consolidation 
efforts, the beneficial impact on the budgetary position 
over the period was less than might have been expected, 
due to the implementation of direct tax relief that was 
not fully compensated by expenditure reductions. In 
Slovenia, there was a moderate improvement in the 
budgetary position since 2000 in an environment of 
relatively low growth; the delay in the expected 
recovery in 2002-2003 has hampered a further 
improvement in spite of supplementary budgets, given 
structural inflexibility on the expenditure side owing to 
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 the high share of mandatory spending. In Sweden, an 
expansionary fiscal stance, including the 
implementation of income tax cuts in 2000-2002, and 
relatively weak growth since 2001 contributed to a 
sharp drop in the government surplus (after its 2000 
peak of around 5 percent of GDP) and this effect was 
magnified by the implementation of income tax cuts, 
implying a drop by more than 2 percentage points of 
GDP in the cyclically-adjusted surplus over the period 
2000-2003. 
Turning to the countries found to be in excessive 
deficit, robust growth has prevailed from 2000 in the 
Czech Republic and 2001 in Slovakia. Disregarding the 
influence of some important one-off operations (see 
below), these favourable growth conditions did not 
translate into a sizeable improvement in the budget 
position given pre-election spending pressures and the 
weight of overruns in mandatory spending; in 2003, 
budgetary execution in both countries was more 
rigorous. In the remaining four countries (Cyprus, 
Hungary, Malta and Poland), there was a slowing of 
growth over the period 2001-2003, the budgetary 
impact of which was aggravated by a loosening of fiscal 
policy in all cases except Malta. In particular, Cyprus 
implemented a staged tax reform, the net budgetary 
impact of which was negative in view of compensatory 
measures, and raised public spending to counter the 
slowdown. In Hungary, where the slowdown was 
relatively modest, there was an increase in the public 
sector wage bill and social transfers as a share of GDP. 
Poland implemented corporate tax relief as well as 
increases in social spending and the relaxation of fiscal 
policy continued in 2003 despite the strengthening of 
growth. 
In conclusion, whether cyclical conditions were 
conducive to an improvement in the government 
accounts or not, the stance of fiscal policy in recent 
years was not geared towards fiscal consolidation in 
most of the Member States under consideration. In 
other words, in countries marked by a favourable 
growth environment, the ensuing improvement of the 
public finance position was limited, while countries 
with disappointing growth have generally not 
counteracted the automatic deterioration in the budget 
position with a restrictive stance of fiscal policy.
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Graph 4.1: General government balance and economic growth (1998-2004)
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 Graph 4.1: General government balance and economic growth (1998-2004) (continued)
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One-off operations do not seem to have impacted 
significantly on the budget balances in the Member States 
currently in surplus or with deficits of less than the 
reference value. In the case of Lithuania, however, it 
should be noted that the budget balance might be affected 
in the future by the payment of VAT refunds and the 
implementation of compensation measures for savers and 
real estate restitution obligations. 
In the other Member States (those currently with deficits 
in excess of the reference value), the influence of one-off 
operations on the deficits has been particularly significant 
in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Malta. In 
the Czech Republic, besides the one-off imputation of 
State guarantees worth around 7 percent of GDP to the 
government balance in 2003, large one-off capital 
transfers have repeatedly occurred mainly reflecting the 
operations of the public agency for the restructuring of the 
banking sector. In particular, such operations resulted in 
an increase in the 2002 budget deficit of almost 3 percent 
of GDP. In Hungary, the 2002 accounts were significantly 
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Table 4.2
Primary 
balance Total revenue
Total 
expenditure
Interest 
expenditure
Primary 
expenditure GFCF Tax burden (*)
CZ -11.3 41.9 54.5 1.3 53.2 4.2 36.5
EE 3.3 38.9 35.8 0.3 35.6 3.4 33.4
CY -2.9 39.7 46.1 3.5 42.6 3.4 33.9
LV -0.7 34.5 36.0 0.8 35.2 1.5 :
LT -0.6 32.3 34.1 1.3 32.9 3.0 28.6
HU -2.1 43.6 49.8 4.2 45.7 3.4 39.2
MT -5.9 40.2 49.9 3.8 46.1 5.2 34.2
PL -0.8 43.7 47.6 3.1 44.5 3.4 35.9
SI 0.1 46.2 48.2 2.1 46.1 2.8 40.4
SK -1.2 35.4 39.2 2.5 36.6 2.6 31.2
SE 2.3 58.4 58.1 1.9 56.1 3.1 51.4
EUR-12 0.7 46.3 49.0 3.5 45.5 2.6 42.4
EU-25 0.3 45.6 48.4 3.1 45.3 2.5 :
(*) The tax burden comprises taxes and social contributions.
Source : Commission services
Main features of the government account, 2003
(as percentage of GDP)
 
affected by one-off deficit-increasing operations, notably 
debt assumptions. One-off operations in Slovakia, mainly 
related to bank restructuring and government guarantees, 
resulted in very large capital transfers, of around 6 and 8 
percent of GDP, respectively, in 1999 and 2000. In Malta, 
the restructuring of the shipyard industry resulted in a 
one-off charge to the general government balance of 3.2 
percent GDP in 2003.  
4.2.1.3. Government investment expenditure and 
other components of the government 
accounts 
When examining compliance with the government deficit 
and debt criteria, the Commission has, according to 
Article 104(3) of the Treaty, to “take into account 
whether the government deficit exceeds government 
investment expenditure”. Therefore, although the Treaty 
does not elevate the relationship between investment and 
the government deficit to the rank of convergence 
criterion, it grants it a specific importance when assessing 
fiscal discipline. This reflects the recognition that 
government investment may have a favourable impact on 
the productive potential of economies and therefore 
indirectly contribute to fiscal sustainability in the long 
term. 
The Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure specifies 
that investment means gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF). Data on government investment in 2003 are 
reported in Table 4.2. Longer runs of data are available in 
the tables for each Member State in Section 4.4. 
The eleven Member States considered in this report have 
registered relatively high levels of government 
investment. All, except Latvia, have government 
investment ratios above the EU average. For the new 
Member States, this reflects their catching-up process and 
the need to upgrade infrastructure. Nevertheless, in 2003, 
government investment did not exceed the government 
deficit in any of the Member States with deficits in excess 
of the Treaty reference level. The government investment 
ratio was higher than, or equal to, the deficit in Latvia, 
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 Lithuania and Slovenia, which recorded deficits below 3 
percent of GDP, and in Estonia and Sweden, which were 
in surplus. 
Over the period 1998-2003, government investment was 
never greater than the deficit in Czech Republic and in 
Malta. Investment exceeded the government deficit in 
Latvia and Slovakia in 1998, in Hungary in 2000, in 
Cyprus in 2000 and 2001, in Poland from 1998 to 2000, 
and in Lithuania and Slovenia since 2001. 
Other components of the government account – notably 
total revenue and expenditure, the tax burden and interest 
expenditure, shown in Table 4.2 – are also relevant when 
considering the financial sustainability of the government 
position. High levels of government expenditure and high 
tax burdens may reduce the efficiency of economies and 
hamper their ability to grow. Moreover, there is evidence 
that the effectiveness of budgetary consolidation efforts 
depends on the composition of the adjustment measures, 
with reductions in current expenditure giving more 
successful results than revenue increases or cuts in 
investment spending. 
The new Member States, in general, have government 
expenditure ratios which are only slightly below the 
average of the euro area or of the EU as a whole38, while 
total revenue and the tax burden are below the EU 
average. However, given that their expenditure on interest 
is relatively low as their debt ratios are – with the notable 
exceptions of Cyprus and Malta – in general below the 
EU average, their primary expenditure is in some cases 
above the average of the euro area and of the EU as a 
whole. 
It should be noted that data on total government 
expenditure and total government revenue in some of the 
new Member States may be not yet fully in line with the 
ESA95 accounting rules and not comparable with other 
Member States. Data on specific categories of revenue 
and expenditure, and on total expenditure and revenue, 
are considerably more sensitive to some difficulties in the 
                                                 
38 Total government expenditure for 2003 in the Czech Republic is 
exceptionally high because of an one-off imputation of State 
guarantees. For other years, total expenditure is below the EU 
average. 
compilation of data – for example because of issues of 
consolidation within the government units and of netting 
among transactions – than those for the balances. 
Moreover, data for 2003 are not directly comparable 
between the new Member States and EU-15 Member 
States, as accession to the EU implies that some 
expenditure and revenue are transferred from national 
authorities to the EU institutions39. 
4.2.2. Government gross debt 
General government gross debt ratios for the period 1998-
2003 and Commission services forecasts for 2004 are 
shown in Table 4.3. The table also reports, for 
comparison, the average government debt ratios in the EU 
and in the euro area. At the end of 2003, the debt ratio 
was below the reference value of 60 percent of GDP in 
nine of the eleven Member States considered (the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden), although at different 
levels and with different trends40. 
In Estonia, the debt ratio at the end of 2003 was very low 
at 5.3 percent of GDP; it has been relatively stable, 
hovering around that level over the latest years, and is 
even expected to fall slightly in 2004. The debt ratio was 
also low and relatively stable in Latvia (14.4 percent of 
GDP), Lithuania (21.4 percent) and Slovenia (29.4 
percent). Small increases in the ratios are expected in 
2004 for Latvia and Slovenia, while in Lithuania the debt 
ratio is expected to stabilise. 
The government debt was also well below the reference 
value in the Czech Republic (37.8 percent of GDP), 
Poland (45.4 percent), Slovakia (42.6 percent) and 
Sweden (52.0 percent). However, while the debt ratio has 
                                                 
39  According to the accounting rules in force, expenditure by the EU 
institutions in the territory of a Member State – for example 
agricultural subsidies – and revenue earmarked for the EU budget – 
for example a share of VAT receipts – are not considered in 
government accounts and are not included in total government 
expenditure and revenue shown in the table. 
40  The caveat on the quality of statistical data in Section 4.2.1 above 
also applies to the government debt. Moreover, given the relative 
size of deficit and debt levels in most Member States, debt ratios are 
considerably more sensitive to revisions in GDP levels than deficit 
ratios. 
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Table 4.3
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(*)
CZ 15.0 16.0 18.2 25.3 28.8 37.8 37.9
EE 5.6 6.0 4.7 4.4 5.3 5.3 4.8
CY 61.6 62.0 61.6 64.3 67.4 70.9 72.6
LV 9.8 12.6 12.9 14.9 14.1 14.4 14.7
LT 16.8 23.0 23.8 22.9 22.4 21.4 21.4
HU 61.6 60.9 55.4 53.5 57.2 59.1 59.9
MT 53.1 56.8 56.4 62.2 62.7 71.1 73.8
PL n.a. 40.1 36.8 36.7 41.1 45.4 47.2
SI 23.6 24.9 27.4 28.1 29.5 29.4 30.8
SK 34.0 47.2 49.9 48.7 43.3 42.6 44.5
SE 68.1 62.8 52.8 54.4 52.6 52.0 51.6
EUR-12 74.1 72.8 70.4 69.5 69.4 70.7 71.2
EU-25 n.a. n.a. 62.9 62.1 61.6 63.3 62.7
(*) Forecast
Source:  Commission services
General government gross debt
(as percentage of GDP)
declined in Slovakia and Sweden, it has increased 
significantly in each of the other two Member States, and 
should rise further in 2004. Specifically, from 2000 to the 
current year, the government debt ratio is estimated to 
increase by almost 20 percentage points of GDP in the 
Czech Republic and by more than 10 points in Poland. 
In Hungary, the government debt at the end of 2003 (59.1 
percent of GDP) was only marginally below the Treaty 
reference value, while it was slightly above 60 percent of 
GDP at the end of the 1990s. The Hungarian government 
debt ratio is projected to increase to virtually 60 percent 
of GDP in 2004. 
The government debt ratios of Cyprus (70.9 percent of 
GDP at the end of 2003) and Malta (70.4 percent) are 
above the reference value and the ratio has increased very 
quickly in recent years, given their large primary deficits 
and, in the case of Cyprus, large positive stock-flow 
adjustments41. During the three years to end-2003, the 
debt ratio increased by 9¼ percentage points in Cyprus 
and by almost 15 points in Malta. The debt ratio is 
projected to further increase in 2004 in both countries.
                                                 
41  The stock-flow adjustment ensures the consistency between the 
deficit and the variation in the outstanding stock of debt. It includes 
the difference between accrual and cash accounting, the 
accumulation of financial assets, the changes in the value of debt 
denominated in foreign currency and other statistical adjustments. A 
positive stock-flow adjustment means that factors other than the 
government deficit increase the government debt level, while a 
negative stock-flow adjustment contributes to reducing the debt. 
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 Graph 4.2: Government debt dynamics (% of GDP)
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Graph 4.2: Government debt dynamics (% of GDP) (continued)
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Graph 4.2 breaks down the yearly change in the debt ratio 
in three components: the primary balance, the combined 
impact of GDP growth and interest expenditure, which is 
often known as the snow-ball effect or debt-inertia effect, 
and the stock-flow adjustment42. 
                                                 
42 The debt dynamics (or the budgetary constraint) for a country can be 
expressed by the following equation: tttt SFNBDD ++= −1 , 
where t denotes a time subscript, D  the government debt level, NB  
the government deficit (net borrowing) and SF  the stock-flow 
                                                                               
adjustment. With the debt-to-GDP ratio on the left-hand side the 
equation becomes: 
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Y  represents GDP at current market prices and y  the nominal 
GDP growth rate. The equation can now be written as 
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1 , showing the change in 
the gross debt ratio as the sum of the deficit ratio, the contribution of 
nominal GDP growth and the stock-flow adjustment. The equations 
for the debt level and debt ratio can also be presented emphasising 
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 The primary deficit has been the main driver of the 
increase in the debt ratio in most countries. The snow-ball 
effect has been relatively small in many countries as the 
high nominal growth rates registered have offset the 
impact of the interest expenditure. In some cases (for 
example Latvia, Hungary and Slovenia), GDP growth has 
even been above the implicit interest rate on the 
government debt, thus resulting in a debt-decreasing 
snow-ball effect. In the most recent years, the stock-flow 
adjustment has led to a significant increase in the debt 
ratio in Cyprus (2000 to 2003), given the accumulation of 
financial assets, and in Poland (1999, 2002 and 2003) and 
Slovenia (2001 to 2002), because of the effect on the 
foreign currency-denominated debt of the depreciation of 
their national currencies. However, the stock-flow 
adjustment has contributed considerably to reducing the 
debt or to slowing down the debt increase in the Czech 
Republic (2002 and 2003), Lithuania (2000 to 2003) and 
Slovakia (2000 to 2002) because of their privatisation 
programmes. The stock-flow adjustment has been 
consistently positive, that is, debt-increasing, in Estonia 
and Sweden, as the surpluses recorded by their respective 
governments were invested in financial assets, rather than 
allocated to debt repayment. 
4.3. Medium-term prospects 
4.3.1. Convergence programmes 
The Stability and Growth Pact requires each Member 
State to regularly submit information for the purpose of 
                                                                               
the role of the primary deficit ( PD ), i.e. the general government 
deficit excluding interest expenditure ( I ): 
( ) ⇔+++⋅=
− ttttt SFPDiDD 11  
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
Y
SF
Y
PD
y
i
Y
D
Y
D
++
+
+
⋅=
−
−
1
1
1
1 , where 
1−
=
t
t
t D
Ii  denotes 
the implicit interest rate on the government debt. The equation can 
again be rearranged to show the change in the government debt ratio: 
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1 , viz. as the sum of 
the primary deficit ratio, the snow-ball effect (i.e. the combined 
contribution of interest and nominal growth) and the stock-flow 
adjustment, which is the breakdown shown in Graph 4.2. The latter 
equation is also valid if y  and i are expressed in real terms. 
multilateral surveillance in the form of medium-term 
programmes and their annual updates43. These 
programmes, which for Member States that are not yet 
participating in the single currency are called convergence 
programmes, contain the government plans towards 
achieving the medium-term objective of a budgetary 
position of close-to-balance or in surplus and the 
assumptions regarding the development of the key 
economic variables. Based on assessments by the 
Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee, 
the Council is called to examine each programme and in 
particular to assess whether they provide margins for 
ensuring the avoidance of excessive deficits. A similar 
assessment has been undertaken by the Council for the 
subsequent annual updates of the programmes. 
Sweden presented the most recent update of its 
convergence programme, covering the period 2003-2006, 
in early December 2003 and the Council examined it in 
January 200444. The ten new Member States submitted 
their first convergence programmes covering the period 
2004-2007 (2004-2008 for Estonia and Hungary) in May 
2004, that is, immediately after their accession. The 
purpose of this early submission was to put the Council in 
the position of delivering its opinions on the new Member 
States’ budgetary strategies at the same time as it issued 
the recommendations for the correction of the excessive 
deficits for those found to be in such a situation. The 
examination of the programmes, together with the issuing 
of the excessive deficit recommendations, was completed 
by the Council as planned by early July 2004. 
4.3.2. Convergence programme projections for the 
general government balance 
Table 4.4 presents the objectives for the government 
budget balance projected in the convergence programmes. 
                                                 
43  Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies (OJ L 209, 2.8.1997, p. 1), which 
is part of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
44  The programmes submitted by the Member States, as well as the 
Commission’s assessments and the Council’s opinions can be found 
at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/mai
n_en.htm. 
Convergence Report 2004 
Technical Annex 
 62
Table 4.4
Convergence programme projections for the general government balance
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
CZ -12.9 -5.3 -4.7 -3.8 -3.3 :
EE 2.6 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CY -6.3 -5.2 -2.9 -2.2 -1.6 :
LV -1.8 -2.1 -2.2 -2.0 -2.0 :
LT -1.7 -2.7 -2.5 -1.7 -1.5 :
HU -5.9 -4.6 -4.1 -3.6 -3.1 -2.7
MT -9.7 -5.2 -3.7 -2.3 -1.4 :
PL -4.1 -5.7 -4.2 -3.3 -1.5 :
SI -1.8 -1.9 -1.8 -1.5 -0.9 :
SK -3.6 -4.0 -3.9 -3.9 -3.0 :
SE 0.2 0.4 1.2 1.6 : :
Source: Convergence programmes (December 2003 for Sweden and May 2004 for the remaining countries)
(as percentage of GDP)
In the new Member States the programmes generally 
project a significant consolidation of public finances to 
occur in the coming years on the back of the ongoing 
recovery and continuing buoyant growth. 
The consolidation is more pronounced in the six new 
Member States currently in excessive deficit, particularly 
those with the highest initial deficits. By the year 2007 
deficits of at most 3 percent of GDP are aimed for in all 
the new Member States with the exception of the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, where the reduction of the deficit 
below the reference value is foreseen for 200845. The 
planned adjustments over the programmes’ periods relative 
to the 2003 deficit levels are particularly large in the cases 
of the Czech Republic, Malta and Cyprus, although, as 
mentioned above, one-off deficit-increasing operations 
significantly distort the base-year deficit for the first two 
countries. Taking into account these one-offs and the fact 
that deficits are actually foreseen to increase in 2004 in 
some Member States, the largest deficit reductions are 
those planned in the programmes of Malta, Cyprus and 
Poland. The profile of the adjustment in Poland’s 
programme, however, is markedly back-loaded, in contrast 
                                                 
45  The budgetary projections in the Czech convergence programme end 
in 2007 but the programme mentions that the proposed path of deficit 
reduction indicates that the elimination of the excessive deficit would 
be completed by 2008. 
with the front-loaded adjustment in the programmes 
of Malta and Cyprus, the latter being the only 
Member State planning to complete the correction 
of the excessive deficit by 2005. A more gradual 
adjustment is planned in the programmes of 
Hungary, Slovakia and, taking account of the above-
mentioned one-off effects, the Czech Republic. 
A gradual improvement of the budgetary position 
from a deficit below the 3 percent of GDP reference 
value is also planned in the programmes of Slovenia 
and Lithuania, however in the latter only after an 
initial worsening projected in 2004 - partly in 
connection with EU accession - and in both cases 
without reaching a close-to-balance position within 
the programme period. The budget deficit in Latvia 
is planned to stay broadly unchanged at around 2 
percent of GDP throughout the programme period, 
while in Estonia the programme plans a move from 
the surplus registered in 2003 to a balanced budget 
from 2004 onwards. In Sweden the programme 
projects gradually rising surpluses, in line with the 
national budgetary strategy of achieving a surplus of 
2 percent of GDP on average over the cycle. 
In its opinions on the programmes, the Council gave 
an assessment of the balance of risks attached to the 
achievement of the planned budgetary objectives. 
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 For the new Member States the balance of risks is assessed 
as broadly neutral in four cases – Estonia, Latvia, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the other cases the 
balance appears to be tilted to the downside. Negative risks 
include: a mixed record of fiscal consolidation or frequent 
expenditure overruns (in particular, Cyprus, Lithuania, 
Hungary and Slovenia); relatively optimistic 
macroeconomic assumptions (in particular, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland and Slovenia); uncertainty about 
the degree of implementation (in particular, Poland); and 
pending accounting issues. 
Accounting issues, which concern in particular 
Sweden and Poland, but also some other new 
Member States, refer mainly to the impact on the 
government balance of a recent Eurostat decision on 
the classification of pension schemes. The decision 
clarifies that funded defined-contribution pension 
schemes cannot be treated in the national accounts 
as social security and therefore are classified outside 
the general government (see Box 4.2). 
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Box 4.2: Pension reforms, the classification of pension schemes and the government balance 
 
Pension reforms 
 
Most EU Member States, including those that are considered in this report, have reformed, are reforming or will 
reform, their pension systems to overcome the population ageing challenge and keep sustainable government 
finance. Pension reforms may encompass changes in the retirement age, the level of social contributions or 
adjustments in the parameters that determine the pension rights of each individual. The impact of these parametric 
reforms on the government balance at different horizons simply depends on whether the reform leads to higher or 
lower contributions and benefits between the government and the private sectors in each period. 
 
Systemic reforms and the delimitation of general government 
 
The impact on the government balance of systemic reforms – replacing or complementing pay-as-you-go systems 
with funded systems, and changing defined-benefit schemes (DB) to defined-contribution schemes (DC) – is more 
complex, as such reforms may lead to changes in the delimitation of general government, that is, on the units that 
are classified by statisticians as government and those that are classified elsewhere. If a pension scheme is 
classified in the government sector, contributions collected and benefits paid by the scheme are government 
revenue and expenditure and contribute to the government balance. If a pension scheme is classified as a private 
pension fund, its contributions and benefits contribute to the private sector balance. 
  
The Eurostat decision of 2 March 2004 
 
The accounting rules that are relevant for the compilation of the government deficit/surplus are established by the 
European System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA). However, some of the ESA rules are too generic and 
need to be interpreted and clarified to be applied to specific cases. Concerning the sectoral classification of pension 
schemes, ESA simply states that pension schemes classified in government are those which are “imposed, 
controlled and financed by government”. On 2 March 2004, Eurostat clarified that funded DC pension schemes did 
not fulfil these criteria. Pensions paid by funded DC schemes depend primarily on financial markets performance 
and therefore are not controlled by government. Moreover, pensions paid by those schemes are financed by 
reserves that are not economically owned by government. Therefore, funded DC pension schemes cannot be 
classified in the government sector. The Eurostat decision on the classification of pension schemes is valid even if 
when DC schemes are mandatory, are managed by government (for example, managed by the same government 
agency in charge of the pay-as-you-go pillar) and there is some government guarantee of a minimum pension (*). 
 
The Eurostat decision was based mainly on two considerations on who bears the risk of the pension scheme and 
who is the economic owner of the existing reserves. In the case of unfunded pension systems or of funded DB 
schemes, the government bears most economic risks, as the benefits to be paid are known beforehand or, at least, 
the award formulas are well defined in advance. The government is responsible for financing pension payments, 
irrespective of economic conditions, for example changes in the value of the existing reserves. In the case of funded 
DC schemes, the risk of positive and negative financial developments, in particular changes in the value and 
performance of the pension scheme’s reserves, is borne by the scheme members (the pensioners and the future 
pensioners) and not by the government. Therefore, the reserves of funded DC schemes belong – from an economic 
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 viewpoint, even if not from a legal perspective – to the scheme members. The contributions paid to the funded DC 
schemes are saving of the scheme members; the scheme members are lending a share of their saving to the pension 
schemes and will be reimbursed through the payment of pensions in future. 
 
The classification of funded DC schemes in a sector other than general government implies that contributions 
collected and pensions paid by these schemes are not government revenue and expenditure, and do not contribute to 
the government balance. Therefore, when a government decides to create a new funded DC pension scheme and 
transfers to this new scheme a share of the social contributions that were previously collected by an unfunded 
pension scheme, the short-term government balance will probably worsen, as government revenue falls. However, 
the pensions that will be paid in future by the new pension scheme will not count as government expenditure – as 
they will be paid by a unit classified in the private sector. This means that such a reform will improve the 
government balance in the longer term at the cost of a deterioration in the short term. 
Quantitative implications of the Eurostat decision 
The Polish second pillar, which was created in the context of the 1999 social security reform, has been classified by 
the Polish statistical office in the government sector, but Eurostat has not yet confirmed whether this is correct, as 
the government is still amending some details of the pension system. In case a sectoral reclassification of the Polish 
second pillar is needed, the government deficit will have to be revised upwards by 1½ to 1¾ percent of GDP. 
Slovakia has recently adopted a pension reform which creates new pension schemes as from 2005. The reform 
might lead to an increase in the government deficit by up to 1 percent of GDP, unless the new scheme were 
classified in the government sector (the Slovak convergence programme, unlike that of Poland, also presents 
budgetary objectives including the estimated impact of the classification of the second-pillar schemes outside the 
government sector, which are those considered by the Council in assessing the programme). In the case of Sweden, 
a sectoral reclassification of their funded DC pensions schemes would imply a decline in their respective 
government surpluses by around 1 percent of GDP, while Denmark has already revised Downward its surplus by 
around 1 percent of GDP. 
There are also funded DC schemes in other countries, such as Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary, which are already 
classified outside government. In Hungary, the effect on the government deficit of the classification of the new 
pension scheme is currently ¾ percent of GDP, but might increase in future years to close to 1 percent of GDP. The 
amounts involved seem to be very small (less than 0.1 percent of GDP) in the case of Latvia, but might increase to 
around ½ percent of GDP by the end of the decade. In the case of Lithuania, the amounts at stake are close to ¼ 
percent of GDP but are expected to increase to ¾ percent of GDP by 2008. 
On 23 September 2004 (**), Eurostat acknowledged that “some Member States might need a transitional period to 
implement the decision and to avoid disruptions in the conduct of their budgetary policies. This transitional period 
will expire with the notification of 2007”. At the time this report is adopted, it is not yet clear which Member States 
will benefit from the transitional period granted by Eurostat. 
(*) Eurostat News Release No 30/2004 of 2 March 2004. 
(**) Eurostat News Release No 117/2004 of 23 September 2004. 
 
As mentioned above, the Council recommendations for 
the correction of the excessive deficits in the six new 
Member States were issued at the same time as the 
opinions on the convergence programmes of all new 
Member States. These recommendations represent a 
critical endorsement of the medium-term adjustment 
strategies contained in the respective convergence 
programmes. Therefore Cyprus is recommended to 
complete the correction of the excessive deficit in 2005, 
Malta is given until 2006 to complete the correction, 
Poland and Slovakia until 2007 and the Czech Republic 
and Hungary until 2008. Cyprus and Malta are also 
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Table 4.5
Convergence programme projections for general government gross debt
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
CZ 37.6 38.4 39.7 41.0 41.7 :
EE 5.8 5.4 5.1 4.7 3.4 3.2
CY 72.6 75.2 74.8 71.5 68.4 :
LV 15.3 16.2 16.8 17.3 17.7 :
LT 21.5 22.4 22.2 21.4 21.0 :
HU 59.1 59.4 57.9 56.8 55.6 53.7
MT 72.0 72.1 72.4 70.5 70.4 :
PL 45.3 49.0 51.9 52.7 52.3
SI 28.6 29.1 29.5 29.4 28.4 :
SK 42.8 45.1 46.4 46.1 45.5 :
SE 51.7 51.5 50.0 48.3 : :
Source: Convergence programmes (December 2003 for Sweden and May 2004 for the remaining countries)
(as percentage of GDP)
recommended to reverse the rising trends in the debt 
ratios in line with their respective programmes (see next 
subsection). 
4.3.3. Convergence programme projections for the 
debt 
The evolution of the government debt ratios projected in 
the convergence programmes broadly mirrors that of the 
deficits (Table 4.5). Reflecting also high rates of nominal 
GDP growth, debt ratios are projected to be on a declining 
path in most of the new Member States from 2006 and in 
2007 to fall below or close to their 2003 levels in all of 
them except the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland and 
Slovakia. Only in the first two, however, a relatively 
significant increase is projected in the debt ratio over the 
programme period, although to a level remaining below 
the 60 percent of GDP reference value, while Latvia 
would continue to rank as one of the lowest-debt 
countries. 
 
The two Member States that registered government debts 
above 60 percent of GDP in 2003 – Cyprus and Malta – 
do not project to remedy this situation within the horizon 
of their convergence programmes. Their debt ratios – 
which are still increasing – are expected to start declining 
in 2005 or 2006, respectively. Though the debt criterion is 
fulfilled if the government debt ratio “is sufficiently 
diminishing and approaching the reference value at a 
satisfactory pace” (see Box 4.1), it is important to extend 
in time the budgetary projections of these two countries to 
test how long it may take them to reduce the debt ratio 
below the Treaty reference value. This can be done, on an 
illustrative basis, with the help of some simple 
assumptions. 
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 Table 4.6
Convergence of debt ratios in Cyprus and Malta
Debt in 2000
(% of GDP)
Debt in 2003
(% of GDP)
Debt in 2007
(% of GDP)*
Change in debt 
ratio 2000-2007 
(% points of 
GDP)
Change in debt 
ratio 2003-2007 
(% points of 
GDP)
Number of 
years from 2003 
to bring debt 
ratio below 
60% of GDP**
Year when debt 
falls below 60% 
of GDP**
CY 61.6 70.9 68.4 6.8 -2.5 9 2012
MT 56.4 71.1 70.4 14.0 -0.7 11 2014
Source:  Commission services and convergence programmes
** The calculations to project the debt ratios beyond 2007, the final year covered in the convergence programmes, assume that the programmes' targets are fully 
respected, that the primary surpluses are kept at the level of 2007 (2.0% of GDP for Cyprus and 2.2% for Malta), that the real GDP growth after 2007 corresponds to the 
long-term average 1995-2004 (3.7% for Cyprus and 2.9% for Malta), that the implicit interest rate on the government debt is 6%, that the inflation rate is 2% and that the 
stock-flow adjustment is zero.
* As projected in the convergence programmes submitted in May 2004.
 
Assuming that Cyprus and Malta fulfil the targets in their 
convergence programmes until 2007 and that, afterwards, 
they keep primary surpluses at the level projected for 
2007, their debt ratios will fall below 60 percent of GDP 
within nine to eleven years from 2003, that is by 2012 in 
the case of Cyprus and 2014 in the case of Malta. The 
other assumptions, specifically, on economic growth and 
the interest rate on the government debt are detailed in the 
note to Table 4.6. However, one should stress the 
mechanistic nature of these projections, and the very 
different outcomes that would result from relatively small 
deviations from the assumptions. For example, primary 
surpluses 1 percent of GDP smaller, and GDP growth 
rates ½ percent lower, than assumed would lead to debt 
ratios above 60 percent of GDP beyond 2020 in the case 
of Cyprus and 2030 in the case of Malta. The opposite 
effect would result from a lower than assumed real 
interest rate. It should also be noted that the debt 
projections of the scenario described in Table 4.6 were 
made setting stock-flow adjustments at zero. Experience 
in other Member States has shown that stock-flow 
adjustments are very often debt-increasing. While the 
average stock-flow adjustment since 2000 has been 
negative in Malta, it has been significantly positive in 
Cyprus (+2.6 percent of GDP per year on average since 
2000). If the average stock-flow adjustment for Cyprus 
were kept at that level in future, the gross debt ratio 
would keep increasing, instead of stabilising or declining, 
even if all the other assumptions in Table 4.6 were 
respected. 
4.4. Developments by Member State 
The following subsections discuss, for each of the eleven 
Member States, the pace of budgetary consolidation in 
recent years and the outlook for 2004. They also 
summarise the main points of the Council’s assessment of 
the medium-term budgetary prospects as depicted in the 
respective convergence programmes. The section on 
Sweden starts with a summary of the assessment in the 
2002 Convergence Report. 
4.4.1. Czech Republic 
The general government deficit has been on an upward 
trend since the end of the 1990s reaching a peak of 12.6 
percent of GDP in 2003. The steady widening of the 
deficit has reflected both expansionary fiscal policies, in 
particular, rapidly increasing social expenditure, and one-
off charges linked to the restructuring of the economy, in 
particular the operation of the Czech Consolidation 
Agency (CKA), and the imputation of state guarantees46. 
                                                 
46
 In accordance with ESA95 methodology, the Czech authorities 
imputed high-risk state guarantees provided by the government as 
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In the period 1995-2002, mandatory social expenditure 
(including pensions, sickness benefits and family 
allowances) grew twice as fast as total general 
government expenditure, resulting in both higher deficits 
and crowding out of other public expenditure. At the 
same time, the Czech state took over bad assets, mainly 
through the operations of the CKA, and extended 
guarantees to the private sector with corresponding 
negative effects on the public accounts. For instance, 
reflecting the operations of the CKA, the 2002 deficit of 
3.9 percent of GDP notified in April 2003 was revised 
upwards in August to 6.7 percent of GDP. 
The budget planning for the year 2003 took place after 
parliamentary elections in June 2002 and the transition to 
a new government. The 2003 pre-accession economic 
programme targeted the general government deficit to 
increase from 6.7 percent in 2002 to 7.6 percent of GDP 
in 2003. Due to a one-off imputation of state guarantees, 
the 2003 deficit reached 12.6 percent of GDP. However, 
without the imputed state guarantees, the deficit would 
have been less than 6 percent of GDP, lower than 
expected in the 2003 pre-accession programme, in spite of 
additional one-off spending related to the arbitration 
proceedings against the CME47 and expenditure for repair 
works after the 2002 floods. Specifically, revenues of the 
state budget were 2 percent higher than expected in the 
budget presented in December 2002. To this result 
contributed in particular VAT receipts (3.6 percent higher 
than expected), and excise duties (8 percent higher than 
expected) related to high household consumption in the 
second half of the year. On the expenditure side, 
unemployment benefits and capital expenditure were 
substantially higher than planned, by 10.3 percent and 9.2 
percent respectively, but overall, total expenditures were 
only 1.6 percent higher than foreseen in the budget. 
The target for the general government deficit in 2004 is 
5.3 percent of GDP, marginally lower than the 2003 
outcome excluding imputed state guarantees. On the 
                                                                               
capital transfers into the general government deficit and debt figures 
since 1994. 
47  In 1993, CME (Central-European Media Enterprises Group) bought 
the first Czech private TV broadcaster NOVA. CME sued the Czech 
Republic for not protecting its investment. In 2003, the Czech 
Republic lost the case before the arbitration court in Stockholm, 
forfeiting almost 0.5 percent of GDP. 
revenue side, higher VAT and excise duties are expected 
to more than compensate for the fall in the corporate 
income tax rate from 31 percent to 28 percent. The overall 
budgetary impact of these tax changes on the general 
government balance is projected to be 0.9 percent of 
GDP. The implementation of new VAT rates from 1 May 
2004 resulted in a further increase of the average effective 
tax rate. Despite higher expected tax revenues, the overall 
revenue ratio in 2004 is expected to remain at the level of 
2003 reflecting a decline in other revenues. On the 
expenditure side, additional measures were taken as of 
June 2004 to mitigate the social consequences of the 
higher indirect tax burden. They include permanent as 
well as one-off additional social spending for the retired 
and for families with children. After the government crisis 
in summer, the new Czech government decided to follow 
the original budgetary plans for 2004. The better-than-
expected economic performance and the satisfactory 
execution of the 2004 budget in the first eight months 
indicate that the 2004 deficit target is likely to be met. 
The Czech convergence programme, which covers the 
period 2004-2007, was examined by the Council on 5 
July 200448. The programme foresees the deficit to be 
reduced to 3.3 percent of GDP in 2007 and to fall further 
thereafter, with the following intermediate targets: 5.3 
percent of GDP in 2004, 4.7 percent of GDP in 2005 and 
3.8 percent of GDP in 2006. The adjustment path does not 
appear very ambitious, taking also into account the 
projected recovery in the economy and the absence of 
fundamental reforms in social expenditure. The macro-
economic scenario underlying the programme reflects 
cautious growth assumptions. The risks to the budgetary 
projections appear broadly balanced. On the one hand, the 
cautious macroeconomic scenario suggests that revenues 
could be better than expected and that expenditures could 
be less than budgeted. On the other hand, there are risk 
linked to the implementation of tax reform, specifically, 
the impact of the numerous coinciding tax changes in 
2004 on the behaviour of economic agents. In addition, 
important savings measures, particularly regarding 
government consumption, still need to be agreed upon. 
Overall, the budgetary stance in the programme should be 
                                                 
48  See footnote 45. 
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 Table 4.7
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(*)
General government balance -5.0 -3.6 -3.7 -5.9 -6.8 -12.6 -5.0
 - Total revenue 38.8 39.2 38.5 39.1 40.2 41.9 42.3
 - Total expenditure 43.8 42.9 42.1 45.0 46.9 54.5 47.3
   of which :  - Interest expenditure 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.3
 - Primary expenditure 42.6 41.9 41.3 43.9 45.4 53.2 46.0
 - GFCF 4.1 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.7 4.2 4.3
Primary balance -3.8 -2.6 -2.8 -4.8 -5.2 -11.3 -3.6
pm  Tax burden 34.0 34.8 34.5 34.6 35.5 36.5 36.6
Government debt 15.0 16.0 18.2 25.3 28.8 37.8 37.9
pm Real GDP growth (%) -1.1 1.2 3.9 2.6 1.5 3.1 3.8
pm HICP inflation (%) 9.7 1.8 3.9 4.5 1.4 -0.1 2.8
(*) Forecast
Source:  Commission services
Czech Republic: budgetary developments
(as percentage of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
sufficient to reduce the deficit to the 3 percent of GDP 
deficit threshold by 2008. 
The debt-to-GDP ratio more than doubled between 1998 
and 2003, when it reached 37.8 percent of GDP. The 
steep increase in the debt ratio since 2002 is due to a 
combination of high government deficits, the assumption 
of considerable contingent liabilities and a drop in 
privatisation proceeds. The debt ratio is projected to 
further increase by 3.9 percentage points over the 
convergence programme period, reaching 41.7 percent of 
GDP in 2007. 
4.4.2. Estonia 
Estonian fiscal policy has been relatively tight throughout 
the entire stabilisation and early transition period of the 
1990s. The authorities have consistently kept public 
finances under control by targeting balanced budgets on 
an annual basis. Fiscal consolidation in the late 1990s was 
brought about by a falling expenditure-to-GDP ratio, 
while revenues, despite tax reductions, were sustained by 
generally strong economic growth. The exception was 
1999, when real GDP declined as a consequence of the 
1998 Russian crisis, and the general government deficit 
rose to a one-time high of 4 percent of GDP. It was 
rapidly brought down to 0.3 percent of GDP already in 
the following year and in 2001 a small surplus of 0.3 
percent of GDP was reached. Since then, solid surpluses 
have marked the fiscal picture. 
In 2003, general government posted a surprise surplus of 
3.1 percent of GDP. This outcome compared favourably 
with a targeted surplus of 0.4 percent of GDP in the 
August 2003 pre-accession economic programme. The 
positive result was achieved not only through somewhat 
stronger-than-projected real GDP growth of 5.1 percent, 
but also through improved tax collection, despite 
additional election-induced spending in 2003, and 
considerable deficits of local government. 
Estonia’s budgetary target for 2004, as outlined by the 
recent budget proposal for 2005, is for the general 
government account to remain in surplus of 0.3 percent of 
GDP. Moving from a comfortable surplus of 3.1 percent 
of GDP in 2003 to a much smaller one implies a 
considerable easing of fiscal policy. Yet, the country has a 
track record of fiscal prudence, as both GDP growth and 
budgetary results tended to exceed targets in recent years. 
Downside risks may derive mainly from cuts in direct 
taxes that may lead to an unexpectedly high revenue 
shortfall, or from adverse growth developments stemming 
from possible exogenous shocks. On the whole, the 
budgetary outcome for 2004 looks set to be broadly in 
line or even above the target because of likely higher-
than-projected growth, and improving tax collection. 
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The Estonian convergence programme, which covers the 
period 2004-2008, was examined by the Council on 5 
July 200449. The programme’s budgetary strategy aims at 
maintaining sound public finances defined as budgetary 
position of close-to-balance or in surplus. To this end, the 
programme targets a small surplus of 0.7 percent of GDP 
in 200450 and balanced budgets from 2005 onwards, 
accompanied by a gradual reduction in both the revenue 
and expenditure ratio, following a rise in both ratios in 
2004 in connection with EU accession. In particular, the 
programme incorporates reforms resulting in reduced 
direct taxes, combined with increased transfer payments 
and tax allowances. Strong growth, improved tax 
collection, savings on the expenditure side and changes to 
the spending structure along with increased VAT and 
excise duty revenues are projected to finance these 
reforms. 
The programme’s macroeconomic scenario assumes that 
real GDP growth will accelerate from 4.7 percent in 
200351 to 5.3 percent in 2004 and further to close to 6 
percent p.a. over the rest of the programme period. The 
main sources of growth would be domestic demand 
expanding at around 7 percent p.a. and strengthening 
export growth of up to 10 percent annually. Private 
consumption is projected to grow at annual rates of 
between 5 and 6 percent. Investment is set to stay lively, 
expanding at between 7 and 9 percent per year, albeit no 
longer at rates above 10 percent as was the case in recent 
years. Consumer price inflation is set to increase to rates 
around 3 percent p.a. starting in 2004, after a record low 
of 1.3 percent in 2003.  
                                                 
49  See footnote 45. 
50 This target was in the meantime revised downward to a surplus of 0.3 
percent of GDP in 2004, following the proposal of a supplementary 
budget to the tune of 0.4 percent of GDP to Parliament in September 
2004. 
51 Following a statistical methodology change, GDP levels were revised 
upward.  
The projections appear on the whole plausible. As far as 
GDP growth is concerned, they contain a certain margin 
of prudence, given that growth has been stronger than 
expected in the first half of 2004, at 6.3 percent year-on-
year. Therefore there is a distinct possibility of stronger-
than-projected growth for the whole year  2004. The 
external account deficit is set to decline from 13.7 percent 
of GDP in 2003 to around 8 percent of GDP by 2008. 
Nonetheless, the correction of the external balance will 
most certainly be delayed, and the deficit is expected to 
remain around a ratio of 13 percent of GDP also in 2004. 
The risks to the budgetary projections appear broadly 
balanced. On the one hand, Estonia has established a track 
record of prudent forecasting and repeated overshooting 
of fiscal targets over the past few years. On the other 
hand, an unexpected revenue shortfall from the planned 
tax cuts, or an adverse impact on growth from exogenous 
shocks cannot be excluded altogether. Therefore the 
budgetary stance in the programme seems sufficient to 
maintain the Stability and Growth Pact’s medium-term 
objective of a budgetary position of close-to-balance or in 
surplus; it should also provide a sufficient safety margin 
against breaching the 3 percent of GDP deficit threshold 
with normal macroeconomic fluctuations. 
At less than 5 percent of GDP, Estonia’s debt-to-GDP 
ratio is almost the lowest in the EU. The debt ratio is set 
to decline further. Because of its limited size, public debt 
- which is entirely covered by public sector reserves - is a 
negligible risk to the Estonian economy. 
Chapter 4 
Government budgetary position 
71
 Table 4.8
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(*)
General government balance -0.3 -3.7 -0.6 0.3 1.4 3.1 0.3
 - Total revenue 38.9 38.8 37.7 37.2 38.0 38.9 37.6
 - Total expenditure 39.3 42.6 38.2 36.9 36.6 35.8 37.3
   of which :  - Interest expenditure 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
 - Primary expenditure 38.8 42.2 37.9 36.7 36.3 35.6 37.0
 - GFCF 4.7 4.2 3.9 4.1 4.7 3.4 4.4
Primary balance 0.1 -3.4 -0.2 0.5 1.7 3.3 0.6
pm  Tax burden 34.8 34.4 32.4 31.6 32.4 33.4 32.3
Government debt 5.6 6.0 4.7 4.4 5.3 5.3 4.8
pm Real GDP growth (%) 5.2 -0.1 7.8 6.4 7.2 5.1 5.9
pm HICP inflation (%) 8.8 3.1 3.9 5.6 3.6 1.4 3.2
(*) Forecast
Source : Commission services
Estonia: budgetary developments
(as percentage of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
 
4.4.3. Cyprus 
In the period 1998-2003, Cyprus showed a mixed record of 
fiscal consolidation, with the general government deficit of 
around 4.5 percent of GDP in both 1998 and 1999. 
Following the introduction of an adjustment plan in 1999, 
fiscal consolidation efforts managed to reduce the deficit 
to 2.4 percent of GDP in 2000 and 2001, but slippage 
occurred again in 2002 and 2003 and the deficit reached 
6.3 percent in 2003. 
Slippages were due to low growth linked to adverse 
external conditions (which affected notably tourism) but 
also to government expenditure overruns including both 
high defence outlays and discretionary measures aimed at 
offsetting the economic downturn. At the same time, a 
staged tax reform was implemented in mid-2002 aimed at 
lowering direct taxation and increasing indirect taxation. 
Indirect tax revenue did increase but the package was not 
implemented as originally planned, as concessions were 
made, mainly in the form of compensatory transfers, in 
order to secure broad political support for the reform. 
For 2003, the original target for the general government 
deficit provided in the 2002 pre-accession economic 
programme was 1.9 percent of GDP, with an expected 
GDP growth rate of 4.6 percent. However, the same 
factors that had led to an increase in the general 
government deficit in 2002 (an adverse external 
environment resulting in lower GDP growth, 
increased government spending and revenue 
shortfalls) brought a widening of the deficit to 6.3 
percent of GDP in 2003. Total tax receipts increased 
by 9 percent, with a 25 percent increase in indirect 
tax revenues (owing partly to a rise in the VAT rate 
from 13 percent to 15 percent in January 2003) more 
than offsetting an 8 percent decline in direct tax 
revenues. However, expenditure swelled more 
rapidly at 18 percent, due to a rapid rise in wage 
expenditure and the compensating social 
expenditure measures linked to the tax reform 
mentioned above. Taking into account these 
compensatory measures, the tax reform is estimated 
to have produced a negative net impact on the 
general government balance in 2003 of about 1.5 
percent of GDP. Finally, capital expenditure jumped 
by 30 percent in nominal terms as part of a 
discretionary fiscal policy effort aimed at 
counteracting the economic slowdown. 
For 2004, the general government deficit target is 
set at 5.2 percent of GDP. The outcome is likely to 
be broadly in line with the target, given that GDP 
growth so far appears to be in line with expectations 
and that the convergence programme introduces 
additional corrective budgetary measures. Revenues 
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should benefit from, inter alia, increases in fees for public 
services and measures to improve tax administration and 
tax compliance. On expenditure, a multi-year framework 
will gradually be implemented that includes measures to 
contain wages and increase civil service efficiency, and 
ceilings on, or reductions of, defence outlays, subsidies 
and other current transfers. 
The Cypriot convergence programme, which covers the 
period 2004-2007, was examined by the Council on 5 July 
200452. The budgetary strategy underlying the programme 
aims at reducing the deficit from 6.3 percent of GDP in 
2003 to 2.9 percent by 2005 and to 2.2 percent in 2006 and 
1.6 percent by 2007. This is underpinned by a package of 
mostly structural measures to contain expenditure, which 
is where historically most of the slippage occurred, and 
both structural and one-off measures to increase revenue, 
to about an equal degree. The measures are mostly 
implemented from 2005 onward. The adjustment path 
reflects the government’s commitment to improve public 
finances given their intention to adopt the euro by 2007; 
this is the main factor behind the strong frontloading of the 
fiscal adjustment in 2005. Given the mixed record on fiscal 
consolidation, the target for 2005 looks rather ambitious 
and therefore requires a strong commitment, including 
taking additional measures if necessary, for its 
implementation. 
                                                 
52  See footnote 45. 
The macroeconomic scenario underlying the 
programme, which projects real GDP growth to 
increase from 3.5 percent in 2004 to 4.5 percent in 
2007, seems to reflect plausible growth assumptions. 
Nevertheless, budgetary outcomes could be worse 
than projected, especially concerning the 
achievement of the objective for 2005, given the 
size of the adjustment and the fiscal consolidation 
record of Cyprus. 
During 1998-2000 the debt ratio remained relatively 
stable at about 62 percent of GDP but then resumed 
an upward trend from 2001 onward, reaching 64.3 
percent in 2001 and 70.9 percent in 2003. The 
increase in the debt ratio was driven by primary 
deficits, as well as sizeable stock-flow adjustments. 
For the period 2004-2007, the convergence 
programme projects the debt ratio to peak at 72.6 
percent in 2004 and then to decline by almost 7 
percentage points by 2007. The projected decline in 
the debt ratio is mainly driven by the increasingly 
positive primary balances and nominal GDP growth 
exceeding the average interest rate on government 
debt in 2005-2007. However, the evolution of the 
debt ratio may be less favourable than projected 
given the risks to the deficit outcomes mentioned 
above. 
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 Table 4.9
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(*)
General government balance -4.3 -4.5 -2.4 -2.4 -4.6 -6.4 -5.2
 - Total revenue 34.3 34.2 36.3 38.0 37.3 39.7 40.6
 - Total expenditure 38.6 38.7 38.7 40.4 41.9 46.1 45.8
   of which :  - Interest expenditure 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.6 3.3 3.5 3.5
 - Primary expenditure 35.4 35.5 35.2 36.8 38.7 42.6 42.3
 - GFCF 3.0 2.6 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.4 3.5
Primary balance -1.1 -1.4 1.1 1.2 -1.3 -2.9 -1.7
pm  Tax burden 29.1 29.5 31.4 32.7 32.5 33.9 :
Government debt 61.6 62.0 61.6 64.3 67.4 70.9 72.6
pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.8 4.7 5.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 3.5
pm HICP inflation (%) 2.3 1.1 4.9 2.0 2.8 4.0 2.4
(*) Forecast
Source : Commission services
Cyprus: budgetary developments
(as percentage of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
 
 
4.4.4. Latvia 
Between 1998 and 2003, the budgetary position of 
Latvia exhibited a high degree of variability, partly 
reflecting exceptional factors (notably the Russian crisis 
in 1998). The general government budget deficit 
increased sharply from 0.7 percent of GDP in 1998 to 
5.3 percent of GDP in 1999. Fiscal consolidation efforts 
were considerable from 1999, but weakened again in 
the run-up to the October 2002 general election. 
Fiscal consolidation efforts during the period 1998-
2003 were of a rather ad-hoc nature and not firmly 
embedded in a medium-term fiscal framework. The 
government pursued a policy of corporate income tax 
reductions, which were only partly offset by increased 
non-tax revenues. Compensating measures on the 
expenditure side were limited and not of a structural 
nature. In 2002, the general government deficit 
increased to 2.7 percent of GDP, up from 1.6 percent in 
2001, and significantly above the initial target of 1.4 
percent of GDP set by the government. Higher 
expenditure in 2002 reflected supplementary spending 
of main ministries approved at the end of the year, as 
well as a higher-than-expected deficit of local 
government, the latter widened by significant wage 
increases. 
In 2003, the general government deficit narrowed to 1.5 
percent of GDP, about half the targeted deficit of 2.9 
percent set in the 2002 pre-accession economic 
programme. The overachievement of the target was 
mainly due to better-than-expected tax and contribution 
revenues, reflecting improvements in tax collection as 
well as higher-than-expected growth, and occurred 
despite a reduction of the main social contribution rate 
from 35 percent to 33 percent. Expenditure control by 
the government was tight and total expenditure did not 
reach the initially allocated amount. The reduction in 
the general government deficit also owed to an 
improvement in the balances of local government and 
social security. This end-result was particularly positive 
in the light of the fiscal slippage of 2002. For 2004, the 
Latvian convergence programme targets a general 
government deficit of 2.1 percent of GDP53. In light of 
the actual 2003 outcome of a deficit of 1.5 percent, this 
target amounts to a moderate deterioration of the 
budgetary position stemming from a decrease in the 
revenue-to-GDP ratio not completely offset by a 
reduction in the expenditure-to-GDP ratio. The 2004 
budget reflected most of the government’s structural 
reform agenda for the current legislative period, both on 
the revenue and expenditure sides, most notably 
                                                 
53 The deficit figure for 2004 that was submitted by the authorities 
for the autumn fiscal notification is set to 1.9 percent of GDP. 
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strengthening tax collection efficiency, financing the 
ongoing public sector reform and meeting obligations 
of EU and NATO membership. The authorities also 
plan to increase expenditure on projects with 
recognized priorities of increasing competitiveness and 
supporting employment growth and development of 
human resources, and infrastructure with support from 
EU funds. On the revenue side, the budget incorporated 
the ongoing tax reform, including a reduction of the 
corporate income tax rate from 19 percent in 2003 to 15 
percent. Revenues from customs duties are expected to 
decline, with a further cut in the overall tax burden to 
29.5 percent of GDP, partly compensated by a higher 
GDP share of non-tax revenues mostly linked to 
receipts of EU funding. In August the Latvian 
Parliament approved amendments to the budget law to 
provide for additional expenditure in 2004 of nearly 
65.8 million lats. Around one-third of the new 
expenditures goes to the agricultural sector and one-
sixth to wage increases of teachers. While the budget 
target remains unchanged at 2 percent of GDP, and is 
likely to be met in the light of very strong growth and 
an emerging tax overshoot in the first half of 2004, the 
implicit decision not to use the additional revenues to 
lower the deficit goes against recommendations of the 
Council opinion on the Convergence Programme of 
Latvia to use any extra revenues to lower the deficit. 
The Latvian convergence programme, which covers the 
period 2004-2007, was examined by the Council on 5 
July 200454. The programme envisages a slight increase 
of the general government budget deficit of 0.1 
percentage point of GDP in 2005, followed by an 
improvement of 0.2 percentage points to 2.0 percent of 
GDP in 2006; the budget balance remains unchanged at 
2.0 percent of GDP in 2007.  
                                                 
54 See footnote 45. 
The lack of fiscal consolidation over these years is 
ascribed to the limited room for fiscal manoeuvre due to 
the cost of economic restructuring and partly EU-
financed spending plans. Over the programme period, 
revenue and expenditure shares are projected to 
decrease by around 1 percentage point of GDP. On the 
revenue side this is partly explained by the ongoing tax 
reform; nonetheless, tax collection efficiency is 
assumed to strengthen over the programme period and 
significant EU funding should be received by the end of 
the period. Firm expenditure control is assumed to 
operate in parallel. The macroeconomic scenario 
provided in the programme envisages average GDP 
growth of 6.7 percent for the 2004-2005 period, with a 
slight easing to 6.5 percent in the two latter years of the 
programme. Domestic demand is foreseen to remain the 
main driver of growth, primarily led by high investment 
and private consumption growth. In addition to 
vulnerability to external demand shocks, risks to growth 
stem from structural constraints. Overall, the 
macroeconomic projections are plausible though 
leaning towards the optimistic side. The relatively 
modest programme targets should therefore be 
attainable, with the single most important threat being 
an unforeseen slowdown of growth. 
The general government debt ratio increased steadily 
albeit modestly from 10.6 percent in 1998 to 14.9 
percent in 2001, though was reduced to 14.4 percent in 
2003. The main factor shaping debt dynamics was the 
primary deficit, significantly offset by rapid nominal 
GDP growth and, in 2002, the effect of currency 
appreciation. The convergence programme foresees the 
debt ratio increasing to 17.7 percent of GDP in 2007. 
The main driving force of the growing debt ratio is 
again the primary deficit; stock-flow adjustments are 
projected to be small. Through the programme period 
the contribution of interest outlays remains broadly at 
the 2003 level, while nominal GDP growth has a 
substantial ratio-reducing effect. 
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 Table 4.10
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(*)
General government balance -0.6 -4.9 -2.8 -2.1 -2.7 -1.5 -2.0
 - Total revenue 40.6 37.4 35.1 34.4 33.1 34.5 33.5
 - Total expenditure 41.3 42.3 37.9 36.5 35.8 36.0 35.5
   of which :  - Interest expenditure 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8
 - Primary expenditure 40.4 41.5 36.9 35.6 35.0 35.2 34.7
 - GFCF 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.5 2.0
Primary balance 0.2 -4.1 -1.8 -1.1 -1.9 -0.7 -1.3
pm  Tax burden : : : : : : :
Government debt 9.8 12.6 12.9 14.9 14.1 14.4 14.7
pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.7 3.3 6.9 8.0 6.4 7.5 7.5
pm HICP inflation (%) 4.3 2.1 2.6 2.5 2.0 2.9 6.8
(*) Forecast
Source:  Commission services
Latvia: budgetary developments
(as percentage of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
 
4.4.5. Lithuania 
In recent years, the budgetary position of Lithuania was 
marked by a significant decline in the general government 
deficit, from 5.7 percent of GDP in 1999 to 1.5 percent in 
2002. The deficit increased to 1.9 percent in 2003. 
Fiscal consolidation was primarily the result of a cut in 
expenditure from 42.9 percent of GDP in 1999 to 34.3 
percent in 2002. The expenditure adjustment was 
concentrated on primary spending, particularly 
government consumption and social transfers. Lower 
interest expenditure, induced by a steady decline in 
interest rates, also contributed to the adjustment. General 
government revenues fell from 37.3 percent of GDP in 
1999 to 32.8 percent in 2002. The decrease of the tax-
revenue ratio was largely due to the introduction of a 
number of tax benefits and exemptions from corporate 
and personal income tax. A decline in dividend income, 
levies and interest earnings, related to the sale of 
government assets, was the major factor explaining a 
decrease in non-tax revenues over the same period. 
In 2003, the general government deficit increased slightly 
to 1.9 percent of GDP on the back of very strong growth, 
undershooting the 2.4 percent of GDP target foreseen in 
the budget for 2003. Revenues were overshot thanks to a 
0.5 percent of GDP higher surplus than planned by social 
security, higher-than-expected corporate and personal 
income tax revenues by 0.8 percent of GDP (partly due to 
better administration of personal income tax and the 
elimination of exemptions for reinvested profits) and a 
better-than-expected budgetary balance of local 
government. This was partly offset by higher-than-
budgeted expenditure through the implementation of an 
additional budget in the second half of 2003. The main 
increases in current expenditure took the form of 
compensation for the loss of rouble savings (about 0.4 
percent of GDP) and agricultural subsidies (about 0.2 
percent of GDP). 
The 2004 general government deficit target is 2.7 percent 
of GDP according to Lithuania’s convergence 
programme. The main factors contributing to the 
widening deficit are: (i) more capital expenditure (0.5 
percentage points of GDP) led by new investment 
projects co-financed by the EU, (ii) higher public 
consumption (1 percentage point of GDP) driven by 
salary increases for public sector workers, (iii) increasing 
subsidies (0.7 percentage points of GDP) led by 
allocations to farmers and (iv) a rise in social welfare 
benefits due to higher pensions and child benefits. 
Furthermore, the transition costs of the pension reform are 
estimated to account for 0.3 percent of GDP, although the 
voluntary nature of participation in the recently 
established second pillar makes the estimation uncertain. 
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Finally, a substantial increase in other expenditures is 
foreseen because of Lithuania’s contribution to the EU 
budget (0.7 percent of GDP). The revenue side is 
expected to be largely influenced by EU structural aid. In 
addition, increases in excise duties on tobacco and petrol 
should raise receipts by about 0.2 percent of GDP. 
Changes in VAT rates required by accession are 
estimated to generate revenues worth close to 0.2 percent 
of GDP, more than offset by an expected loss of 0.3 
percent of GDP from the change to a new VAT collection 
procedure. An emerging tax overshoot in the first months 
of 2004 led the Parliament to approve a supplementary 
budget in June, while maintaining the deficit target at 2.7 
percent of GDP. Additional primary expenditure accounts 
for about 0.3 percent of GDP, of which social security 
payments, compensation payment for lost savings and 
real estate restitutions represent the biggest share. This is 
expected to be partially offset by lower interest 
expenditure. Although risks of a worse-than-planned 
budgetary outcome from a deceleration of growth in the 
second half of the year cannot be excluded, the revenue 
dynamics seem to leave a sufficient margin to meet the 
target. 
The Lithuanian convergence programme, which covers 
the period 2003-2007, was examined by the Council on 5 
July 200455. The general government deficit is expected 
to increase from 1.9 percent of GDP in 2003 to 2.7 
percent in 2004, and to decrease gradually thereafter to 
1.5 percent in 2007. 
                                                 
55  See footnote 45. 
The programme envisages a rise of the GDP-share of both 
revenue and expenditure in 2007 relative to 2003. The 
increase in the revenue ratio, by 2 percentage points, is 
mostly due to a significant expansion in non-tax revenues. 
The expenditure ratio is foreseen to increase by 1.8 
percentage points over the same period, mainly driven by 
higher primary expenditure. The medium-term 
macroeconomic scenario envisages GDP growth to 
remain robust over the programme horizon, particularly in 
2004 and 2005, when it is projected at some 7 percent. 
Looking further ahead, growth is expected to slow down 
slightly to about 6.5 percent in 2006 and 2007, but stays 
above potential as estimated by the national authorities. 
Domestic demand is foreseen to continue as the main 
driver of growth, primarily led by high investment and 
private consumption growth. The risk of lower-than-
expected growth over the programme horizon cannot be 
ruled out and appears the main threat to the achievement 
of the envisaged budgetary targets. 
Following an initial deterioration of the general 
government debt ratio in the aftermath of the Russian 
crisis, from 16.8 percent in 1998 to 23.8 percent in 2000, 
the ratio declined steadily to 21.4 percent in 2003. The 
major factors contributing to the decrease were the fiscal 
consolidation initiated in 2000, the use of privatisation 
proceeds to repay debt and the positive effect of the 
currency appreciation. The convergence programme 
projects an increase of the debt ratio in 2004 by about 1 
percentage point, but afterwards the debt ratio should 
stabilise at about 21 percent of GDP by 2007. 
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 Table 4.11
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(*)
General government balance -3.0 -5.6 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.9 -2.6
 - Total revenue 37.4 37.3 35.8 33.0 32.8 32.3 33.6
 - Total expenditure 40.4 42.9 38.4 35.0 34.3 34.1 36.3
   of which :  - Interest expenditure 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2
 - Primary expenditure 39.2 41.4 36.6 33.4 32.9 32.9 35.1
 - GFCF 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.8 3.0 3.2
Primary balance -1.9 -4.1 -0.8 -0.4 -0.1 -0.6 -1.4
pm  Tax burden 32.3 32.4 30.5 29.1 28.7 28.6 28.3
Government debt 16.8 23.0 23.8 22.9 22.4 21.4 21.4
pm Real GDP growth (%) 7.3 -1.7 3.9 6.4 6.8 9.0 7.0
pm HICP inflation (%) 5.0 0.7 0.9 1.3 0.4 -1.1 1.0
(*) Forecast
Source:  Commission services
Lithuania: budgetary developments
(as percentage of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
 
4.4.6. Hungary 
Since 1998, the general government deficit has shown 
large fluctuations, particularly in the last three years. 
After a process of continuous deficit reduction until 2000, 
ending with a level of 3.0 percent of GDP, the general 
government deficit started to increase again in 2001. In 
2002, it peaked at 9.3 percent of GDP about 3 percent of 
GDP referred to statistical operations implying a one-off 
expenditure increase. After a deficit of 6.2 percent in 
2003, the authorities targeted a general government 
deficit of 3.8 percent of GDP for 2004. This target was 
revised twice: first to 4.6 percent of GDP in January 2004 
and later to 5.3 percent of GDP in September 2004.  
The large deterioration in Hungarian government finances 
after 2000 can be explained by the slowdown in economic 
activity in the years 2001 to mid-2003 and by the 
implementation of an expansionary fiscal policy in 2001-
2002. It should also be noted that these deficit figures 
include an increasing annual revenue loss due to the 
reform of the pension system in 1998, which established a 
second-pillar defined-contributions pension scheme (see 
Box 4.2). The Hungarian authorities estimated that this 
additional burden to the general government finances 
reached 0.7 percent of GDP in 2003. 
In 2003, the general government deficit was reduced from 
9.3 percent in 2002 to 6.2 percent of GDP. Despite the 
achieved deficit reduction, the original budgetary target of 
a deficit of 4.5 percent of GDP was exceeded by about 1½ 
percent of GDP. This can be attributed to an overrun in 
general government expenditures. The main reasons for 
this were: (i) higher-than-planned increases in social 
benefits, as higher-than-forecast real wage growth and 
inflation implied a retroactive correction of pensions and 
an unexpected contribution to the cost of child care; (ii) a 
large increase in subsidies, notably for housing56 and 
prescribed medicines; and (iii) higher-than-forecast 
interest expenditure. Despite real GDP growth being 
lower than projected in the 2003 budget, developments in 
overall tax revenues turned out to be better than expected 
at 44.5 percent of GDP (instead of 43.2 percent of GDP). 
This was mostly due to the dynamism of VAT and excise 
duties (reflecting higher-than-forecast consumption 
growth) and higher revenues from the simplified 
corporate tax scheme, which more than compensated for 
                                                 
56  A significant tightening of the eligibility criteria of the previously 
very generous housing subsidy policy was decided in December 
2003. This resulted from mid- to end-December 2003 in a very large 
number of applications for housing loans under the old rules. As the 
loan subsidies were claimed by households in 2004, the full 
restrictive fiscal effect of the eligibility tightening can only be 
expected from 2005 onwards. 
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the shortfall in personal income tax, corporate profit taxes 
and social contributions. 
The 2004 budget included a real wage freeze in the public 
sector, which, together with the ongoing reduction of the 
number of public employees, should trigger a significant 
deceleration in the wage bill. On the revenue side, the 
2004 budget incorporated a tax reform which came into 
effect at the beginning of 2004. This included a cut in 
direct tax rates, a broadening of the tax base as well as a 
rise in the lower VAT rates and was foreseen to lead to a 
stable tax burden. In January 2004, the original general 
government deficit target of 3.8 percent of GDP for 2004 
was revised to 4.6 percent of GDP, since the outcome of 
the 2003 budget revealed that several of the expenditure 
and revenue items were underestimated. In September 
2004 the target was revised for the second time upwards 
to 5.3 percent of GDP, since shortfalls on the revenue side 
(VAT and personal income taxes), and overspending on 
the expenditure side (mainly interest expenditure and 
social benefits) became visible. Apart from these two 
revisions the government also adopted a series of 
expenditure freezes amounting to 1.3 percent of GDP 
relative to the budget baseline.  
The Hungarian convergence programme, which covers 
the period 2004-2008, was examined by the Council on 5 
July 200457. The macro-economic scenario underlying the 
programme foresees real GDP growth of about 3½ in 
2004, followed by an acceleration of the growth rate of ½ 
a percentage point per year until 2008. The medium-term 
growth assumptions seem to be on the optimistic side. 
The envisaged budgetary adjustment in the programme is 
frontloaded with the deficit decreasing from 5.9 percent 
of GDP in 2003 to 4.6 percent of GDP in 2004, followed 
by a yearly adjustment of some ½ percentage point, with 
the aim of bringing the general government deficit below 
3 percent by 2008.  
                                                 
57 See footnote 45. 
The decline in the expenditure ratio, underpinned by 
structural reforms, would more than compensate for the 
decline in the revenue ratio, resulting from the planned 
reduction of the overall tax burden. The consolidation 
strategy in the convergence programme seems conducive 
to a better quality of public finances. However, several 
risks are attached to the budgetary targets in the 
programme: (1) the whole adjustment strategy depends 
crucially on the success of meeting the 2004 deficit target; 
(2) there are no clear indications about the ambitious 
expenditure-reducing measures; (3) the planned deficit 
would be reduced below the 3 percent of GDP only in 
2008, and only by a small margin, which could be 
prevented by any unfavourable macroeconomic or 
budgetary development. As it was already officially 
indicated by the authorities, the 2004 target as set down in 
the May convergence programme (4.6 percent of GDP) 
will not be met. This makes all the more important to 
seize all opportunities to catch up and accelerate the fiscal 
adjustment. 
Between 1998 and 2001, the debt ratio declined steadily 
from almost 62 percent of GDP to 53.5 percent of GDP, 
driven by sound budgetary policy and relatively robust 
GDP growth. In 2002, this trend was reversed. The debt 
ratio increased sharply in 2002 to over 57 percent of 
GDP, due to the very high fiscal deficit in that year, and 
to 59 percent of GDP in 2003, thus approaching the 60 
percent of GDP reference value. Beside the high deficit 
level, the depreciation of the forint contributed to the 
increase in the debt in 2003, since around a quarter of the 
public debt is denominated in foreign currencies. 
According to the convergence programme, the debt ratio 
would decrease from close to 60 percent of GDP in 2004 
to about 54 percent of GDP in 2008. However, the slower 
reduction of the interest rates than projected and the 
upwards revised deficit indicate a slower reduction of the 
debt than foreseen. 
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 Table 4.12
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(*)
General government balance : : -3.0 -4.4 -9.2 -6.2 -5.5
 - Total revenue : : 44.6 44.3 43.4 43.6 41.3
 - Total expenditure : : 47.6 48.7 52.6 49.8 46.8
   of which :  - Interest expenditure : : 5.6 4.8 4.1 4.2 4.4
 - primary expenditure : : 42.1 43.9 48.5 45.7 42.4
 - GFCF : : 3.2 3.8 4.9 3.4 3.2
Primary balance : : 2.6 0.4 -5.1 -2.1 -1.1
pm  Tax burden : : 39.6 39.3 38.9 39.2 38.6
Government debt 61.6 60.9 55.4 53.5 57.2 59.1 59.9
pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.8 3.5 2.9 3.9
pm HICP inflation (%) 14.2 10.0 10.0 9.1 5.2 4.7 6.9
(*) Forecast
Source:  Commission services
Hungary: budgetary developments
(as percentage of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
 
 
4.4.7. Malta 
Between 1998 and 2002, the budget deficit of Malta 
steadily declined from 10.8 percent of GDP to 5.9 
percent. Then it jumped again to 9.7 percent of GDP in 
2003, of which 3.2 percentage points correspond to a one-
off operation related to the restructuring of the shipyard 
industry. 
Cyclical factors can to a large extent explain the reduction 
in the deficit achieved in 1999 and 2000, while 
discretionary adjustments took place in 2001 and 2002, 
when GDP growth was not supportive of fiscal 
consolidation. 
In 2003, even without the cost of the one-off operation, 
the general government deficit would still have widened 
to 6.5 percent of GDP. This outturn implies a substantial 
slippage compared with the target of 4.6 percent of GDP 
set in the pre-accession economic programme of 2002, 
which assumed a real GDP growth of 3.1 percent. While 
growth turned out to be much weaker (only 0.2 percent), 
much of the slippage is not of a cyclical nature but rather 
reflects higher-than-planned public expenditure. 
The deficit target for 2004 in the convergence programme 
is 5.2 percent of GDP, lower than that set in the 2004 
budget (5.7 percent) presented in November 2003. Such 
differences are explained by different growth 
assumptions: 2.8 percent in the budget compared to 1.1 
percent in the convergence programme. The deficit target 
of 5.2 percent of GDP for 2004 seems feasible, but 
requires strong resolution to fully implement the measures 
envisaged in the convergence programme. Total revenues 
are expected to increase by 5.3 percentage points of GDP, 
to reach 45.3 percent of GDP. Half of this amount is due 
to inflows under the financial cooperation agreement 
between Malta and Italy and from EU funds. Other 
additional receipts would stem from stronger enforcement 
in tax collection. Total expenditures should reach 50.5 
percent of GDP in 2004, compared with 52.4 percent in 
2003. In particular, the increases in interest expenditure 
(by 0.2 percentage points of GDP), public consumption 
(0.4 percent) and public investment (0.1 percent) would 
be more than compensated by the fall in the GDP share of 
transfers, subsidies and other expenditures by a total of 
2.6 percentage points of GDP. 
The Maltese convergence programme, which covers the 
period 2004-2007, was examined by the Council on 5 
July 200458. The macroeconomic scenario underlying the 
programme seems to reflect plausible growth 
assumptions. However, it remains subject to a 
                                                 
58 See footnote 45. 
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Table 4.13
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(*)
General government balance : : -6.2 -6.4 -5.9 -9.7 -5.2
 - Total revenue : : 35.6 37.5 40.0 40.2 46.7
 - Total expenditure : : 41.9 43.9 45.8 49.9 51.9
   of which :  - Interest expenditure : : 3.8 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.8
 - Primary expenditure : : 38.1 40.3 41.9 46.1 48.1
 - GFCF : : 4.0 3.6 4.5 5.2 5.8
Primary balance : : -2.5 -2.8 -1.9 -5.9 -1.4
pm  Tax burden : : 29.7 32.0 34.5 34.6 33.9
Government debt 53.1 56.8 56.4 62.2 62.7 71.1 73.8
pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.4 4.1 6.4 -2.2 1.8 0.2 1.4
pm HICP inflation (%) 3.7 2.3 3.0 2.5 2.6 1.9 3.1
(*) Forecast
Source : Commission services
Malta: budgetary developments
(as percentage of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
considerable uncertainty, due the high exposure to 
external shocks of the Maltese economy and a possible 
overestimation of the nominal GDP level. The 
consolidation path, foreseeing a sharp reduction in the 
deficit, seems within reach, given the room for 
manoeuvre provided by the termination of some 
investment projects. Nevertheless, achieving the fiscal 
targets requires a strong commitment by the authorities, 
while the recent revision of the real GDP growth figure 
for 2003 could imply some downward risks. Therefore, 
the budgetary stance in the programme might not be 
sufficient to reduce the deficit below the 3 percent of 
GDP deficit threshold by 2006, as envisaged in the 
programme. 
The debt ratio increased from 53.1 percent in 1998 to 62.7 
percent in 2002. In 2003, mainly as a result of the 
restructuring of the shipyard sector, the debt ratio jumped 
to 71.1 percent of GDP, thus rising further above the 60 
percent reference value. The convergence programme 
projects a quasi stabilisation of the debt ratio in 2004 and 
2005, followed by decline in the debt ratio to 70.5 percent 
in 2006 and 70.4 percent in 2007. According to the 
Council Opinion, the evolution of the debt ratio could be 
less favourable than projected in the convergence 
programme, given the above mentioned risks to the 
deficit. 
4.4.8. Poland 
The general government deficit increased from 1.9 
percent of GDP in 1999 to 3.6 percent in 2002. The 
deterioration in Poland’s budgetary position over this 
period reflects a combination of cyclical factors and some 
discretionary relaxation of fiscal policy stemming mainly 
from an increase in social spending. The high costs of 
three major reforms implemented at the beginning of 
1999, namely in public administration, health care and 
social security, weighed heavily on the central 
government budget. On the revenue side, a drop in tax 
receipts resulted among other from changes in direct 
taxation and from an extensive use of tax exemptions and 
rebates. 
Since 2001, there have been many attempts by the Polish 
authorities to tackle the increasing general government 
deficit but none of the reform plans was implemented and 
the deficit continued to widen. Budgetary targets were 
frequently revised and often missed. 
The August 2002 pre-accession economic programme 
projected a deficit of 3.6 percent of GDP in 2003. The 
2003 pre-accession economic programme contained an 
upward revision of the 2003 deficit to 4.1 percent of 
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 GDP59. The overshoot in the general government deficit 
reflected lax implementation of the fiscal measures, but 
also a different growth composition from that forecast. 
Because growth was more export-led than expected, 
hence having a lower tax-content, and in spite of various 
measures to improve the tax administration, revenues in 
2003 were lower than initially foreseen. In addition, 
personal income tax revenues were overestimated 
reflecting optimistic wage and employment forecasts. 
Higher-than-planned expenditure resulted from additional 
outlays for various social allowances and foreign 
currency-denominated debt servicing. 
The Polish authorities targeted a significant widening of 
the general government deficit from 3.9 percent of GDP 
in 2003 to 5.7 percent in 2004 mainly due to increased 
expenditure, despite a considerable strengthening of 
economic growth. An additional reduction of the 
corporate tax rate in 2004 to 19 percent was implemented, 
after a cut from 28 percent to 27 percent in 2003. By 
contrast, the alignment of the VAT regime to EU 
legislation has led to an increase of the tax rate on various 
products to 22 percent (e.g. construction materials) from 
May 2004. The deficit outcome for 2004 could, however, 
be somewhat better than the initial target of 5.7% because 
of recent signs of strong growth and buoyant corporate 
tax revenues. 
Poland’s convergence programme, which covers the 
period 2004-2007, was examined by the Council on 5 
July 200460. The programme foresees the deficit to be 
reduced to below the 3 percent of GDP reference value in 
2007. The reduction of the deficit between 2004 and 2007 
represents an ambitious 4.2 percent of GDP. The largest 
annual reduction is expected for 2007 (1.8 percentage 
points). The projections for 2005 and beyond are built 
upon the Hausner Plan, which aims at structural reforms 
on the expenditure and revenue sides. The 
macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme 
seems to reflect rather favourable growth assumptions. If 
the growth forecast of 5.0 percent for 2004 and 2005 
appears plausible, the evolution of growth in the medium-
                                                 
59 This figure was revised downward in the fiscal notification 
(September 2004) to 3.9 percent of GDP. 
60  See footnote 45. 
term, i.e. an increase in the GDP growth rate to 5.6 
percent in 2006 and 2007, seems to be on the high side.  
Several risks surround the programme targets. Besides 
downside macroeconomic risks, there is uncertainty over 
the implementation of the measures, with the planned 
adjustment being heavily back-loaded (the measures 
adopted or discussed in parliament by the end of 
September 2004 are estimated at 25-30 percent of planned 
savings). Finally, the planned figures for the deficit may 
have to be revised upwards by 1.6 percent of GDP, if it is 
established that the funded defined-contribution pensions 
scheme should be classified outside government (see Box 
4.2 above). Therefore, the budgetary stance in the 
programme may not be sufficient to reduce the deficit to 
below 3 percent of GDP in 2007. 
The deterioration of the fiscal accounts together with the 
slowdown in the privatisation process resulted in a sharp 
increase in the government debt ratio in the last two years. 
The debt ratio increased from 36.7 percent of GDP in 
2001 to 45.4 percent in 2003. In the convergence 
programme, the debt ratio is projected to increase by a 
cumulative 7.4 percentage points over the period 2004-
2006 to reach 52.7 percent of GDP at the end of 2006, 
before declining by 0.4 percentage points in 2007. The 
evolution of the debt ratio could be less favourable than 
projected given the risks to the deficit outcomes and to 
the realisation of planned privatisations. The classification 
of the funded pension scheme outside general government 
would lead to an increase in the debt ratio by 
approximately 4.5 percentage points. Even under this 
scenario, the debt ratio would remain below the 60 
percent of GDP reference value over the programme 
period if the deficit targets were met. 
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Table 4.14
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(*)
General government balance -2.1 -1.4 -0.7 -3.8 -3.6 -3.9 -5.6
 - Total revenue 44.5 44.9 42.5 43.8 43.9 43.7 40.4
 - Total expenditure 46.6 47.0 44.2 47.7 48.1 47.6 46.0
   of which :  - Interest expenditure 1.9 2.0 2.1 3.0 2.9 3.1 3.1
 - Primary expenditure 44.7 45.1 42.1 44.7 45.2 44.5 43.0
 - GFCF 3.9 3.6 2.5 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.5
Primary balance -0.2 0.6 1.4 -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 -2.5
pm  Tax burden 37.7 38.3 36.2 36.6 36.1 35.9 :
Government debt n.a. 40.1 36.8 36.7 41.1 45.4 47.2
pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.8 4.1 4.0 1.0 1.4 3.8 5.9
pm HICP inflation (%) 11.8 7.2 10.1 5.3 1.9 0.7 3.5
(*) Forecast
Source:  Commission services
Poland: budgetary developments
(as percentage of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
 
 
4.4.9. Slovenia 
In the period 1998-2003, general government deficits 
were relatively small, averaging 2.5 percent of GDP. 
After having increased to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2000, the 
deficit gradually returned to levels of slightly above 2 
percent of GDP. 
The government has committed itself to fiscal prudence 
and strives to improve the budgetary position. In 
December 2001, Slovenia started adopting budgets for 
two consecutive years with an aim to bring greater 
certainty in the long-term planning of public finance. In 
2002-2003, however, general government expenditure 
overruns coupled with tax revenue shortfalls led to 
failures in achieving the initial deficit targets, thus 
prompting the adoption of supplementary budgets. These 
slippages were the result of overly optimistic domestic 
growth assumptions based on then common expectations 
of a recovery of the international economy, which failed 
to materialise. On the other hand, timely adjustments have 
been heavily strained by the structural rigidity as 
mandatory outlays account for more than four fifths of the 
budget. 
At 2.0 percent of GDP in 2003, the general government 
deficit was much higher than 1.3 percent of GDP, the 
initially planned deficit according to the 2002 pre-
accession economic programme. Against the background 
of faltering growth, this outcome was exactly as projected 
in the 2003 pre-accession economic programme (1.95 
percent). Note that a revision of the government accounts, 
linked to the sectoral re-classification of some public 
institutions, has recently raised the general government 
deficit figures for the period 2000-2003 (by 0.2-0.5 
percent of GDP). Fiscal performance was satisfactory in 
2003. On the revenue side, taxes on profits and capital 
gains increased markedly, while substantial savings on 
interest expenditure materialised due to lower-than-
anticipated inflation.  
The Commission services project the general government 
deficit to worsen in 2004. Applying the old methodology, 
the convergence programme foresaw a deficit of 1.9 
percent of GDP. Despite the anticipation of an economic 
rebound, this target was set slightly higher than previous 
year’s outcome and is due to growing deficits of the 
central government as structural reforms are moving 
forward only slowly. With fiscal policy geared to 
reducing the structural deficit, measures in the 2004 
budget mostly apply to the restructuring of spending. 
Furthermore, the agreement on public sector wages for 
2004-2005 introduced forward-looking indexation 
mechanisms. A new wage adjustment method, taking into 
account expected domestic inflation, inflationary 
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 expectations in the EU and the expected growth in the 
tolar/euro exchange rate, is deemed to contain budget 
expenditure given that wages constitute an important part 
of general government spending. Moreover, indexation of 
some social benefits has also been weakened. The 
government is committed to adhering to the targets. It is 
within its discretion to reduce expenditure proportionally 
– up to 15 billion tolar (0.25 percent of GDP) – to a 
revenue shortfall in the course of the year, without having 
to propose the budget to be amended. On the other hand, 
an up to 10 billion tolar (0.2 percent of GDP) higher 
deficit would be allowed in case of unfavourable 
macroeconomic trends. 
The Slovene convergence programme, which covers the 
period 2004-2007, was examined by the Council on 5 
July 200461. Based on a plausible macroeconomic 
scenario, the budgetary strategy underlying the 
programme aims at achieving sound public finances as 
defined by a budgetary position of close-to-balance. To 
this end, the programme envisages cuts in both the 
revenue and the primary expenditure ratio – the former 
through a direct tax reform and the latter through restraint 
on mandatory expenditure – resulting in a gradual 
reduction of the general government deficit over the 
period covered.  
                                                 
61 See footnote 45. 
The general government deficit is projected to narrow 
from 2.0 percent in 2003 to 0.9 percent in 2007. By 
postponing the deficit reduction to the far end of the 
programme horizon, the programme projects a back-
loaded fiscal consolidation whereby a close-to-balance 
position is only approached, not reached. The budgetary 
stance in the programme is therefore not consistent with 
the Stability and Growth Pact’s medium-term objective of 
a budgetary position of close-to-balance or in surplus.  
Furthermore, risks to keeping the deficit under control 
cannot be excluded. Should the authorities not succeed in 
limiting the play of fiscal stabilisers there may not be a 
sufficient safety margin against breaching the 3 percent of 
GDP deficit threshold, especially in the initial years of the 
programme period. Beyond 2005, however, budgetary 
projections appear credible as the macroeconomic 
scenario seems to reflect plausible growth forecasts, 
anticipating real GDP to grow slightly above potential 
output at 3.7 percent and assuming that the restructuring 
process continues. 
Following a steady upward trend, gross public debt stayed 
at slightly less than 30 percent of GDP in 2003. Over the 
medium-term horizon of the convergence programme, the 
debt ratio will remain relatively low although the 
government anticipates a further rise in the first two years 
given the persistent primary deficit. After increasing until 
2005, the debt ratio is expected to fall back to 28.4 
percent of GDP in 2007. 
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Table 4.15
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(*)
General government balance : : -3.5 -2.8 -2.4 -2.0 -2.3
 - Total revenue : : 44.7 45.1 45.7 46.2 45.3
 - Total expenditure : : 48.2 47.9 48.1 48.2 47.7
   of which :  - Interest expenditure : : 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0
 - Primary expenditure : : 45.7 45.5 45.7 46.1 45.6
 - GFCF : : 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.8 2.8
Primary balance : : -1.0 -0.4 0.0 0.1 -0.3
pm  Tax burden : : 39.3 39.4 39.8 40.4 40.2
Government debt 23.6 24.9 27.4 28.1 29.5 29.4 30.8
pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.6 5.6 3.9 2.7 3.3 2.5 4.0
pm HICP inflation (%) 7.9 6.1 8.9 8.6 7.5 5.7 3.9
(*) Forecast
Source:  Commission services
Slovenia: budgetary developments
(as percentage of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
 
4.4.10. Slovakia 
The development of the general government deficit 
between 1998 and 2003 was heavily influenced by 
exceptional factors, mainly related to bank restructuring 
and government guarantees, which resulted in particularly 
high capital transfers in the years 1999 and 2000 of 
roughly 6 and 8 percent of GDP respectively. 
Accordingly, the deficit peaked in 2000 at over 12 percent 
of GDP but fell to 3.7 percent of GDP in 2003. 
Adjusting for the exceptional factors suggests that fiscal 
consolidation efforts strengthened in 1999 (as part of a 
macroeconomic stabilisation package) but weakened 
again in the run-up to the 2002 election – in spite of 
growth accelerating from 1.5 percent in 1999 to 4.4 
percent in 2002. Fiscal consolidation efforts during this 
period were of a rather ad-hoc nature and not sufficiently 
embedded in a medium-term fiscal framework. 
Expenditure overruns, notably in social transfers, were 
frequent and the attainment of budgetary targets 
sometimes depended on across-the-board cuts or 
compression of the least protected expenditure categories 
during the budget year. 
In the budget for 2003, a newly formed government 
started to implement its agenda of structural public 
expenditure reforms and kept expenditures much better 
under control during budget execution than in previous 
years, including in the area of social transfers. In addition, 
in particular due to substantial under-spending in the 
areas of government consumption, subsidies and capital 
outlays, expenditures turned out some 2 percent of GDP 
lower than budgeted. This was to some extent supported 
by ½ percentage point higher-than-expected real growth 
of 4.2 percent. In contrast, on the revenue side, the higher 
GDP growth could not compensate for far too optimistic 
budgetary projections, in particular on VAT receipts, in 
the context of changes in tax rates and assessment 
procedures. Revenues underperformed substantially and 
were some 3/4 percent of GDP lower than planned. 
The budget for 2004 targets a general government deficit 
of 4.0 percent of GDP, as confirmed by the convergence 
programme. The budget reflects most of the government’s 
structural reform agenda for the current legislative period, 
both on the revenue and expenditure side. It constitutes an 
important step to place public finances on a more 
sustainable footing and to increase their quality. On the 
revenue side, it incorporates a comprehensive tax reform 
package, which is expected to be basically revenue-
neutral and constitutes a major shift from direct to indirect 
taxation. On the expenditure side, reform measures in the 
areas of pensions, sickness benefits, social assistance, 
social benefits and health care are likely to lead to 
sustained savings in mandatory spending, whereas 
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 expenditure increases are mostly implemented in more 
discretionary areas, such as gross fixed capital formation. 
Subsidies are planned to increase as well. Budget 
execution figures available to date confirm the 
attainability of the deficit target. Downside risks could 
result from additional spending pressures. Altogether, the 
risks in 2004 would appear to be somewhat tilted to the 
positive side. 
The Slovak convergence programme, which covers the 
period 2004-2007, was examined by the Council on 5 
July 200462. The budgetary strategy underlying the 
programme aims at reducing the general government 
deficit to 3.0 percent of GDP by 2007. The reduction in 
the deficit is expected to occur mainly in 2007. The 
programme envisages an adjustment based on primary 
expenditure reductions of 1.5 percentage points of GDP 
over the period, underpinned by the mentioned structural 
reforms, which are mostly already enacted and in force. In 
addition, a funded pension pillar will be introduced in 
2005, which leads to a revenue decrease for general 
government, amounting to 1 percent of GDP by 2007 
(included in the above-mentioned deficit figure). 
                                                 
62  See footnote 45. 
The macroeconomic scenario underlying the programme 
seems to reflect broadly plausible growth assumptions, 
including an acceleration of growth to around 5 percent in 
2006 and 2007 – due to further strengthening exports on 
the back of an FDI-induced expansion of export capacity. 
The risks to the budgetary projections over the 
programme horizon appear broadly balanced. Downside 
risks seem to be concentrated on the expenditure side. 
The dynamics of the debt ratio between 1998 and 2003 
were dominated by extraordinary factors: on the one 
hand, bank restructuring operations and debt assumptions 
related to government guarantees led to a sharp increase 
of the debt ratio in 1999 and 2000; on the other hand, 
major privatisation projects mitigated the increase in the 
debt ratio and contributed to its fall in 2001 and 2002 to 
around 43 percent of GDP. The convergence programme 
expects an increase in the debt ratio by roughly 2½ 
percentage points in 2004, predominantly owing to stock-
flow adjustments. After a further increase in 2005, it 
predicts a decline to 45½ percent of GDP by 2007.
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Table 4.16
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(*)
General government balance -3.8 -7.1 -12.3 -6.0 -5.7 -3.7 -3.9
 - Total revenue 57.1 49.8 47.6 45.5 45.2 35.4 35.8
 - Total expenditure 60.8 56.9 59.9 51.5 50.9 39.2 39.7
   of which :  - Interest expenditure 2.4 3.4 4.1 4.0 3.6 2.5 2.4
 - Primary expenditure 58.4 53.5 55.9 47.5 47.3 36.6 37.3
 - GFCF 4.0 2.9 2.8 3.1 3.3 2.6 2.9
Primary balance -1.4 -3.8 -8.2 -2.0 -2.1 -1.2 -1.6
pm  Tax burden 38.4 36.0 34.4 32.9 33.1 31.2 29.4
Government debt 34.0 47.2 49.9 48.7 43.3 42.6 44.5
pm Real GDP growth (%) 4.2 1.5 2.0 3.8 4.4 4.2 4.8
pm HICP inflation (%) 6.7 10.4 12.2 7.2 3.5 8.5 7.7
(*) Forecast
Source:  Commission services
Slovakia: budgetary developments
(as percentage of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
 
 
4.4.11. Sweden 
4.4.11.1. Situation in the 2002 Convergence 
Report 
In the 1998 Convergence Report63, the Commission 
considered that the excessive deficit situation in Sweden 
had been corrected. In the light of this assessment and in 
parallel with the adoption of the report, the Commission 
made a recommendation to the Council that the Decision 
of 10 July 1995 on the existence of an excessive deficit in 
Sweden should be abrogated. Acting on this 
recommendation the Council adopted on 1 May 1998 a 
decision abrogating the decision on the existence of an 
excessive deficit in Sweden64. In the 2000 and the 2002 
Convergence Reports65, the Commission considered that 
Sweden continued to fulfil the criterion on the 
government budgetary position. 
                                                 
63  COM (1998) 1999, 25.3.1998. 
64 OJ L 139, 11.5.1998, p. 19. 
65  COM (2000) 277 final, 3.5.2000 and COM (2002) 243 final, 
22.5.2002. 
4.4.11.2. Assessment of public finances in 
2004 
Swedish public finances have been in good shape in 
recent years; surpluses were recorded in each year 
between 1998 and 2001 and, after a marginal deficit in 
2002, a surplus of 0.3 percent of GDP was recorded in 
2003. 
After having achieved an ambitious and successful fiscal 
consolidation of mainly structural nature in the five years 
to 1998, resulting in a surplus that year, the cyclically-
adjusted government balance declined by 0.7 percentage 
points of GDP between 1999 and 2003. A significant 
fiscal easing in 2001 and 2002, comprising also income 
tax cuts, contributed to this. This considerable fiscal 
easing was facilitated by the strong budgetary position, 
and the cyclically-adjusted surplus of 1.0 percent of GDP 
in 2003 suggests that the Swedish public finances remain 
relatively favourable. 
The 2003 update of the Swedish convergence programme 
covering the period 2004-2006 was examined by the 
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 Table 4.17
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(*)
General government balance 1.8 2.5 5.1 2.8 0.0 0.3 0.6
 - Total revenue 62.7 62.7 62.4 60.0 58.1 58.4 58.0
 - Total expenditure 60.8 60.2 57.3 57.2 58.1 58.1 57.3
   of which :  - Interest expenditure 5.6 4.6 4.1 3.2 2.9 1.9 2.1
 - Primary expenditure 55.3 55.5 53.3 53.9 55.1 56.1 55.2
 - GFCF 3.2 3.2 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.0
Primary balance 7.4 7.1 9.2 6.0 2.9 2.3 2.7
pm  Tax burden 53.8 54.5 54.7 52.9 51.0 51.4 51.1
Government debt 68.1 62.8 52.8 54.4 52.6 52.0 51.6
pm Real GDP growth (%) 3.6 4.6 4.3 0.9 2.1 1.6 3.7
pm HICP inflation (%) 1.0 0.6 1.3 2.7 2.0 2.3 1.1
(*) Forecast
Source:  Commission services
Sweden: budgetary developments
(as percentage of GDP unless indicated otherwise)
 
Council on 20 January 200466. The updated programme 
projects gradually rising government surpluses over the 
period, with a projected surplus of 1.9 percent of GDP in 
2006, in compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact’s 
medium-term objective of a budgetary position close-to-
balance or in surplus. The national budgetary strategy of a 
surplus of 2 percent of GDP on average over the cycle is 
maintained. This strategy is supported by expenditure 
ceilings on central government set three years ahead, 
extended to 2006 with this update. In addition, there is a 
balanced budget requirement for local government as 
stipulated by law since 2000. 
In the Budget Bill for 2005 presented to Parliament by the 
Swedish government on 20 September 2004, the surplus 
in government finances is expected to be 0.7 percent of 
GDP in 2004 and thereafter gradually to rise slightly to a 
projected 0.9 percent of GDP in 2007.This implies a 
downward revision of the budgetary situation vis-à-vis the 
2003 update of the convergence programme. The Budget 
Bill supersedes the macroeconomic scenario and 
budgetary plans and projections included in the updated 
                                                 
66 OJ C 29, 3.2.2004. 
convergence programme. The plans and projections of the 
Budget Bill appear broadly plausible67. 
The government debt ratio in Sweden has been on a 
declining trend since 1994 and has been below the 
reference value of 60 percent of GDP since 2000. In 
2003, the debt ratio was 52 percent of GDP. In 2004 the 
debt ratio is expected by the Commission services to be 
slightly lower. According to the Swedish authorities’ 
most recent projections (in the Budget Bill for 2005), the 
debt ratio is expected to decline further in the years to 
2007.  
                                                 
67  However, the downward revisions of the government budgetary 
position in coming years may be difficult to reconcile with the 
overall Swedish fiscal strategy of a surplus of 2 percent of GDP on 
average over the cycle. 
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 5. EXCHANGE RATES 
5.1. Treaty provisions and assessment of 
exchange rate stability  
The third indent of Article 121 refers to the exchange rate 
criterion as “the observance of the normal fluctuation 
margins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of 
the European Monetary System, for at least two years, 
without devaluing against the currency of any other 
Member State”. 
Article 3 of the Protocol on the convergence criteria 
stipulates: “The criterion on participation in the exchange 
rate mechanism of the European Monetary System (…) 
shall mean that a Member State has respected the normal 
fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate 
mechanism of the European Monetary System without 
severe tensions for at least the last two years before the 
examination. In particular, the Member State shall not 
have devalued its currency’s bilateral central rate against 
any other Member State’s currency on its own initiative 
for the same period”. 
With the launch of the euro, the European Monetary 
System has been replaced by the exchange-rate 
mechanism II. This mechanism links the currencies of 
participating Member States to the euro, which is at the 
centre of the mechanism. 
None of the eleven Member States with a derogation has 
participated for two years in ERM II during the review 
period. As a result, none of them meet the exchange rate 
criterion.  
5.2. Exchange rate movements of Member 
State currencies 
5.2.1. Overall conditions in exchange markets 
While developments in foreign exchange markets since 
the inception of the euro had been marked by the general 
rise in the US dollar, the last 2½ years have witnessed a 
broad depreciation of the US dollar that was mirrored by 
an appreciation of the euro. After passing parity vis-à-vis 
the US dollar in mid-2002, the euro has been on a steady 
upward trend and maintained its strength vis-à-vis the 
dollar in mid-2004. The exchange rate of the euro 
increased by about 38 percent from 0.88 USD in January 
2002 to 1.22 USD in September 200468, thereby 
exceeding the level at which the single currency had been 
traded at the start of Stage III of EMU (1.16 USD in 
January 1999). In mid-2004, the USD-EUR exchange rate 
stood close to its long-run average. 
Within the EU-15, the pound sterling depreciated by 10 
percent between January 2002 and September 2004 (from 
0.62 EUR to 0.68). The Danish krone remained within a 
narrow margin around its ERM II-central parity. 
                                                 
68 All figures are monthly averages. 
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Source : ECB
Graph 5.1 : Euro against US dollar, Japanese yen, pound sterling and Danish krone
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5.2.2. ERM II currencies 
As of 28 June 2004, the Estonian kroon, the Lithuanian 
litas and the Slovenian tolar participate in ERM II with a 
standard fluctuation band of ±15 percent around their 
central rate. Estonia and Lithuania have announced their 
intention to unilaterally maintain their currency board in 
ERM II. 
Estonia has been operating a currency board regime since 
the reintroduction of the kroon in 1992. With the kroon 
initially pegged to the German mark, the peg was 
Box 5.1: Euro central rates and compulsory intervention rates in ERM II 
Following the decisions taken on 27 June 2004 on the euro central rates in ERM II for the Estonian kroon, the Lithuanian 
litas and the Slovenian tolar, the compulsory intervention rates for these currencies have been established with effect from 
28 June 2004. They are: 
Currency   EUR 1 = 
Estonian kroon (EEK) 
Upper rate 
Central rate 
Lower rate  
17.9936 
15.6466 
13.2996 
Lithuanian litas (LTL) 
Upper rate 
Central rate 
Lower rate  
3.97072 
3.45280 
2.93488 
Slovenian tolar (SIT) 
Upper rate 
Central rate 
Lower rate  
275.586 
239.640 
203.694 
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 switched to the euro as of 1 January 1999, at a rate of 
15.6466 kroon per euro. 
Estonia’s currency board arrangement is fairly orthodox. 
The Law on the Security of the Estonian kroon, which is 
the legal basis for the currency board arrangement, 
requires that all domestic liabilities of the central bank (in 
particular currency in circulation and deposits with the 
central bank) are backed up by foreign currency reserves 
or gold. The law guarantees full convertibility of the 
kroon at the parity rate and permits the issue of new 
currency only against a corresponding change in reserves. 
During the last decade, the currency board arrangement 
has been backed up by prudent fiscal policies, open 
markets, a robust financial sector and a relatively flexible 
economy. The currency board system has also withstood 
shocks, such as a domestic mini-boom in 1997 (which the 
Asian crisis helped to deflate) and the Russian crisis in 
1998; strong policies were key in these instances. 
On 28 June 2004, the kroon started to participate in ERM 
II with the central rate set at the parity rate prevailing in 
the currency board arrangement. The Estonian authorities 
have committed to unilaterally maintain the currency 
board in the mechanism. There has been no deviation 
from the central rate since the kroon’s participation. 
Lithuania has been operating a currency board regime 
since April 1994 with the litas initially pegged to the US 
dollar at LTL 4 per USD. In February 2002, the litas’ peg 
was switched to the euro at the prevailing market rate of 
LTL 3.4528 per euro. 
Pursuant to the Litas Credibility Law, the Bank of 
Lithuania guarantees that the total amount of litas put into 
circulation does not exceed gold and foreign exchange 
reserves. In practice, the ratio of official reserve assets to 
the monetary base has well exceeded 100 percent, 
underpinning the credibility of the currency board 
arrangement. 
During the last decade, the currency board arrangement 
has served as a disciplining force for imposing and 
maintaining prudent fiscal policies and external 
sustainability. The currency board has also proven to 
withstand shocks, such as the banking crisis of 1996 and 
the Russian crisis in 1998, which in combination with a 
severe recession and a worsening fiscal position put the 
system under substantial strain. Corrective policy 
measures, including significant fiscal adjustment and 
structural reforms, helped to restore growth and capital 
inflows and supported the credibility of the currency 
board arrangement. 
On 28 June, the litas started to participate in ERM II with 
the same central rate. The Lithuanian authorities have 
committed to unilaterally maintain the currency board in 
the mechanism. There has been no deviation from the 
central rate since the litas’ participation. 
Before joining ERM II on 28 June 2004, the Bank of 
Slovenia conducted monetary policy through a 
combination of interest rate policy and exchange rate 
management. The Bank set interest rates with a view of 
controlling domestic demand in line with its inflation 
objective. In order to prevent interest-rate sensitive capital 
inflows, the Bank of Slovenia engineered a continuous 
depreciation of the exchange rate in such a way that the 
capital loss through the depreciation offset the higher 
revenue from the interest rate differential (uncovered 
interest rate parity).  
Active exchange rate management has resulted in a 
smooth depreciation of the tolar against the euro. Before 
participating in ERM II at the end of June 2004, the tolar 
had depreciated by 9 percent against the euro compared to 
January 2002. In nominal effective terms, it had 
depreciated by 5 percent over the same period. 
While in 2002 the main refinancing rate had been rather 
stable, the Bank of Slovenia cut it in 2003 by a 
cumulative 225 basis points. A better inflation outlook 
allowed the Bank to lower the main refinancing rate 
further in 2004. In September 2004, the main refinancing 
rate stood at 3 percent, compared to 2 percent in the euro 
area.  
In line with the strategy towards ERM II and euro 
adoption published in November 2003, the authorities 
started to stabilise the exchange rate upon ERM II 
participation, in line with the convergence of interest 
Convergence Report 2004 
Technical Annex 
 92
rates. Since its participation in ERM II, the tolar has been 
trading close to its central rate of 239.640 tolar per euro. 
The average deviation has been .13 percent, while the 
maximum deviation from the central rate reached .16 
percent. The monetary authorities have sporadically 
intervened on the foreign exchange market. 
  
Graph 5.2 : ERM II currencies: spread against central rate and nominal effective exchange rate(*)
Source : ECB, Commission services
(*)The NEER are calculated against 34 countries: 25 EU Member States, USA, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand and Mexico. 
Base year: 1999 = 100
EEK/EUR - Spread against central rate
-0.30%
-0.20%
-0.10%
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
01
/0
6/
20
04
15
/0
6/
20
04
29
/0
6/
20
04
13
/0
7/
20
04
27
/0
7/
20
04
10
/0
8/
20
04
24
/0
8/
20
04
07
/0
9/
20
04
21
/0
9/
20
04
ERM II participation
from 28/06/2004
LTL/EUR - Spread against central rate
-0.30%
-0.20%
-0.10%
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
01
/0
6/
20
04
15
/0
6/
20
04
29
/0
6/
20
04
13
/0
7/
20
04
27
/0
7/
20
04
10
/0
8/
20
04
24
/0
8/
20
04
07
/0
9/
20
04
21
/0
9/
20
04
ERM II participation
from 28/06/2004
SIT/EUR - Spread against central rate
-0.30%
-0.20%
-0.10%
0.00%
0.10%
0.20%
0.30%
01
/0
6/
20
04
15
/0
6/
20
04
29
/0
6/
20
04
13
/0
7/
20
04
27
/0
7/
20
04
10
/0
8/
20
04
24
/0
8/
20
04
07
/0
9/
20
04
21
/0
9/
20
04
ERM II participation
from 28/06/2004
Estonia - NEER
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
Ja
n-
99
Ju
l-9
9
Ja
n-
00
Ju
l-0
0
Ja
n-
01
Ju
l-0
1
Ja
n-
02
Ju
l-0
2
Ja
n-
03
Ju
l-0
3
Ja
n-
04
Ju
l-0
4
Lithuania - NEER
90
100
110
120
130
140
Ja
n-
99
Ju
l-9
9
Ja
n-
00
Ju
l-0
0
Ja
n-
01
Ju
l-0
1
Ja
n-
02
Ju
l-0
2
Ja
n-
03
Ju
l-0
3
Ja
n-
04
Ju
l-0
4
Slovenia - NEER
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
Ja
n-
99
Ju
l-9
9
Ja
n-
00
Ju
l-0
0
Ja
n-
01
Ju
l-0
1
Ja
n-
02
Ju
l-0
2
Ja
n-
03
Ju
l-0
3
Ja
n-
04
Ju
l-0
4
 
Chapter 5 
Exchange rates 
93
 5.2.3. Developments in non-ERM II currencies 
Exchange rate developments of non-ERM II currencies 
are reviewed in the context of the exchange rate 
strategies pursued by the authorities 
5.2.3.1. The pegged currencies: the Cyprus pound, 
the Hungarian forint, the Latvian lats and 
the Maltese lira 
While the Cyprus pound and the Hungarian forint are 
pegged to the euro, the Latvian lats and the Maltese lira 
are pegged to a basket of currencies69. 
Since its independence in 1960, monetary policy in 
Cyprus has been conducted through an exchange rate 
target, which has been historically understood as a tool 
to maintaining macroeconomic stability and low 
inflation. After having been pegged to different 
anchors, be it one currency (pound sterling or US 
dollar) or a basket of currencies, Cyprus re-pegged in 
1992 the pound to the ECU with fluctuation margins of 
±2.25 percent. The peg has been redirected towards the 
euro since January 1999 with a central rate of .5853 
pound per euro. Following progress with capital 
account liberalisation in 2001, the fluctuation band has 
been widened to ±15 percent in August 2001, although 
the exchange rate has continued to be de facto traded in 
a narrow band.  
The central bank raised interest rates by 100 basis 
points at the end of April 2004 for the first time in 
several years in a precautionary move linked to the 
completion of the liberalisation of the capital account as 
of 1 May 2004, bringing the marginal lending facility 
rate to 5.5 percent. Rates were kept unchanged since 
then. The pound subsequently started to slowly 
appreciate and, at the end of September 2004, was 
trading slightly above its central rate (by 1.4 percent) 
and 0.2 percent above its January 2002 level.  
Reflecting the developments in the ECU/euro exchange 
rate, the nominal effective exchange rate of the Cyprus 
pound has followed a slow but sustained appreciation 
path since 1994, with the exception of the 1999-2000 
period when the euro depreciated against the US dollar. 
                                                 
69  Both Latvia and Malta will need to change their exchange rate 
regime to participate in ERM II, as pegs to other currencies than 
the euro are not compatible with the mechanism.  
In September 2004, it stood 7.7 percent above the 
January 2002 level. 
In the mid-1990s, Hungary operated a crawling peg 
regime based on a narrow exchange rate corridor. The 
currency was kept within a ±2.25 percent band around a 
reference rate which, in the last stage of the regime in 
2001, was depreciated by 0.2 percent a month. The 
regime helped to lower inflationary expectations and 
inflation fell from over 25 percent to below 10 percent 
in mid-2001. 
Since October 2001, the National Bank of Hungary 
operates an inflation targeting framework in 
combination with an exchange rate peg. The forint is 
pegged to the euro with a ±15 percent fluctuation band 
around a central parity. The central parity of the forint 
was unchanged from 1 October 2001 – the date of 
abolition of the former crawl – until 4 June 2003, when 
it was devalued by 2.26 percent from 276.1 to 282.4 
forint per euro. 
Monetary policy has been aiming at controlling 
inflation by keeping the exchange rate in the stronger 
half of the fluctuation band. With the forint appreciating 
towards the limit of the band in early 2003, despite a 
reduction of interest rates by a total of 100 bps in late 
2002, policy rates were further reduced from 8.5 to 6.5 
percent. In June 2003, the government decided, in 
agreement with the central bank, to devalue the central 
parity of the forint by 2.26 percent to its present level. 
Official communication stressed the need to prevent an 
excessive appreciation of the currency and to contribute 
to improving international competitiveness of the 
Hungarian economy. The ensuing capital outflows 
triggered a decline in the forint beyond what was 
judged to be desirable from the perspective of 
controlling inflation. Policy rates were increased by a 
cumulative 300 basis points in June 2003 and again in 
November to 12.5 percent. 
In early 2004, the forint strengthened again, allowing 
the central bank to gradually lower policy rates despite 
continued inflationary pressures. By September 2004, 
the base rate had been reduced by a total of 150 basis 
points in four steps, to 11 percent. The Monetary 
Council pointed to a better assessment by foreign 
investors of the risks facing the Hungarian economy, 
which made it possible to reduce the earlier high risk 
premium. Also, the bank revised downwards its
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Graph 5.3 : Exchange rate of the pegged currencies (daily data)
Cyprus pound against the euro Latvian lats against the SDR
Hungarian forint against the euro Maltese lira against the basket
Source : ECB, Commission services
Note : The Cyprus pound is quoted for one unit of foreign currency 
1 EUR = 0.585274 CYP
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 inflation forecast to around 6 percent for December 
2004 and between 4 to 5 percent at year-end 2004 and 
2005 respectively.  
Since April 2004, the forint has stabilised in a range of 
246-256 forint per euro. At the end of September, the 
forint was trading at 247 forint per euro, some 12 
percent stronger than its central parity, and 2 percent 
below its January 2002 level. On an effective basis, the 
forint has appreciated by 3 percent since January 2002. 
Since February 1994, the Bank of Latvia has been 
operating an exchange rate regime under which the lats 
is pegged to the SDR basket of currencies – at the fixed 
rate 0.7997 lats per SDR70 – in order to achieve its 
primary objective of price stability. The fluctuation 
band around the fixed peg rate is ±1 percent, with the 
                                                 
70  The currency weights in the SDR basket are (in percent): USD 45, 
EUR 29, JPY 15, and GBP 11. 
Bank of Latvia committed to intervene to keep the lats 
exchange rate within the fluctuation margins. 
In recent years, the lats has been trading in the stronger 
half of the fluctuation band. Following the general USD 
appreciation throughout 1999 and most of 2000, the lats 
also appreciated vis-à-vis the euro. The euro-lats 
exchange rate stabilised in 2001 and the currency 
subsequently depreciated in 2002 and 2003, as the euro 
appreciated against all other SDR basket currencies. 
Between January 2002 and September 2004, the lats 
depreciated against the euro by around 18 percent, 
returning to approximately the same levels as seen in 
the beginning of 1999. 
A similar development took place in nominal effective 
terms. The effective exchange rate of the lats rose in 
1999 and most of 2000 in line with the general rise of 
the US dollar. Following the stabilisation of the euro-
dollar exchange rate in 2001 and the significant 
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 appreciation of the euro in 2002 and 2003 against other 
SDR basket currencies, the nominal effective exchange 
rate of the lats declined and was in September 2004 
some 10 percent below its January 2002 level, 
approximately the same levels as seen in the beginning 
of 1999. 
The combination of a fixed exchange rate and free 
capital movements constrains the Bank of Latvia’s 
ability to independently set monetary policy rates. The 
refinancing rate has been lowered on several occasions 
since the mid-1990s, with the latest rate by 0.5 
percentage points to 3 percent occurring in September 
2002. In March 2004, the Bank of Latvia’s Board of 
Governors increased the refinancing rate by 0.5 
percentage point to 3.5 percent.  
Since its independence in 1964, Malta has maintained a 
pegged exchange rate regime – with an at-par peg of the 
Maltese lira to the pound sterling, followed since the 
early 1970s by pegs to changing currency baskets. 
Within this regime, the only exchange rate realignment 
occurred in 1992, when the lira was devalued by 10 
percent against the basket in response to devaluations 
by major trade partners and competitors in the context 
of the ERM crisis. The current basket is composed of 
the euro, the US dollar and the pound sterling, whose 
respective shares were set at 70 percent, 10 percent and 
20 percent when the basket was last revised in August 
2002. 
Due to the dominant share of the euro in the basket, 
fluctuations in the Maltese lira/euro rate have been 
limited to around ± 3.5 percent on average over the past 
years. In 2003, the lira depreciated against the euro 
compared to its end-2002 level, while it appreciated 
substantially against other reserve currencies such as 
the dollar, the yen and the pound sterling. In early 2004, 
some of these movements were reversed as the euro 
eased against other major currencies. In September 
2004, the lira stood some 7 percent lower against the 
euro compared to January 2002. In nominal effective 
terms, the Maltese lira has appreciated by some 5 
percent over the same period. 
After having cut several times between 2001 and 2003, 
the central bank has maintained the policy rate at 3 
percent (100 points above the euro area level), 
unchanged since September 2003. 
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Graph 5.4: Pegged currencies: bilateral exchange rate against the euro and nominal effective exchange rate(*)
Source : ECB, Commission services
(*)The NEER are calculated against 34 countries: 25 EU Member States, USA, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand and Mexico. 
Base year: 1999 = 100
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 5.2.3.2. The floating currencies: the Czech koruna, 
the Slovak koruna, the Polish zloty and the 
Swedish krona 
Following the creation of two independent states in 
1993, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia inherited a 
system of a fixed peg within a ±0.5 percent band. 
In 1997, following a period of economic overheating 
accompanied by large current account deficits and loose 
fiscal policy, the Czech koruna came under devaluation 
pressures and the peg was abandoned. Since 1998, the 
Czech National Bank has combined explicit inflation 
targeting with a managed exchange rate. The 
importance attached to the exchange rate has varied 
over time.  
While in the past the central bank resisted what it 
considered as unfounded appreciation pressures, more 
recently the exchange rate has been left to fluctuate 
more freely. Following a period of quick interest rate 
convergence with the euro area, decisions of the central 
bank started to mirror those of the ECB and the interest 
rate differential disappeared in mid-2002. In response to 
a strengthening growth momentum potentially leading 
to inflationary pressures, the Czech National Bank 
during summer 2004 raised the refinancing rate by 50 
basis points to 2.5 percent.  
The Czech koruna experienced a long period of 
appreciation in effective terms, mainly driven by an 
appreciation against the euro. The appreciating trend 
was mainly attributed to substantial inflows of foreign 
direct investment associated with privatisation projects. 
In mid-2002 the trend reversed, mainly because of the 
slowdown of the privatisation process and the Central 
Bank’s intervention against a “too quick” appreciation 
of the Czech koruna. After regaining some momentum 
in the second quarter of 2004, the koruna stabilised 
since June in a range of 31.2-31.9 koruna per euro and 
was trading at 31.7 koruna per euro at the end of 
September 2004, very close to its level of January 2002. 
In nominal effective terms, the koruna stood 6 percent 
above its January 2002 level. 
Soon after its introduction in February 1993, the Slovak 
koruna came under pressure and the central rate was 
devalued by 10 percent in July 1993. Following a 
progressive liberalisation of the current and capital 
account, the Slovak central bank decided to widen the 
fluctuation band to ±5 percent in 1996 and to ±7 
percent in 1997. Increasing external imbalances, the 
Russian crisis and political uncertainty resulted in 
further depreciation pressures, leading to the peg being 
abandoned in October 1998 and to a subsequent 
substantial depreciation of the currency. Since then, 
Slovakia has been operating a combination of implicit 
inflation targeting and managed float. 
The koruna strongly appreciated against the euro after 
the adoption of an economic stabilisation program in 
May 1999, aimed at stabilising public finances and 
correcting external imbalances by controlling domestic 
demand. This appreciation trend stopped in mid-2000 
and eventually reversed in the first half of 2002 when 
pre-election uncertainties and economic imbalances re-
emerged. An improving macroeconomic outlook led to 
a surge in foreign direct investment and to renewed 
appreciation pressures since the second half of 2002. 
Together with market intervention, the central bank 
initiated a series of interest rate cuts of a cumulative 
150 basis points in 2004 leaving the refinancing rate at 
4.5 percent since June 2004. The appreciation trend 
stopped in July and August and the koruna lost around 
1 percent in these two months. By September 2004, the 
Slovak koruna has appreciated by 6 percent against the 
euro since January 2002 and by 10 percent in effective 
terms over the same period. 
Poland has implemented different monetary and 
exchange rate regimes in the course of its transition 
process. At the outset of transition, an exchange-rate 
based stabilisation strategy was implemented to fight 
hyperinflation. The zloty was first pegged to the dollar 
and later to a basket of currencies. In 1991, the regime 
was changed to a crawling peg – with a band around the 
central rate introduced in 1995 – combined with 
monetary targeting, with the aim to pursue disinflation 
while also taking account of competitiveness concerns 
(an approach known as “eclectic monetary policy”). 
Over time, tensions between the multiple goals of 
monetary and exchange rate policy became apparent 
and the National Bank of Poland switched to a direct 
inflation targeting framework in 1998. At the same 
time, the rate of crawl was slowed and the band around 
the depreciation path was widened and central bank 
interventions were progressively scaled back. Since 
April 2000, Poland operates a floating exchange rate 
regime, with the central bank abstaining from currency 
interventions. 
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Following an initial appreciation after the float, the 
exchange rate of the zloty has been depreciating against 
the euro since mid-2001. Its fall accelerated in the 
second half of 2003 as market uncertainty regarding 
fiscal consolidation increased. As the zloty remained 
relatively stable against the dollar, the depreciation was 
less pronounced in nominal effective terms. In early 
2004, the zloty continued to depreciate vis-à-vis the 
euro, but it has since regained ground, standing in 
September roughly at its level of autumn 2003 and 
around 22 percent below its January 2002 level. In 
nominal effective terms, the zloty registered a modest 
further depreciation during the first five months of 2004 
before recovering again, standing end-September about 
15 percent above its level of January 2002. 
During summer 2004, the National Bank of Poland 
raised the main reference rate by 125 basis points 
between June and August, to 6.5 percent. This first 
move since mid 2003 followed a very long period of 
monetary easing that started early 2001. 
Compared to developments in previous years, the 
Swedish krona has been largely stable vis-à-vis the euro 
since 2002. Rising interest rate differentials contributed 
to an appreciation of the krona vis-à-vis the euro in the 
first half of 2002. Subsequently, the krona remained 
broadly stable vis-à-vis the euro, fluctuating in the 
interval SEK 8.9-9.5 per EUR, with an average of SEK 
9.15 per EUR since January 2002. Following the 
referendum on euro adoption in autumn 2003 the krona 
appreciated against the euro and traded close to SEK 
9.0 per EUR throughout the year. In the beginning of 
2004, the krona again lost some ground vis-à-vis the 
euro, reflecting financial market expectations of a 
diminishing interest rate differential vis-à-vis the euro 
area. Since early April 2004, the krona had fluctuated 
around SEK 9.16 per EUR, but slightly appreciated in 
September to reach 9.05 SEK/EUR. By September 
2004, the krona had appreciated by -1.5 percent against 
the euro compared to January 2002. 
Based on the benign inflation outlook, the Riksbank 
lowered the key policy rate by 25 basis points from 2.75 
percent to 2.50 percent in early February 2004 and 
further by half a percentage point to 2.00 percent in 
early April 2004, bringing the policy rate in line with 
that of the European Central Bank for the first time 
since November 2001. 
Following almost two years of decline, the nominal 
effective exchange rate path of the krona reversed at the 
end of 2001. From January 2002 to September 2004, 
the nominal effective exchange rate of the krona rose by 
almost 11 percent, fully reversing the decline in the 
previous two years. Improved relative growth 
prospects, rising interest rate differentials and a 
slowdown in portfolio outflows – reflecting the 
completion of the portfolio reallocation following the 
technology sector crisis – were important factors in 
support of the Swedish currency. Given that the krona 
has been broadly stable vis-à-vis the euro since the 
beginning of 2002, the rise in the nominal effective 
exchange rate mainly reflects movements vis-à-vis the 
US dollar – against which the krona rose by 29 percent 
in the period January 2002 to September 2004 – and to 
a lesser extent vis-à-vis the currencies of Japan and 
Great Britain. 
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 6. LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES
6.1. Treaty provisions  
The fourth indent of Article 121(1) of the Treaty 
requires “the durability of convergence achieved by the 
Member State and of its participation in the exchange 
rate mechanism of the European Monetary System 
being reflected in the long-term interest rate levels”. 
Article 4 of the Protocol on the convergence criteria 
further stipulates that “the criterion on the convergence 
of interest rates (…) shall mean that, observed over a 
period of one year before the examination, a Member 
State has had an average nominal long-term interest 
rate that does not exceed by more than 2 percentage 
points that of, at most, the three best-performing 
Member States in terms of price stability. Interest rates 
shall be measured on the basis of long-term government 
bonds or comparable securities, taking into account 
differences in national definitions”. 
Long-term interest rates cannot be directly influenced 
by national authorities but reflect financial market 
participants’ assessment of underlying economic 
conditions, including the credibility and sustainability 
of economic policies. The level of the long-term interest 
rate depends on the underlying real rate, the expected 
inflation rate and risk premia (related mainly to default 
on repayment of debt, expected exchange rate 
movements and uncertainty attached to inflation rate 
and exchange rate expectations). With liberalised 
capital markets in the Union, real rates tend to equalise 
across Member States. Therefore, differentials between 
the corresponding nominal rates mainly reflect how 
financial markets assess the prospects – in terms of 
inflation, soundness of public finances and exchange 
rate stability – of each Member State relative to the 
others71. 
6.2. Interest rate developments in major 
bond markets and the Member States 
6.2.1. Global context 
Much of the low level of global long-term bond yields 
in recent years is associated with the forward-looking 
                                                 
71  Differentials will also reflect differences in tax treatment and 
market liquidity.  
and pre-emptive monetary policies in the major 
industrialised regions since 1999, which have 
generally managed to contain inflationary 
pressures and maintain price stability. Since the 
beginning of 1999, the average CPI inflation rate 
of the OECD area has fluctuated in the interval 1-3 
percent. In the United States, CPI inflation has 
remained below 4 percent and has averaged 2½ 
percent since the beginning of 1999 while Japan 
has experienced deflation for most of the period. 
Euro area inflation, measured by the HICP, has 
averaged 2.0 percent in the same period and has 
fluctuated in the interval 1-3 percent for most of 
the period. 
Reflecting strong economic activity, rising 
inflation expectations and higher short-term 
interest rates, the yield on the benchmark 10-year 
government bond in the United States rose by 
around 160 basis points in the course of 1999 to 
stand at 6.3 percent at the end of the year. 
Following the economic slowdown in 2000 and 
amid contained inflationary pressures, monetary 
policy in the US eased considerably in 2001. 
Reflecting these developments, and in spite of an 
increasing budget deficit in the US, the yield on the 
benchmark 10-year government bond fell to 3.3 
percent by June 2003. Subsequently, the 10-year 
government bond yield has risen, to stand at 4.3 
percent in August 2004, reflecting an end to 
concerns about deflationary pressures, an 
increasingly optimistic economic outlook, 
expectations of measured policy rate increases and 
rising inflation expectations. 
Weak economic activity and persistent deflation 
have required a highly expansionary monetary 
policy in Japan during the period 1999-2004. 
Japanese bond yields accordingly remained at very 
low levels of below 2 percent during most of this 
period. The yield on the benchmark 10-year 
government bond reached in May 2003 a historic 
trough of below 0.6 percent before rising to 1.6 
percent in August 2004, reflecting a more positive 
growth outlook and easing deflationary pressures. 
Reflecting monetary tightening by the ECB and 
partly influenced by developments in the US bond 
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market, euro area long-term bond yields rose on 
average by 130 basis points in the course of 1999, to 5.3 
percent by the end of the year, before levelling off in 
the first half of 2000. In 2001, amid clear signs of lower 
inflationary pressures arising initially from weakening 
external demand – subsequently followed by sluggish 
growth in the euro area – and continued wage 
moderation, the monetary policy stance eased. In the 
following years, geopolitical uncertainties, the 
significant and rapid appreciation of the euro and 
downside risks to economic activity contributed to 
somewhat lower inflationary pressures over the medium 
term and the key ECB rate was further reduced to 2.0 
percent in mid-2003. Long-term bond yields 
accordingly trended downward during this period, much 
in line with bond market developments in the US. The 
average yield on benchmark 10-year government bonds 
in the euro area reached a trough in June 2003 at 3.7 
percent, reflecting financial market participants’ more 
pessimistic growth outlook and receding medium-term 
inflationary pressures. Since mid-2003, the average 
yield on benchmark 10-year government bonds in the 
euro area has risen and stood at 4.2 percent in August 
2004, partly owing to influences from the US bond 
market as well as shifting expectations of euro area 
monetary policy rates, rising uncertainty about medium-
term inflation prospects and a slightly more optimistic 
economic outlook. 
6.2.2. Long-term interest rates in the Member 
States with a derogation 
6.2.2.1. Overall developments 
The level of long-term interest rates in most Member 
States with a derogation has declined substantially over 
the past five years, due to lower short-term interest rates 
combined with an improvement in inflationary 
expectations and a decline in risk premia, but also 
reflecting developments in major bond markets, where 
contained inflationary pressures and low policy rates 
have contributed importantly to the low level of long-
term bond yields. 
Since the beginning of 2001, long-term interest rates in 
most new Member States have converged downward as 
shown in Graph 6.172. This favourable evolution is 
                                                 
72  Harmonised series of long-term interest rates for convergence 
assessment purposes for the new Member States do, in most cases, 
consistent with a sustained improvement in 
medium-term inflationary expectations and a 
decrease in country-specific risk premia. 
Reflecting enhanced medium-term prospects for 
macroeconomic stability and sound policies, 
sovereign ratings have been upgraded for most of 
the new Member States, which has further 
contributed to decreasing the level of their long-
term interest rates and the spread vis-à-vis the euro 
area. For a number of countries, a high degree of 
nominal exchange rate stability has arguably also 
been a contributing factor, although the decisive 
element appears to be the overall credibility of the 
monetary regime. 
In the beginning of 2001, the countries with the 
highest long-term interest rates among the new 
Member States were Lithuania and Poland (with 
rates in the range of 9½-10½ percent) while the 
country with the lowest long-term interest rate was 
Malta (6.1 percent). In August 2004, Hungary and 
Poland had the highest long-term interest rates 
among the new Member States (with rates above 7 
percent) while the countries with the lowest long-
term interest rates were Lithuania, Malta and 
Slovenia (all with rates around 4.6-4.7 percent). 
Excluding Hungary and Poland – where 
developments in long-term interest rates have 
diverged from euro area developments in the 
recent past and where rates currently stand well 
above the euro area average –the degree of long-
term interest rate convergence among new Member 
States is strong. In the group of new Member 
States excluding Hungary and Poland, the spread 
between the highest and the lowest long-term 
interest rates declined from 2.0 percentage points 
on average in 2001 to around 0.9 percentage points 
on average in the period January-August 2004, 
clustered within a range of 0.4 percentage points 
(Lithuania) and 1¼ percentage points (Cyprus) 
above the euro area average. 
                                                                      
not extend further back than to the beginning of 2001. 
Estonia has been excluded from the comparisons in the 
following paragraph due to the absence of a harmonised 
benchmark long-term government bond or comparable 
security (see Box 6.1). 
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 6.2.2.2. Country-specific developments 
At the beginning of 2001, the Czech Republic enjoyed 
one of the lowest long-term interest rates among the 
new Member States and the long-term bond yield has 
continued to decline, temporarily dropping below euro 
area rates between mid-2002 and mid-2003. Against the 
background of low inflationary pressures, monetary 
policy was eased significantly in the Czech Republic 
between mid-2001 and mid-2003. Subsequently, in 
June 2004, the Czech national bank began to increase 
its policy rates to counter risks to price stability. The 
long-term interest rate spread vis-à-vis the euro area 
stood in August 2004 at 0.9 percentage points. 
Estonia does not set independent policy interest rates; 
monetary impulses from the euro area are directly 
transmitted to the domestic money market through the 
operation of its currency board. Money market spreads 
vis-à-vis the euro area have been decreasing since 2001 
and remained relatively stable at around ½ percentage 
points since the beginning of 2003. Bank lending rates 
in Estonia73, which are not directly comparable to 
government bond yields, were still quite high in mid-
2002 but have declined sharply toward the euro area 
level since then, reflecting both lower short-term rates 
and increased competition in the banking sector.  
In Cyprus, long-term interest rates declined 
considerably early 2002 and the long-term interest rate 
spread vis-à-vis the euro area remained within 1 
percentage point for most of 2003. At the end of April 
2004, the central bank increased policy rates by 100 
basis points in a precautionary move linked to the 
completion of the liberalisation of the capital account 
on the eve of EU accession. Following this move, the 
June auction of 10-year government bonds yielded an 
average interest rate around 2¼ percentage points above 
the euro area level. Given the absence of a secondary 
bond market in Cyprus and an overall stable 
macroeconomic environment, this increase of long-term 
interest rates could in addition to higher short-term rates 
also reflect specific liquidity conditions at the time of 
                                                 
73  Due to its sound public finance position, Estonia has very limited 
government debt; no harmonised 10-year government bond in 
kroon or comparable security in line with the common statistical 
framework could be identified. At this stage, an indicator is 
derived from bank lending rates: the weighted average interest rate 
on the monthly EEK-denominated new business loans issued to 
resident non-financial corporations and households, with an 
original maturity over 5 years (see Box 6.1). 
the auction. In August 2004, Cyprus’ long-term 
interest rate spread vis-à-vis the euro area stood at 
2.4 percentage points. 
Following several years of policy rate cuts to bring 
interest rates closer to euro area levels, monetary 
policy rates were recently raised in Latvia to 
prevent current high inflation rates from impacting 
negatively on inflation expectations and future 
inflation. Long-term interest rates in Latvia 
declined considerably toward euro area levels in 
the course of 2001 and 2002. Following short 
periods of very low long-term interest differentials 
vis-à-vis the euro area during 2002, the differential 
has since then increased slightly to levels around ¾ 
of a percentage point. Long-term yield spreads vis-
à-vis the euro area are now significantly lower than 
spreads at the short end of the curve. 
Lithuania operates a currency board regime and do 
not set independent policy interest rates. Money 
market spreads to the euro area have been 
decreasing from rather high levels since 2001 and 
have remained relatively stable at around ½ 
percentage points since 2003. Long-term interest 
rates in Lithuania stood at around 10 percent in the 
beginning of 2001 but declined considerably 
toward euro area levels in the course of 2001 and 
2002, in line with muted inflationary pressures and 
strong gains in policy credibility. In August 2004, 
Lithuania’s long-term interest rate spread vis-à-vis 
the euro area stood at 0.4 percentage points.  
In Hungary, developments in long-term interest 
rates have diverged from euro area developments 
in the recent past and long-term interest rates 
currently stand well above the euro area average. 
Both key policy rates and long-term bond yields 
have remained significantly above the level of the 
euro area for most of the period since 1999. The 
disinflation process, accompanied by successively 
decreasing policy rates, came to a halt in 2003 and 
turbulence in the forint market with associated 
capital outflows in mid-2003 triggered substantial 
increases in the key policy rate in the second half 
of that year. Reflecting the overall improvement in 
the outlook in Hungary until mid-2003, long-term 
interest rates declined by more than 2 percentage 
points between the beginning of 2001 and their 
trough in May-June 2003. Since then, long-term 
interest rates have risen considerably to similar 
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levels as in early 2001 and remained in August 2004 
more than 4 percentage points above the euro area 
average. The rise in long-term interest rates appears to 
have been associated mainly with an increase in foreign 
exchange risk premia and higher inflation expectations. 
At the beginning of 2001, Malta had the lowest long-
term interest rate among the new Member States and 
the decline towards euro area yield levels has 
continued. Against the background of low inflationary 
pressures, monetary policy was eased significantly in 
the period until mid-2003; since then, monetary policy 
rates have been left on hold. Long-term interest rate 
spreads vis-à-vis the euro area stood in August 2004 at 
0.6 percentage points in Malta. 
In Poland, long-term interest rates currently stand well 
above the euro area average, partly due to increasing 
uncertainties about the economic policy outlook. The 
sustained disinflation process over the past years 
allowed the central bank to lower policy rates 
substantially until mid-2003, but the subsequent shift in 
the balance of risks to inflation ended the easing cycle 
and the key policy rate has been raised on several 
occasions since June 2004. The overall improvement in 
the outlook in Poland until mid-2003 was reflected in a 
decline in the long-term interest rate by 5 percentage 
points between the beginning of 2001 and the trough in 
May-June 2003. Since then, long-term interest rates 
have risen and remained in August 2004 more than 3 
percentage points above the euro area average, 
reflecting concerns about fiscal policies and their 
impact on inflation as well as the exchange rate 
outlook. 
Inflation in Slovenia has gradually fallen since 
2001, allowing the central bank to lower key 
policy rates. The long-term interest rate was still 
quite high in mid-2002 but has declined sharply 
toward the euro area level since then. The long-
term interest rate differential vis-à-vis the euro area 
stood in August 2004 at around 0.5 percentage 
points. 
In Slovakia, the relatively high level of headline 
inflation has not prevented the central bank from 
gradually lowering policy rates since the second 
half of 2002, mainly to ward off currency 
appreciation pressures. The long-term interest rate 
declined considerably towards euro area levels in 
the second half of 2002, partly associated with the 
disappearance of political uncertainties linked to 
the parliamentary elections. The long-term interest 
rate spread vis-à-vis the euro area stood at 0.9 
percentage points in August 2004.  
Sweden has consistently been in the group of 
countries with the lowest long-term interest rates 
among the Member States with a derogation, 
reflecting a high degree of macroeconomic 
stability and a credible economic policy 
framework. Notwithstanding some periods of 
negative interest rate differentials, Sweden’s long-
term interest rate has generally been fluctuating 
within 0.5 percentage points above the euro area 
long-term rate since 1999. In August 2004, the 
long-term interest rate differential vis-à-vis the 
euro area was 0.3 percentage points. 
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NB: Representative interest rates, except for Estonia, where an indicator has been used (see Box 6.1)
Source : Eurostat
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6.3. Assessment of long-term interest 
rate convergence in terms of the 
Treaty criterion 
For the assessment of the criterion on the convergence 
of interest rates, yields on benchmark 10-year bonds 
have been used; details about the interest rates used for 
the Member States are given in Box 6.1. The long-term 
interest rates are averaged over periods of 12 months. 
The reference value is calculated from the simple 
average of the average long-term interest rates of the 
three best-performing Member States in terms of price 
stability plus 2 percentage points74. As explained in 
Chapter 3, the three best-performing Member States in 
terms of price stability are selected using the 
harmonised indices of consumer prices. Interest rate 
data for convergence assessment purposes are available 
only from 2001 for most new Member States, implying 
that a 12-month average can be computed from 
December 2001 onward. For the Czech Republic, the 
required monthly data are available from April 2000, 
while for Slovenia the series starts only from March 
2002. Given the absence of benchmark long-term 
government bond yields in Estonia, bank lending rates  
                                                 
74  It should be noted that the best-performing Member States in 
terms of price stability do not necessarily have the lowest interest 
rates.  
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Box 6.1: Data for the interest rate convergence criterion 
 
The fourth indent of Article 121(l) of the Treaty requires that the durability of nominal convergence and 
exchange rate stability in Member States should be assessed by reference to long-term interest rates. 
Article 4 of the Protocol on the convergence criteria adds that these “Interest rates shall be measured on 
the basis of long-term government bonds or comparable securities, taking into account differences in 
national definitions”. 
 
Article 5 of the Protocol requires that the Commission should provide the statistical data used for the 
application of the convergence criteria. However, in the context of the interest rate criterion, the European 
Monetary Institute developed the criteria for harmonising the series of yields on benchmark 10-year bonds 
on behalf of Eurostat and started collecting the data from the central banks, a task which has then been 
transferred to the European Central Bank. The selection of bonds for inclusion in this series is based on the 
following criteria: 
− a residual maturity close to 10 years; 
− issued by central government; 
− adequate liquidity, which is the main selection criterion; the choice between a single benchmark or the 
simple average of a sample is based on this requirement; 
− yield gross of tax; 
− fixed coupon. 
 
For all Member States, except Estonia and Luxembourg, the representative interest rates used in this report 
incorporate all of the above characteristics75. Twenty Member States have been using a single benchmark 
bond and three a sample of bonds (Germany, Spain, and Malta). Out of the nine new Member States, seven 
yields are calculated on the basis of secondary market yields whereas Cyprus and Lithuania use primary 
market rates76. 
 
For Estonia, no appropriate harmonised series or proxy could be identified. Instead, an indicator has been 
selected: the interest rate on the monthly EEK-denominated loans issued to non-financial corporations and 
households, with an original maturity over five years. This indicator will be replaced as soon as a more 
comparable instrument is available. 
 
It has been necessary to identify a proxy for Luxembourg as the remaining maturity of the 10-year bond 
previously used is now about 3 years. The indicator for Luxembourg is based on a basket of securities, 
which have together an average residual maturity close to 10 years. The securities are issued by a private 
bank and have a solid credit rating. This indicator will be replaced as soon as a more comparable 
instrument becomes available.  
                                                 
75 For Latvia, data prior to February 2003 refer to 5-year government bonds. For Lithuania, data for the period March 2001 to March 
2002 refer to 7-year government bonds; data prior to March 2001 refer to 3-year government bonds. For Slovenia, data prior to 
November 2002 refer to 3-year government bonds. 
76 The data for Slovenia for the period November 2002-October 2003 are based on primary market rates. 
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are used as an indicator on which to base a qualitative 
assessment of the fulfilment of the long-term interest 
rate criterion. 
Average long-term interest rates for the 12-month 
period from September 2003 to August 2004 are shown 
in the final column of Table 6.1. The reference value in 
August 2004 (derived from the average interest rates in 
Finland, Denmark and Sweden, the three best-
performing Member States in terms of price stability)77 
was 6.4 percent. Average long-term interest rates in 
eight of the ten Member States for which long-term 
interest data are available stood below the reference 
value in July 2004 (all except Hungary and Poland). 
Therefore, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden fulfil 
the criterion on the convergence of long-term interest 
rates. 
The convergence criterion on long-term interest rates is 
not directly applicable to Estonia. The absence of 
government long-term benchmark bonds in Estonia 
reflects a very low level of government debt and 
prudent fiscal policies, rather than low credibility with 
markets (which would prevent the sovereign debtor 
from raising long-term funds). Therefore, it does not 
preclude Estonia from fulfilling the long-term interest 
criterion. The 12-month average of bank lending rates 
in Estonia – which serves as the closest available 
substitute on which to base a qualitative judgement – 
has shown a marked decline from 10 percent in 
December 2001, standing below 5 percent since 
February 2004. The low level of lending rates suggests 
contained inflationary expectations, but it does by 
definition not indicate a market view on fiscal 
prospects, while reflecting other factors such as private 
sector credit risk and the degree of competition in the 
banking sector. It would therefore not be appropriate to 
assess this substitute indicator directly against the 
reference value. However, the development of bank 
lending rates does not suggest any strains that would 
indicate a lack of market confidence in macroeconomic 
stability comparable to the situation of countries whose 
long-term interest rates are above the reference value. 
For the purposes of this examination, there are no 
reasons to conclude that Estonia would not fulfil the 
long-term interest criterion. 
                                                 
77  See Chapter 3.  
The reference value of the long-term interest rate 
criterion has remained relatively stable at some 6.9 
percent for most of 2002, followed by a steady decline 
to around 6.1 percent in autumn 2003 and a stabilisation 
at that level since then, followed by a slight increase 
since May 2004 (see Graph 6.2).  
As well as the general downward trend in long-term 
interest rates, changes in the constituents of the three 
best-performing Member States in terms of price 
stability also affected the reference value and caused 
shifts in its level. The inclusion of the new Member 
States into the calculation base in May 2004 (with the 
Czech Republic as one of the three best performers in 
terms of price stability) led to an upward shift in the 
reference value of 0.11 percentage points. The long-
term interest rate underlying the calculation of the 
reference value was 0.17 percentage points higher than 
the euro area average in August 2004. 
Three of the Member States under review (the Czech 
Republic, Malta and Sweden) have had average long-
term interest rates below the reference value ever since 
December 2001, which represents an additional 
indicator of sustainability. Cyprus, Latvia and Lithuania 
have had average long-term interest rates below the 
reference value since spring 2002, while Slovakia’s 
average long-term interest rate fell below the reference 
value in January 2003. Slovenia experienced a late but 
pronounced convergence in the average long-term 
interest rate; from the beginning of its data series in 
February 2003 to October 2003, it had the highest 12-
month average long-term interest rate among the new 
Member States, declining but still well above the 
reference value. Following a further significant 
reduction in yield spreads, Slovenia’s average long-
term interest rate fell below the reference value in 
March 2004. Poland’s average long-term interest rate, 
which had stood below the reference value between 
April 2003 and March 2004, exceeded the reference 
value again in the period April to August 2004; the 
margin was slightly less than 0.5 percentage points in 
August 2004. Hungary’s long-term interest rate has 
always exceeded the reference value; while the distance 
to the reference value had been below 0.5 percentage 
points between April 2002 and October 2003 (coming 
as close as 0.2 percentage points in late 2002), it has 
widened considerably since then, standing at 1.6 
percentage points in August 2004. 
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Table 6.1
Development of long-term interest rates
(12 month averages)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  Aug-2004(1)
CZ -- -- -- 6.3 4.9 4.1 4.7
EE(2) 13.2 11.4 10.5 10.2 8.4 5.2 4.6
CY -- -- -- 7.6 5.7 4.7 5.2
LV -- -- -- 7.6 5.4 4.9 5.0
LT -- -- -- 8.2 6.1 5.3 4.7
HU -- -- -- 7.9 7.1 6.8 8.1
MT -- -- -- 6.2 5.8 5.0 4.7
PL -- -- -- 10.7 7.4 5.8 6.9
SI -- -- -- -- -- 6.4 5.2
SK -- -- -- 8.0 6.9 5.0 5.1
SE 5.0 5.0 5.4 5.1 5.3 4.6 4.7
Euro area 4.7 4.7 5.4 5.0 4.9 4.2 4.3
Reference value(3) 6.6 6.8 7.3 6.9 6.9 6.1 6.4
Source : Eurostat
(1)Average Sep-03 to Aug-04
(2)Bank lending rates; not directly comparable with long-term interest rate data for the other Member States
(3)Average of interest rates of the three best-performing Member States in terms of price stability plus 2 percentage points (in Aug-04: FI 4.23;DK 4.42; SE 4.66)
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Source: Eurostat
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Jan-99
Jul-99
Jan-00
Jul-00
Jan-01
Jul-01
Jan-02
Jul-02
Jan-03
Jul-03
Jan-04
Jul-04
M
alta
R
eference value
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Jan-99
Jul-99
Jan-00
Jul-00
Jan-01
Jul-01
Jan-02
Jul-02
Jan-03
Jul-03
Jan-04
Jul-04
Poland
R
eference value
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Jan-99
Jul-99
Jan-00
Jul-00
Jan-01
Jul-01
Jan-02
Jul-02
Jan-03
Jul-03
Jan-04
Jul-04
Slovenia
Reference value
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Jan-99
Jul-99
Jan-00
Jul-00
Jan-01
Jul-01
Jan-02
Jul-02
Jan-03
Jul-03
Jan-04
Jul-04
Slovakia
R
eference value
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Jan-99
Jul-99
Jan-00
Jul-00
Jan-01
Jul-01
Jan-02
Jul-02
Jan-03
Jul-03
Jan-04
Jul-04
Sw
eden
R
eference value
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Jan-99
Jul-99
Jan-00
Jul-00
Jan-01
Jul-01
Jan-02
Jul-02
Jan-03
Jul-03
Jan-04
Jul-04
Euro area
R
eference value
  
Convergence Report 2004 
Technical Annex 
 112
 113
 7. ADDITIONAL FACTORS
This chapter examines two areas associated with 
economic integration and convergence, which Article 
121 stipulates also need to be taken into account in the 
report: 
− the results of the integration of markets and 
− the situation and development of the current 
account of the balance of payments. 
The requirement in the Treaty reflects the need to 
ensure that the Member States that will join the euro 
area exhibit a satisfactory degree of financial and 
product market integration with the EU and have 
sustainable current account positions. The following 
sections examine the results of market integration 
separately for financial markets and product markets 
and then the situation and development of the current 
account of the balance of payments. The examination of 
the development of unit labour costs and other price 
indices, which is also prescribed by Article 121, is 
taken up in the chapter dealing with price stability 
(Chapter 3)78. 
7.1. Results of the integration of markets 
7.1.1. Financial market integration 
An efficient financial system is a prerequisite for 
sustainable economic growth and development, and will 
be an important driver of the catching-up process in the 
Member States that have recently joined the Union. 
Quantifying the benefits of a more integrated EU 
financial system is difficult, but recent studies 
undertaken on behalf of the Commission suggest that 
the impact of financial integration on the performance 
of the EU economy will be substantially positive and 
durable79. Efforts to enhance the functioning of the EU 
                                                 
78  Article 121, reflecting the situation before the beginning of the 
third stage of EMU, prescribed that the report should also take 
into account the development of the ecu. The provision can be 
considered obsolete following the irrevocable fixing of the parities 
between the participating national currencies and the ecu and the 
converting of the ecu at one-to-one with the euro at the start of 
Stage III on 1 January 1999. The section on financial market 
integration provides information on the use of the euro in the 
Member States covered by the report. 
79 See: London Economics (2002) Quantification of the Macro-
Economic Impact of Integration of EU Financial Markets and 
Giannetti M., L.Guiso, T. Jappelli, M. Padula and M. Pagano 
financial system have intensified markedly since the 
introduction of the euro in 1999 and Sweden has 
participated fully in these efforts. 
While the process of EU financial integration can be 
expected to accelerate in the coming years, progress in 
bringing the financial systems of the new Member 
States into line with existing EU requirements is 
already well advanced. The adoption of the acquis 
communautaire and expectations of future adoption of 
the euro have fostered convergence in all financial-
market segments. Moreover, the involvement of 
strategic foreign investors in developing the financial 
systems of the new Member States ahead of accession 
has resulted in the unusual situation that their banking 
systems are generally more integrated with the rest of 
the EU than the banking systems of the euro area 
Member States. Reflecting this relatively advanced state 
of integration, the euro is already playing a significant 
role as a financing and investment currency in most of 
the new Member States. 
This section of the report examines the degree of 
financial integration achieved between Sweden, the new 
Member States and the euro area, focusing on the main 
characteristics, structures and trends in their financial 
systems. Empirical analysis of financial integration 
relies on the use of relevant financial indicators, with 
the typical drawbacks in relation to the availability and 
comparability of data80. Moreover, it should be borne in 
mind that comparison with euro area indicators can 
provide false impressions of the degree of 
convergence/integration achieved, as euro area averages 
often hide significant variations between the 
participating Member States. The analysis begins by 
briefly reviewing the compliance of Sweden and the 
                                                                            
(2002), “Financial market Integration, Corporate Financing and 
Growth”, DG ECFIN Economic Paper N° 179. 
80  Indeed, even the definition of an integrated financial market 
remains uncertain. A recent definition (see Lieven Baele, Annalisa 
Ferrando, Peter Hördahl, Elizaveta Krylova and Cyril Monnet: 
Measuring financial integration in the euro area, ECB Occasional 
Paper No. 14, April 2004) suggests that integration is achieved 
when all economic agents face identical rules and have equal 
access to financial instruments or services. This definition 
conforms to the objectives of the acquis communautaire in 
providing a common legal and regulatory framework for the EU 
market as a whole, but does not provide the basis for assessing the 
extent of financial integration in practice.  
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new Member States with EU financial legislation under 
the acquis. Following a synthetic overview of the 
various national financial systems, the degree of 
integration achieved with the euro area is assessed by 
reference to various financial market segments, with a 
particular focus on the use of the euro. 
7.1.1.1. Compliance with EU financial legislation 
Compliance with the acquis communautaire (i.e. the 
implementation and enforcement of existing EU 
legislation) in respect of the financial sector is a moving 
target for all of the Member States. However, the 
current level of compliance for Sweden and the new 
Member States in the area of financial services is 
generally favourable. Sweden adopted the acquis in 
relation to the financial sector on its accession in 1995 
and has participated in the formulation, adoption and 
now transposition of the new legislation contained in 
the Financial Services Action Plan81.  
                                                 
81  To this end, the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) – 
comprising 42 legislative and non-legislative actions and covering 
a wide range of financial market segments - was adopted in 1999 
and should be fully implemented by the end of 2005. 
The new Member States made substantial progress 
toward compliance with the acquis (including the FSAP 
measures) in preparation for their accession to the 
Union in 200482. Practically full compliance has been 
achieved in respect of the free movement of capital 
(Chapter 4) and company law (Chapter 5). Some of the 
new Member States have retained specific transitional 
arrangements in relation to the freedom to provide 
financial services (Chapter 3), e.g. in the area of 
accounting rules, capital requirements for co-operative 
and saving banks, the minimum level of deposit 
guarantees and investor compensation schemes. With 
regard to taxation (Chapter 10), a limited number of 
derogations in the field of VAT and excise have been 
negotiated for all of the new Member States. Finally, all 
of the new Member States will need to make additional 
efforts toward compliance with the acquis in the field of 
consumer protection (Chapter 23). The state of 
compliance with the acquis in the new Member States 
is summarised in Table 7.1. 
                                                 
82  See European Financial Services Regulation (EFSR), May 04; 
Comprehensive monitoring report of the European Commission 
on the state of preparedness for EU membership of the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/summary
_paper2003_full_en.pdf. 
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 Table 7.1
New Member States' state of adoption of financial market related acquis  upon EU entry
Source : Commission services
Negotiation Chapters
Chapter 3 on the freedom to 
provide services
Chapter 4 on free movement of 
capital
Chapter 5 on company law
Chapter 10 on taxation
Chapter 11 on EMU
Chapter 23 on consumer protection
Limited number of derogations in the filed of VAT and excise duties requested by all new Member States
Derogation until adoption of the euro after compliance with Maastricht criteria
More efforts to grant consumer rights, to ensure free competition and circulation of goods requested
State of the adoption upon EU entry
Transitional arrangements in the area of accounting rules or capital requirements for co-operative and saving 
banks (e.g. in Cyprus, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) and the minimum level of deposit guarantee schemes 
(e.g. the Baltic States and Slovenia) or investor compensation schemes (e.g. for the Baltic States, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia)
No major discrepancies
No major discrepancies
 
 
7.1.1.2. Financial structure and characteristics 
Reflecting their different political and economic 
evolution, Sweden and the new Member States have 
financial systems which vary significantly in terms of 
development and structure. Sweden has the most 
developed of the national financial systems under 
review, followed by Cyprus and Malta and then by the 
remaining new Member States. Accordingly, their 
financial systems also vary in terms of integration with 
the euro area financial system. While divergence in 
financial structure is not per se indicative of a lack of 
financial integration (e.g. in an integrated EU financial 
market, there could be an incentive for greater 
specialisation at the Member State level), it is to be 
expected that progress in financial development – 
particularly in the new Member States – will result in a 
progressive convergence with the overall financial 
structure of the euro area. The extent of convergence so 
far can be assessed on the basis of Graph 7.1, which 
provides data on the financial structure in the eleven 
Member States under review as well as averages for the 
new Member States and for the EU. 
Despite its overall high level of financial development, 
Sweden has a low degree of financial intermediation 
compared to the euro area as a whole. Relative to GDP, 
the total assets of the banking sector, bank loans and 
bank deposits are all about half the euro area average 
and are below the levels in most of the euro area 
Member States. On the other hand, Sweden’s capital 
markets are well developed both in size and 
sophistication (e.g. in terms of liquidity of instruments, 
use of derivatives and participation of foreign investors) 
relative to most of the euro area Member States.
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Graph 7.1:  Comparison of financial structures in the new Member States and Sweden
 
 
In the eight new Member States of Central and Eastern 
Europe, the level of financial intermediation remains 
low when compared to the euro area average. Relative 
to GDP, total assets of the banking sector, total loans 
and total deposits are well below the euro area average 
and, indeed, are below those in any of the euro area 
Member States. These new Member States have 
established domestic markets for money, bonds and 
equities, but these are small in both absolute terms and 
relative to GDP with a generally limited number of 
issuers and secondary market activity. In this respect 
also, their capital markets are relatively underdeveloped 
when compared to the euro area average and most of 
the individual euro area Member States. In contrast, 
Cyprus and Malta – both of which are established 
market economies with off-shore financial centres – 
have banking systems that are comparable to the euro 
area banking system in terms of GDP, but their capital 
markets are also comparably small and illiquid. 
7.1.1.3. Progress in financial integration 
7.1.1.3.1 Financial intermediaries 
Banking sector 
In Sweden, the banking system has become more 
concentrated over time and is characterised by a high 
degree of integration within the Nordic region – 
although Finland is the only euro area Member State 
involved.  
The Nordic banking sector is dominated by four 
Swedish banks – Handelsbanken, SEB, Nordea Bank 
Sverige and Föreningssparbaken – which account for a 
total of 85 percent of the region’s banking sector 
assets83. Integration within the banking system is set to 
intensify in the near term, with the decision by Nordea 
to establish as a single entity under the European 
Company Statute. In practical terms, this will mean that 
Nordea will transform from a subsidiary-based to a 
branch-based bank, which will have important 
implications for the functional organisation of the bank 
as well as for cross-border supervisory arrangements. 
Mortgage banks play a relatively important role in the 
Swedish banking system, holding about one third of the 
system’s total assets. 
                                                 
83  Sveriges Riksbank , “The Swedish Financial Market 2003”, 
available at www.riksbank.se. 
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The banking systems of the new Member States – 
particularly those of Central and Eastern Europe – are 
characterised by high degrees of foreign ownership, 
mainly originating in other EU Member States 
including those in the euro area. Foreign ownership of 
financial intermediaries is, in principle, a powerful 
driving force for financial integration. Although foreign 
ownership does not automatically imply convergence in 
financing systems across countries, the interaction of 
scale/scope economies and enhanced competition 
should ensure that the nature of financial products and 
services provided in the new Member States will 
converge with those provided elsewhere in the EU. 
While their strategies have varied, almost all of the new 
Member States have encouraged the involvement of 
strategic foreign investors in the privatisation and 
consolidation of their banking systems; this followed an 
initial phase of rapid expansion, poor supervision and 
macroeconomic instability, which in many cases 
resulted in severe financial crisis. Attracted by high 
margins and future growth prospects in the new 
Member States, foreign investment has helped to re-
capitalise the banking systems of the new Member 
States concerned, while transferring important expertise 
and technology84. Foreign ownership has ensured that 
                                                 
84  Slovenia is now the only new Member State in Central and 
Eastern Europe in which foreign-owned banks account for less 
than half of total assets and capital. The share of foreign-owned 
banks is very high (i.e. about 80 percent or more of total assets or 
capital) in Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary, and quite high in Latvia and Poland. Public banks have 
retained a significant share of the market only in Poland and 
Slovenia (with a share of about 25 percent of total assets). The 
presence of European and US banks in the new Member States is 
mostly in the form of subsidiaries or majority shareholders of 
listed domestic banks, with the main foreign investors coming 
the new Member States’ banking systems are now 
largely well capitalised, solvent and profitable, even if 
the share of non-performing loans remains higher than 
in other EU countries. Given the importance of banking 
as a component of the financial systems of the new 
Member States, this high degree of foreign ownership 
should be a major asset in sustaining a process of 
nominal and real convergence with the euro area. 
Facilitated by cross-ownership with euro area Member 
States, the share of euro-denominated bank loans and 
deposits in the new Member States is generally quite 
high. The share of foreign currency lending – mainly in 
euro – is notable in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Hungary. Only in the Czech Republic can the share of 
foreign currency loans in total be described as low. In 
some of the new Member States, foreign currency 
borrowing by the corporate and household sectors is 
substantially un-hedged, creating an exposure to the 
risk of an unanticipated devaluation in the domestic 
currency. On the deposit side, offshore activities are 
reflected in substantial foreign currency deposits  in 
Latvia, Cyprus and Malta. In the latter two new 
Member States, the activities of foreign-owned banks 
have been traditionally focussed on offshore activities, 
but some of these institutions have also begun to offer 
services in the domestic markets following the abolition 
of legal barriers. As a counterpart of business expansion
                                                                            
from Austria (e.g. Bank Austria/Creditanstalt, Erste Bank, 
Raiffeisen), Belgium (e.g. KBC), Italy (e.g. Unicredito, Banca 
Commerciale Italiana/Intesa), France (e.g. Société Générale), the 
Netherlands (e.g. ING), Germany (e.g. Commerzbank) and the 
United States (e.g. Citibank) while Swedish and Finnish banks 
(SEB, Nordea) are particularly active in the Baltic States. 
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Graph 7.3:  Insurance assets and insurance penetration
 to other countries – notably the Baltic States – the 
Swedish banking system’s lending to foreign banks and 
public has increased, accounting for about 20 percent of 
total lending. 
Insurance sector 
The Swedish insurance sector is large (with an 
insurance penetration at par with EU-15 and euro area 
levels). While many small local companies participate 
in the market, it is dominated by a small number of 
larger players. The insurance sector is expanding 
rapidly in the new Member States, but remains 
underdeveloped relative to the euro area as a whole. For 
instance, insurance penetration (i.e. premiums as a 
percentage of GDP) tends to be less than half of the 
euro area average, while the life insurance sector is still 
particularly underdeveloped despite a recent pick-up in 
growth. The Czech Republic and Slovenia have the 
most developed insurance sectors, while the low level 
of development of insurance in the Baltic States reflects 
the small size of their population (which has hindered 
growth and dissuaded foreign investment in the sector). 
However, the insurance sector in the new Member 
States is expected to grow rapidly over the coming 
years, driven by increasing per capita income and 
ageing of the population. Several large insurance 
companies from EU-15 countries have recently 
expanded into new Member States’ markets, and the 
Czech, Estonian, Slovak and Hungarian insurance 
sectors are almost entirely controlled by foreign 
insurers. The Cypriot insurance sector also has a 
substantial number of foreign participants. On the other 
hand, the largest insurance companies in Poland and 
Slovenia are owned in the main by local investors, 
while two large domestic banks dominate Malta’s small 
insurance sector. 
Pension funds 
In Sweden, assets under management by private 
pension funds remain small (some 3 percent of GDP), 
but the state-owned pension funds sector is large (about 
20 percent of GDP in terms of assets under 
management). Similarly, the scale of public pension 
systems in both Malta and Cyprus has left little room 
for the development of private occupational funds. 
Pension funds are developing quickly in most of the 
new Member States, although the level of pension fund 
assets in terms of GDP is still generally below the euro 
area average85. Pension funds are expected to become 
important financial intermediaries in the new Member 
States, amid reforms to domestic pension schemes. As 
the growth in pension funds’ assets under management 
accelerates, it is unclear whether domestic securities 
markets will be able to respond to such growth and 
there may be a need for increased investment in foreign 
assets. Pension funds in several new Member States 
have already invested substantially in foreign assets86. 
In these circumstances, increased investment in euro 
area assets is to be expected – particularly in countries 
with a peg to the euro or participating in ERM II – 
subject to any prudential restrictions. 
                                                 
85  The level of pension fund assets relative to GDP in the new 
Member States ranges from 0 percent in Lithuania to 5.2 percent 
in Hungary, with an average of 3.5 percent. This compares to an 
average of about 30 percent for the EU-15 and a high of 90 
percent in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
86 For example, 50 percent of pension funds are invested in foreign 
assets in Estonia, 12 percent in Latvia, although the ratio is less 
than 2 percent in Poland where restrictions are applied for 
prudential reasons. 
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Graph 7.4:  Basic characterisitics of bond markets
Mutual funds 
The Swedish mutual funds industry is large and diverse. 
In the new Member States, the assets of mutual funds 
relative to GDP remain below EU-15 and euro area 
levels, but the industry is expected to grow – albeit not 
as rapidly as the pension funds industry – in the coming 
years. Mutual funds may also suffer from a domestic 
asset constraint due to the undeveloped state of 
domestic capital markets and an increase in euro area 
investments would again be expected – subject to any 
prudential restrictions. 
Supervisory arrangements 
With progress in financial integration and the resulting 
inter-linkage of national financial systems, adequate 
supervision of financial institutions becomes a crucial 
element in safeguarding stability. Although the new 
Member States have significantly strengthened their 
financial supervisory arrangements in recent years, the 
growth and structural changes within their financial 
systems pose new challenges. The expansion in non-
banking intermediation calls for a further strengthening 
of insurance supervision and cross-sector cooperation 
among supervisors. In addition, the high level of 
foreign ownership in the financial systems of the new 
Member States and a typically high degree of market 
concentration calls for a further strengthening in cross-
border cooperation in financial supervision. 
7.1.1.3.2 Capital markets 
Fixed income markets 
Sweden’s fixed-income securities markets are 
comparably well-developed and internationally 
integrated, although they remain substantially less 
liquid than the corresponding euro-denominated 
markets. The Swedish debt market is among the smaller 
of the EU debt markets, but its size relative to GDP (89 
percent) is close to the average for EU-15 (111 percent) 
and euro area (115 percent). Central government and 
mortgage institutions issuers account for about 50 
percent and 40 percent of total issuance respectively, 
leaving only a small share to other issuers such as 
municipalities and corporations. Fixed income markets 
in the new Member States are generally small and 
illiquid. In terms of total amounts of securities 
outstanding at the end of 2002, the new Member States 
account for only 2 percent of the EU-25 markets. Only 
the three biggest markets in the new Member States, i.e. 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, are larger 
than the Irish market, which is currently the smallest in 
the euro area. On the other hand, the size of markets in 
the new Member States in terms of GDP is generally 
closer to the euro area average. A common feature of 
fixed-income markets in the new Member States is the 
dominance of central government issuance, which 
accounts for a share of between 80 percent and 100 
percent in most cases. Issuance by the private sector 
represents a significant share of total only in the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and Estonia. 
Expectations of future euro adoption have become a 
main driver of bond yields in the new Member States 
and yields have already converged significantly toward 
euro area levels. Expectations of euro adoption may 
also explain the share of the euro in issuance by the new 
Member States. Malta is the only new Member State 
not to have issued a euro-denominated bond and the 
share of euro-denominated debt is very high in some of
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Graph 7.5:  Some basic characteristics of the equity market
 the smaller new Member States – although outstanding 
debt is still denominated mainly in national currency in 
the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland 
and Slovakia. Meanwhile, Sweden has about a quarter 
of its debt in foreign currency and uses foreign 
exchange derivatives and foreign currency bonds 
(denominated notably euro and US dollars) to manage 
its foreign debt exposure. 
Equity markets 
The Swedish stock market is large and liquid and is 
integrated with its Nordic counterparts. In contrast, 
most of the equity markets in the new Member States 
are small and illiquid. Market capitalisation in terms of 
GDP is less than half of the euro area level for most of 
the new Member States and turnover is generally less 
than one sixth of the euro area level. However, levels of 
development vary widely among the new Member 
States. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have 
the largest markets in absolute terms, while Estonia, 
Malta and Cyprus have the largest markets in terms of 
GDP. In the new Member States of Central and Eastern 
Europe, equity markets were generally shaped by the 
choice of privatisation method. New Member States 
using the voucher privatisation method (e.g. the Czech 
Republic, Lithuania and Slovakia ) began with a large 
number of listed companies, which were gradually de-
listed for reasons of illiquidity. New Member States 
employing a case-by-case approach to privatisation 
(e.g. Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia) 
began with a small number of more liquid stocks, but 
these markets still have few actively traded companies. 
Stock markets in Malta and Cyprus are also relatively 
new, small and illiquid. 
The liquidity of new Member States’ domestic markets 
has however improved over time, supported by 
enhanced domestic regulation, relatively strong 
economic growth, improved corporate profitability, and 
increasing demand from institutional investors. In 
addition, a number of successful IPOs were recently 
recorded (including a foreign company on the Warsaw 
stock exchange). However, it is fair to say that equity 
markets in the new Member States have not yet 
established themselves as effective mechanisms for 
corporate sector financing. To acquire access to a wider 
investor base – and to cheaper capital – a significant 
number of companies in the new Member States have 
been cross-listing abroad87, mostly in New York and 
London and to a much lesser extent within the euro 
area. Meanwhile, several exchanges of the new Member 
States have entered strategic partnerships with other 
exchanges. For instance the Tallinn and Riga exchanges 
have been integrated into the HEX market alongside the 
Stockholm and Helsinki stock exchanges88. The 
Warsaw stock exchange has signed a cross-membership 
and cross-access agreement with Euronext. Stock 
markets from the new Member States are, therefore, 
increasingly integrated, via growing portfolio equity 
flows, as well as functionally. However, this integration 
is global and not specifically with the euro area. 
                                                 
87  Defined here to include dual-listing as well as listing only on an 
international exchange. 
88  As such, they are now part of the NOREX alliance connecting 
also the Copenhagen, Iceland and Oslo stock exchanges. 
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 7.1.1.4. Conclusion 
Although difficult to measure with accuracy, evidence 
suggests that financial integration between the Member 
States under review and the euro area is quite advanced. 
Foreign ownership in the banking sector is more 
established in Sweden and the new Member States than 
in most of the euro area Member States. This high 
degree of foreign ownership should help the new 
Member States in sustaining a process of nominal and 
real convergence toward the euro area, but points to a 
need for enhanced cross-border cooperation within the 
current arrangements for financial supervision. Issuance 
of fixed-income securities in euro is widespread among 
the new Member States and links with euro area equity 
markets have been established as part of a process of 
global integration. In addition, long-term government 
bond yields have already converged significantly 
toward euro area levels. 
7.1.2. Product market integration 
This section presents evidence on the development of 
product market integration of the ten new Member 
States and Sweden. The degree of integration of product 
markets plays an important role in examining real 
convergence of Member States. Moreover, increasing 
competition in product markets, which is a result of 
continuing integration, can help enhance the efficiency 
of Member States’ economies and thus improve their 
adaptability to asymmetric shocks. Integration of 
product markets is assessed through trade, FDI and 
M&A activity and a smooth functioning of the Internal 
Market. The focus is predominantly on the situation in 
the new Member States. Given that the degree of 
product market integration is a slow-moving 
characteristic and that the situation of Sweden was 
extensively analysed in the 2002 Convergence Report, 
the section only provides updates on product market 
integration in Sweden where necessary. 
The new Member States have experienced considerable 
structural change and convergence towards the EU-15 
over the last 15 years. This is due to the transition to 
fully-fledged market economies in general and to the 
process of integration with the EU in particular. The 
intensive trade and investment links with the EU-15 
have played an essential role in this respect. Adoption 
and application of Internal Market acquis have created 
initial conditions for satisfactory integration of the new 
Member States into the Internal Market although 
considerable effort is still needed to ensure its smooth 
functioning in the enlarged EU. Structural reforms have 
improved the competitiveness of the new Member 
States’ economies and contributed to increasing the 
level of competition. As documented in the 2002 
Convergence Report, Sweden is well integrated in the 
European economy and this process has continued in 
the most recent period. 
7.1.2.1. Trade and FDI 
The new Member States are all open economies. Their 
trade openness, defined as average imports and exports 
divided by GDP, is high and most of them trade more 
intensively than the average small EU countries. The 
trade openness of Poland, which shares characteristics 
of large economies, exceeds the average for the other 
large Member States. Due to its special situation, 
Cyprus trades relatively little in goods but its openness 
increases considerably once trade in services is taken 
into account, because of the large contribution from 
tourism (see Graph 7.6). 
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Graph 7.6:  Trade openness - goods (2001-2003)
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The EU-15 is the major trading partner for most of the 
new Member States. Trade flows with the EU-15 have 
been progressively increasing over the last decade as a 
result of the continuous removal of barriers to trade in 
the context of integration into the Internal Market and 
also the general catching-up process of these countries. 
It can be expected that this link will be further 
strengthened as a result of EU membership and the 
related removal of the remaining barriers to trade. The 
Graph 7.7 indicates that already now many new 
Member States belong to the best performers in the EU 
in terms of intra-EU trade (in goods and services) as a 
share of GDP. The highest potential for increases in 
intra-EU trade lies within the services sector, as the 
share of services in intra-EU trade is on average lower 
in the new Member States. Sweden’s share of intra-EU 
trade in goods as a percentage of GDP has declined 
over the last two years in line with the overall trend in 
EU-15. Although this ratio is roughly the same as in the 
neighbouring economies of Denmark and Finland, it is 
considerably lower than the average for small EU 
Member States. 
The structure of trade between the new Member States 
and the EU-15 has changed significantly since the 
beginning of the transition. The share of intra-industry 
trade has been increasing, further underlining the high 
degree of integration of the new Member States in the 
European economy. In general, the share of exports of 
labour-intensive industrial branches and energy-
intensive branches has declined while the share of 
capital-, R&D- and skill-intensive branches has 
increased89. This process has been most pronounced in 
Hungary and to a lesser degree in the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Slovakia. The smaller countries seem to 
have a more specialised production structure, which is 
reflected in a narrower range of export products e.g. in 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. Nonetheless, there 
is some evidence that, although the share of intra-
industry trade is increasing, the new Member States 
generally specialise in lower value-added activities 
while the EU-15 specialise in the higher value-added 
activities. 
                                                 
89 Landesmann, M. (2003), “Structural features of economic 
integration in an Enlarged Europe: patterns of catching-up and 
industrial specialisation”, European Economy No 181. 
Chapter 7 
Additional factors 
123
 
Graph 7.7:  Intra-EU trade (2002)
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Another indicator that acts as a good proxy for the 
extent of product market integration is the intensity of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. FDI has played 
an important role in the new Member States in the 
transition. Most importantly, FDI acted as a means of 
the technology, organisational- and managerial-skill 
transfer, and contributed to the structural change in the 
new Member States’ economies. Furthermore, it 
allowed the new Member States to gain easier access to 
European and other world markets. Finally, FDI flows 
have helped significantly to cover the high current 
account deficits which have been an accompanying 
feature of the transition process. A large part of the FDI 
flows into the new Member States has been due to the 
privatisation of state-owned assets. However, the share 
of greenfield investment has also picked up and in some 
countries reached considerable levels. This is especially 
the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, due to 
several large scale investments. In recent years, the 
share of reinvested earnings in the total FDI volume has 
been increasing. 
Most of the new Member States have experienced large 
FDI inflows since the mid-1990s. In general, FDI 
transactions experienced a sustained growth since the 
mid-1990s, although at a decreasing pace. The EU-15 
Member States account for around ¾ of the FDI stocks 
invested in the new Member States and this share has 
increased considerably since the mid-1990s. Despite the 
significant slowdown of FDI extra-EU-15 flows over 
the recent years, the volume of inward flows into the 
new Member States from the EU-15 has remained 
steady. 
There is considerable variation among the new Member 
States in terms of volumes of FDI inflows and their 
time profile. This points to differences in the catching-
up and also the privatisation process. Around 80 percent 
of FDI inflows since mid-1990s in the new Member 
States have been directed to the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland. In terms of the ratio of FDI to 
GDP, the highest ranking countries have been the 
Czech Republic, Estonia and Malta. On the other hand, 
Cyprus and Slovenia have attracted relatively little 
foreign investment. Sweden has been a favourite 
destination of FDI flows over recent years, with one of 
the highest rankings in the EU (see Graph 7.8). 
The intensive FDI links and increasing integration in 
the Internal Market are further confirmed by increasing 
M&A activity with the EU-25 as measured by both the 
number and the average value of deals. This rising trend 
has been interrupted in 2003 as a result of adverse 
economic conditions. 
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Graph 7.8: Total FDI inflows (as % of GDP, average 1995-2003)
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7.1.2.2. Implementation of the Internal Market 
In many new Member States the framework for 
competition in product markets is relatively well-
developed, as their economies have been opened up to 
international competition. While the new Member 
States have made encouraging headway in 
strengthening competition rules and establishing 
independent competition and regulatory authorities, 
there is still some way to go. 
The progress of integration of the new Member States 
into the EU economy can be documented by the 
continuing convergence of prices towards the 
considerably higher levels in the EU-15. Consumer 
prices in the new Member States have risen 
significantly in the past years and this may continue due 
to the catching-up process and the deregulation of 
administered prices. As a result, price convergence in 
the new Member States has been faster than in the EU-
15 (see Graph 7.9). A moderating effect on the 
consumer price level is expected from increased 
competition through imports and the development of 
more efficiently functioning domestic product markets. 
As a result of the significant progress made in opening 
up the product markets to competition, both from within 
and from outside the country, Sweden’s price level has 
decreased somewhat but still remains one of the highest 
in the EU. This high relative price level may be partly 
attributed to the high levels of indirect taxation in 
Sweden, but more importantly to a lack of competition 
in certain sectors, such as the retail and distribution of 
pharmaceuticals and food retailing. 
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Graph 7.9 : Price convergence between EU Member States
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 p
C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 o
f v
ar
ia
tio
n 
of
 re
la
tiv
e 
pr
ic
e 
le
ve
ls
 o
f p
riv
at
e 
fin
al
 c
on
su
m
p
in
cl
ud
in
g 
in
di
re
ct
 ta
xe
s 
(%
)
Convergence EU 15 Convergence Eurozone Convergence EU 25
 
 
The smooth functioning of the Internal Market in the 
new Member States might be to some extent hindered 
by high deficits in transposing and applying the Internal 
Market directives. The new Member States have on 
average much higher implementation deficits than the 
EU-15 Member States. However, in this respect there 
are also important disparities among the new Member 
States. On the one hand, Lithuania has a notification 
deficit of a mere 0.8 percent, placing it among the best 
performers in the whole  
EU-25. Poland and to some extent Slovenia are also 
doing rather well. On the other hand, some new 
Member States failed to notify the transposition of a 
significant part of Internal Market legislation, with 
Malta, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Cyprus being the 
worst performers90. 
Sweden’s implementation deficit of 1.8 percent places 
the country in the seventh place among the EU-15 and 
Sweden remains short of the 1.5 percent Lisbon target 
set for the implementation deficit. 
                                                 
90 These figures might to some extent overstate the transposition 
deficit where the national implementing measures have been 
adopted but have not yet been notified due to the short time since 
the notification obligation came into force (May 2004). In order to 
gain more precise information, the new Member States have been 
invited to report what they consider to be the state of 
implementation. The results of this self-assessment exercise give a 
roughly similar picture to the notification figures. Lithuania and 
Slovenia rank in the top places in both exercises, while Malta, 
Slovakia, Cyprus, Poland and the Czech Republic fare the worst, 
as each of them has more than 250 directives not transposed. On 
the other hand, the implementation record might be overstated in 
some cases since the European Commission has not yet been able 
to verify whether all the notified measures fully transpose the 
Internal Market directives. 
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Graph 7.10:  Transposition deficit (May 2004)
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 7.2. Situation and development of the 
current account of the balance of 
payments91 
Eight out of the eleven Member States reviewed in this 
report are economies that went through a process of 
transformation from central planning to market 
economy. This process was associated with a large 
initial decline of GDP and an important reorientation of 
trade, in particular exports, from the former eastern 
block towards the OECD area. As a result, current 
accounts in the countries concerned recorded only 
moderate deficits, or even turned positive, at the very 
beginning of the 1990s. 
The overall surge of economic activity towards the 
middle of the 1990s, including a progressive 
resumption of investment activity, explains the 
progressive widening of the current account deficits in 
the transition economies.  
                                                 
91  It should be noted that in most of the countries, the methodology 
used for the collection of statistical data has been progressively 
adjusted and harmonised with EU standards. Thus, comparable 
data for some countries are only available for the most recent 
period. 
 
In this period, the new Member States also liberalised 
transactions on the current and capital accounts. 
Financing of the current account shifted from loans and 
transfers from official lenders such as the IMF to 
private capital, mostly foreign direct investment and, in 
some cases, debt-creating flows. With the progressively 
widening current account imbalances leading to 
increasing doubts about current account sustainability, 
capital flows started to reverse and provoked in some 
countries adjustments to their exchange rate regimes 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia). The 
impact of the 1998 Russian crisis and of the economic 
slowdown contributed to an overall decrease of current 
account deficits in the late 1990s in most of the 
countries, with the exception of Hungary and Poland. 
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Table 7.2
Current account of the balance of payments
(national accounts definition, as percentage of GDP)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
CZ -2.2 -2.7 -4.9 -5.4 -5.6 -6.2
EE -8.6 -4.4 -5.5 -5.6 -10.2 -13.2
CY -- -- -- -3.4 -4.7 -3.6
LV -9.7 -8.9 -6.5 -8.9 -6.9 -8.6
LT -11.7 -11.0 -5.9 -4.7 -5.2 -6.9
HU -7.2 -7.8 -8.7 -6.2 -7.1 -8.9
MT -6.2 -3.4 -13.5 -4.5 -1.1 -5.9
PL -4.1 -7.6 -6.0 -2.9 -2.7 -2.0
SI -0.6 -3.3 -2.8 0.2 1.4 0.1
SK -9.6 -5.7 -3.5 -8.4 -8.0 -0.9
SE 3.9 4.3 4.1 4.4 5.4 6.4
Source : Eurostat and various national sources  
 
More recently, the slowdown of economic growth in the 
EU together with a stronger growth momentum in most 
of the new Member States led to a gradual widening of 
the current account deficits in six out of the eleven 
Member States reviewed (Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Malta). In the same 
period, Slovenia’s current account went into surplus; 
Poland and Cyprus saw their deficit narrowing and 
Slovakia experienced a sharp deficit reduction in 2003. 
The recent deterioration, where it occurred, generally 
looks more benign compared to the sustainability 
problems recorded by some countries in the 1990s. The 
recent current account widening in the Baltic States has 
been associated with strong investment activity 
underlying the catching-up process. The overall 
coverage of the current account deficit by foreign direct 
investment has also been high in recent years, even 
though it substantially decreased in some countries in 
2003. While developments in the trade balance, in 
particular goods, were better due to stronger export 
performance, a progressive deterioration of the income 
balance was observed resulting from the increase of 
negative net international investment positions. The 
impact of the negative income balance has been 
particularly high in Estonia and the Czech Republic, 
important in Hungary and Lithuania and contained in 
Latvia and Malta. 
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 Table 7.3
Net foreign direct investment
(national accounts definition, as percentage of GDP)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
CZ 6.3 11.4 8.9 9.0 11.2 2.6
EE 10.2 3.9 6.0 5.7 2.2 8.3
CY -- -- -- 7.6 5.9 3.9
LV 4.6 4.6 5.2 1.8 4.1 3.0
LT 8.3 4.4 3.3 3.6 5.1 0.8
HU 6.5 6.4 4.6 6.9 4.0 1.1
MT 7.2 21.4 16.9 7.2 -11.1 7.8
PL 3.6 4.4 5.7 3.1 2.0 1.8
SI 1.1 0.3 0.4 1.2 6.9 -0.5
SK 1.9 3.5 10.1 7.0 16.3 1.8
SE -1.9 15.3 -7.2 2.5 0.4 -2.4
Source : Eurostat and various national sources  
 
Over the whole period, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
has played an important role not only for the financing 
of the current account deficits, but through its typical 
import-triggering effect, it also contributed to their 
creation. The importance of foreign investments for the 
financing of the current account in the new Member 
States in general alleviates concerns about 
sustainability, since FDI stocks tend to be more stable 
than short-term capital. Recently, in a number of 
countries, the current account deficits have been 
increased by profits realised by the foreign-owned 
sector. To the extent that they are reinvested and not 
repatriated, these earnings (recorded on the income 
balance) mitigate foreign exchange pressures 
potentially generated by large current account deficits. 
Their importance, however, points to a risk of 
potentially large swings in FDI flows and should not be 
overlooked. 
In considering the recent current account developments 
in the new Member States, four groups of countries can 
be identified. 
- The first group only includes Slovenia, which 
has a long tradition of a balanced current 
account with the exception of the 1999-2000 
period, when  buoyant domestic demand led to 
a temporary deterioration of the external 
balance. Slovenia has recorded a current 
account in balance or in surplus in the last 
three years, a feature quite unusual among the 
new Member States and partly explained by 
the continuous depreciation of the tolar against 
the DEM and the euro. Until 2003, Slovenia 
also recorded relatively modest, albeit positive, 
net foreign direct investment inflows, with the 
exception of 2002, when banking privatisation 
and a large sale to foreign investors in the 
pharmaceutical sector boosted foreign direct 
investment to close to 7 percent of GDP. As a 
result of higher investments by Slovenian 
firms abroad, foreign direct investment turned 
negative for the first time in 2003. 
 
- The second group of countries includes 
Cyprus, Poland and Slovakia, which are 
economies with generally low current account 
deficits.  
It is difficult to assess the medium-term 
developments of the current account of Cyprus 
due to methodological revisions92. The small 
size of the economy and its openness to the 
rest of the world explain in part the observed 
volatility of the current account deficit, which 
peaked in 1998. Recently, the current account 
deficit narrowed, mostly as a result of a 
progressively improving world economic 
                                                 
92  The Cypriot current account deficit has been marked by an 
important methodological revision introduced in 2002 and so far 
implemented to the historical time-series since 2001. Its most 
important feature was the inclusion of the large foreign business 
sector having  physical presence in Cyprus in the residents’ 
category, which significantly boosted  exports of services and at 
the same time led to a highly negative income balance. 
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environment which boosted exports of 
services. The Cypriot current account deficit is 
to an increasing extent financed by foreign 
direct investment, the reporting of which has, 
however, also been affected by methodological 
revisions.  
 
Following a progressive deterioration of the 
Polish current account in the 1990s, the deficit 
narrowed from its peak of over 7 percent of 
GDP in 1999 to 2 percent in 2003. Important 
factors included sluggish domestic demand and 
a progressively improving cost and 
competitiveness position, linked to a sustained 
effective depreciation of the Polish zloty and to 
rising productivity.  
 
The Slovak current account also improved 
substantially from persistently high deficit 
levels above 5 percent of GDP since 1996 
(with the exception of 2000) to a deficit below 
one percent in 2003. The reduction was 
associated with a strong growth of exports, 
made possible by recent large foreign direct 
investment, and to very subdued domestic 
demand. 
 
 
- The third group of countries includes the 
Czech Republic, Lithuania and Malta,, i.e. 
countries with relatively large current account 
deficits, but where sustainability appears to be 
less of an issue.  
 
The Czech current account deteriorated rapidly 
in the mid-1990s from a surplus to a deficit of 
above 7 percent prior to the 1997 economic 
downturn. The ensuing strong drop of GDP 
growth led to a sharp correction of the external 
imbalance in 1998. Since then, the current 
account deficit has shown a slow but 
continuous deterioration peaking at over 6 
percent in 2003. However, the structure of the 
deficit has changed. An improving export 
performance linked to a higher non-price 
competitiveness of the Czech economy led to a 
continuous narrowing of the negative balance 
of trade in goods which had been behind the 
substantial deficits in 1996 and 1997. The 
recent increase of the current account deficit is 
mainly due to a widening income balance, 
associated with reinvested profit earnings 
linked to past inflows of foreign investment. 
The current account of Lithuania deteriorated 
between 1996 and 1998 due to 
competitiveness losses caused by wage growth 
outpacing productivity, fiscal imbalances and 
an appreciation of the nominal effective 
exchange rate caused, in part, by depreciations 
of the currencies of the countries of the 
Community of Independent States. The deficit 
subsequently narrowed considerably from 
2000 onwards in the context of the economic 
slowdown following the Russian crisis. The 
adjustment was also helped by fiscal 
consolidation and a low growth of unit labour 
costs. As was the case in some other countries, 
the deterioration from some 5 percent in 2002 
to close to 7 percent in 2003 was mainly 
associated with a negative income balance due 
to reinvested earnings. While foreign direct 
investment has been around 4 percent or 
higher since 1998, the end of the privatisation 
process led to a substantial lowering of foreign 
direct investment in 2003 and an increased 
share of debt-creating instruments in financing 
of the current account deficit.  
 
Malta has traditionally had a fairly volatile 
current account, reflecting the strong impact of 
one-off operations on its small economy. The 
current account deficit ballooned from less 
than 4 percent in 1999 to over 13 percent in 
2000, before receding to a mere 1 percent in 
2002. The external balance worsened again to 
close to 6 percent of GDP in 2003, on the back 
of a deterioration in both the trade and the 
service balance. Foreign direct investment 
inflows are relatively strong, but tend to be 
volatile year-on-year; in 2003, the external 
deficit was more than fully financed by foreign 
direct investment inflows in the order of 8 
percent of GDP. 
 
- Lastly, Estonia, Hungary and Latvia have 
faced large current account deficits. While this 
does not automatically imply a sustainability 
problem, external sector developments deserve 
close monitoring in the three countries. 
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 Estonia’s current account has been in deficit 
since 1992 and the gap reached 13.2 percent of 
GDP in 2003. The progressive widening of the 
deficit – which was interrupted only in 1999 as 
a consequence of the recession in the aftermath 
of the 1998 Russian crisis - mainly reflects the 
momentum of the catching-up process of the 
Estonian economy and in particular a strong 
investment performance not matched by 
domestic private savings. More recently, the 
current account deficit has also been boosted 
by a strongly negative income balance, 
reflecting the importance of reinvested profits 
by the foreign-owned sector. Foreign direct 
investment coverage of the current account 
deficit has considerably fluctuated over the 
past ten years, mostly reflecting the impact of 
large investment projects and privatisation. As 
a result, gross external indebtedness has also 
increased, reaching 75 percent of GDP in 
2003. 
In Hungary, following a progressive 
deterioration between 1997 and 2000, the 
current account deficit improved in 2001 
following the economic slowdown. A 
domestic demand pick-up boosted by 
significant wage increases resulted in a 
subsequent widening of the deficit to some 9 
percent in 2003. As foreign investment 
progressively slowed down from a peak in 
1996, the net foreign direct investment 
coverage of the current account deficit also 
progressively narrowed and became close to 
inexistent in 2003. As a result, the bulk of the 
deficit was financed by debt-creating 
instruments, primarily public debt issues. 
The external position of Latvia has also been 
progressively deteriorating between 1995 and 
1998, when it turned from a surplus into a 
deficit of almost 10 percent of GDP. Since 
1999, the external position has persistently 
been in deficit, reaching over 8 percent in 
2003, and is expected to remain high in the 
near future. The deficit primarily reflects a 
large trade balance gap triggered by strong 
growth of domestic investment demand linked 
to the restructuring process. Until recently, the 
current account deficit has been to a large 
extent financed by foreign direct investment 
inflows, but their importance is progressively 
diminishing as privatisation and other big 
investment opportunities become fewer. In 
2003, debt-creating financing has been the 
most important source of coverage of the 
current account deficit. 
In the 1970s and 1980s Sweden emerged as a 
significant international net debtor because a 
combination of low private and public saving and 
recurring competitiveness problems created substantial 
current account deficits. Sweden’s position changed 
after the deep recession at the beginning of the 1990s. 
The large depreciation in November 1992 and 
continued depressed private domestic demand, in 
combination with consolidation of public finances, 
generated large current account surpluses. The current 
account surplus remained substantial at above 4 percent 
of GDP between 2002 and 2003, signalling 
continuously strong external competitiveness of the 
Swedish economy. 
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Graph 7.11 : Current account - Net international investment position
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